§241ΞΕ. καὶ λόγος οἶμαι ψευδὴς οὕτω κατὰ ταὐτὰ νομισθήσεται τά τε ὄντα λέγων μὴ εἶναι καὶ τὰ μὴ ὄντα εἶναι.
STR. And false speech, I think, will in this way, according to the same things, be considered to be that which says that things that are are not, and that things that are not are.
ΘΕΑΙ. πῶς γὰρ ἂν ἄλλως τοιοῦτος γένοιτο;
THEAI. For how else could it become such?
ΞΕ. σχεδὸν οὐδαμῶς· ἀλλὰ ταῦτα ὁ σοφιστὴς οὐ φήσει.
STR. Scarcely in any way; but the sophist will deny these things.
ἢ τίς μηχανὴ συγχωρεῖν τινα τῶν εὖ φρονούντων, ὅταν προσδιωμολογημένα ᾖ τὰ πρὸ τούτων ὁμολογηθέντα;
Or what means is there for anyone of sound mind to agree, when the things agreed upon before these have been further acknowledged?
μανθάνομεν, ὦ Θεαίτητε, ἃ λέγει;
Do we understand, O Theaetetus, what he says?
ΘΕΑΙ. πῶς γὰρ οὐ μανθάνομεν ὅτι τἀναντία φήσει λέγειν ἡμᾶς τοῖς νυνδή, ψευδῆ τολμήσαντας εἰπεῖν ὡς ἔστιν ἐν δόξαις τε καὶ κατὰ λόγους;
THEAI. How could we not understand? For he will say that we are saying things contrary to what we said just now, since we dared to say that falsehood exists in opinions and in speeches.
τῷ γὰρ μὴ ὄντι τὸ ὂν προσάπτειν ἡμᾶς πολλάκις ἀναγκάζεσθαι, διομολογησαμένους νυνδὴ τοῦτο εἶναι πάντων ἀδυνατώτατον.
For he will say we are forced to attach being to not-being many times, though we just now agreed that this is the most impossible of all things.
ΞΕ. ὀρθῶς ἀπεμνημόνευσας.
STR. You have remembered correctly.
ἀλλʼ ὅρα δὴ τί χρὴ δρᾶν τοῦ σοφιστοῦ πέρι· τὰς γὰρ ἀντιλήψεις καὶ ἀπορίας, ἐὰν αὐτὸν διερευνῶμεν ἐν τῇ τῶν ψευδουργῶν καὶ γοήτων τέχνῃ τιθέντες, ὁρᾷς ὡς εὔποροι καὶ πολλαί.
But see now what we must do about the sophist; for you see how easy to find and how numerous are the objections and difficulties, if we search him out by placing him in the art of falsehood-makers and wizards.
ΘΕΑΙ. καὶ μάλα.
THEAI. Very much so.
ΞΕ. μικρὸν μέρος τοίνυν αὐτῶν διεληλύθαμεν, οὐσῶν ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν ἀπεράντων.
STR. We have traversed, then, only a small part of them, although they are, so to speak, infinite.
ΘΕΑΙ. ἀδύνατόν γʼ ἄν, ὡς ἔοικεν, εἴη τὸν σοφιστὴν ἑλεῖν, εἰ ταῦτα οὕτως ἔχει.
THEAI. It would indeed, as it seems, be impossible to catch the sophist, if these things are so.
ΞΕ. τί οὖν;
STR. What then?
οὕτως ἀποστησόμεθα νῦν μαλθακισθέντες;
Shall we now shrink back and stand aloof in this way?
ΘΕΑΙ. οὔκουν ἔγωγέ φημι δεῖν, εἰ καὶ κατὰ σμικρὸν οἷοί τʼ ἐπιλαβέσθαι πῃ τἀνδρός ἐσμεν.
THEAI. I certainly do not say we should, if we are able in any way to lay hold of the man, even to a small degree.
ΞΕ. ἕξεις οὖν συγγνώμην καὶ καθάπερ νῦν εἶπες ἀγαπήσεις ἐάν πῃ καὶ κατὰ βραχὺ παρασπασώμεθα οὕτως ἰσχυροῦ λόγου;
STR. Will you then forgive me and, just as you have now said, be content if we can somehow pull ourselves away, even slightly, from so powerful an argument?
ΘΕΑΙ. πῶς γὰρ οὐχ ἕξω;
THEAI. How indeed should I not?
ΞΕ. τόδε τοίνυν ἔτι μᾶλλον παραιτοῦμαί σε.
STR. This further thing, then, I beg of you even more.
ΘΕΑΙ. τὸ ποῖον;
THEAI. What sort of thing?
ΞΕ. μή με οἷον πατραλοίαν ὑπολάβῃς γίγνεσθαί τινα.
STR. That you do not suppose me to become a sort of parricide.
ΘΕΑΙ. τί δή;
THEAI. Why so?
ΞΕ. τὸν τοῦ πατρὸς Παρμενίδου λόγον ἀναγκαῖον ἡμῖν ἀμυνομένοις ἔσται βασανίζειν, καὶ βιάζεσθαι τό τε μὴ ὂν ὡς ἔστι κατά τι καὶ τὸ ὂν αὖ πάλιν ὡς οὐκ ἔστι πῃ.
STR. Because it will be necessary for us, in self-defense, to put the argument of our father Parmenides to the test, and to force both that which is not in some way to be, and in turn, that which is in some way not to be.
ΘΕΑΙ. φαίνεται τὸ τοιοῦτον διαμαχετέον ἐν τοῖς λόγοις.
THEAI. It seems that such a point must be fought out in our arguments.
ΞΕ. πῶς γὰρ οὐ φαίνεται καὶ τὸ λεγόμενον δὴ τοῦτο τυφλῷ;
STR. How indeed does it not appear, as the saying goes, even to a blind man?
τούτων γὰρ μήτʼ ἐλεγχθέντων μήτε ὁμολογηθέντων σχολῇ ποτέ τις οἷός τε ἔσται περὶ λόγων ψευδῶν λέγων ἢ δόξης, εἴτε εἰδώλων εἴτε εἰκόνων εἴτε μιμημάτων εἴτε φαντασμάτων αὐτῶν, ἢ καὶ περὶ τεχνῶν τῶν ὅσαι περὶ ταῦτά εἰσι, μὴ καταγέλαστος εἶναι τά γʼ ἐναντία ἀναγκαζόμενος αὑτῷ λέγειν.
For unless these things are either refuted or agreed upon, anyone speaking about false speeches or opinion, whether about images or likenesses or imitations or their appearances themselves, or about any of the arts concerned with these, will scarcely ever be able to avoid being ridiculous, when he is forced to contradict himself.
ΘΕΑΙ. ἀληθέστατα.
THEAI. Most true.
§242ΞΕ. διὰ ταῦτα μέντοι τολμητέον ἐπιτίθεσθαι τῷ πατρικῷ λόγῳ νῦν, ἢ τὸ παράπαν ἐατέον, εἰ τοῦτό τις εἴργει δρᾶν ὄκνος.
STR. For these reasons, then, we must dare to lay hands on our father's argument now, or we must abandon it altogether, if some hesitation prevents us from doing this.
ΘΕΑΙ. ἀλλʼ ἡμᾶς τοῦτό γε μηδὲν μηδαμῇ εἴρξῃ.
THEAI. But let nothing of the sort prevent us in any way.
ΞΕ. τρίτον τοίνυν ἔτι σε σμικρόν τι παραιτήσομαι.
STR. Then I will beg of you yet a third small thing.
ΘΕΑΙ. λέγε μόνον.
THEAI. Only speak.
ΞΕ. εἶπόν που νυνδὴ λέγων ὡς πρὸς τὸν περὶ ταῦτʼ ἔλεγχον ἀεί τε ἀπειρηκὼς ἐγὼ τυγχάνω καὶ δὴ καὶ τὰ νῦν.
STR. I said, I suppose, just now in speaking that I always happen to have despaired of the refutation concerning these things, and especially so now.
ΘΕΑΙ. εἶπες.
THEAI. You said so.
ΞΕ. φοβοῦμαι δὴ τὰ εἰρημένα, μή ποτε διὰ ταῦτά σοι μανικὸς εἶναι δόξω παρὰ πόδα μεταβαλὼν ἐμαυτὸν ἄνω καὶ κάτω.
STR. I fear, indeed, because of what has been said, lest I may seem to you to be mad, turning myself upside down on the spot.
σὴν γὰρ δὴ χάριν ἐλέγχειν τὸν λόγον ἐπιθησόμεθα, ἐάνπερ ἐλέγχωμεν.
For it is for your sake, indeed, that we shall undertake to refute the argument, if indeed we refute it.
ΘΕΑΙ. ὡς τοίνυν ἔμοιγε μηδαμῇ δόξων μηδὲν πλημμελεῖν, ἂν ἐπὶ τὸν ἔλεγχον τοῦτον καὶ τὴν ἀπόδειξιν ἴῃς, θαρρῶν ἴθι τούτου γε ἕνεκα.
THEAI. Since, then, you will by no means seem to me to be doing anything wrong if you proceed to this refutation and demonstration, go forward with confidence as far as this is concerned.
ΞΕ. φέρε δή, τίνα ἀρχήν τις ἂν ἄρξαιτο παρακινδυνευτικοῦ λόγου;
STR. Come then, what beginning might one make of a hazardous argument?
δοκῶ μὲν γὰρ τήνδʼ, ὦ παῖ, τὴν ὁδὸν ἀναγκαιοτάτην ἡμῖν εἶναι τρέπεσθαι.
For I think, my boy, that this is the most necessary path for us to turn to.
ΘΕΑΙ. ποίαν δή;
THEAI. Which path indeed?
ΞΕ. τὰ δοκοῦντα νῦν ἐναργῶς ἔχειν ἐπισκέψασθαι πρῶτον μή πῃ τεταραγμένοι μὲν ὦμεν περὶ ταῦτα, ῥᾳδίως δʼ ἀλλήλοις ὁμολογῶμεν ὡς εὐκρινῶς ἔχοντες.
STR. To examine first the things that now seem to be clear, lest we should somehow be in confusion about them, while easily agreeing with one another as if we were clear about them.
ΘΕΑΙ. λέγε σαφέστερον ὃ λέγεις.
THEAI. Say more clearly what you mean.
ΞΕ. εὐκόλως μοι δοκεῖ Παρμενίδης ἡμῖν διειλέχθαι καὶ πᾶς ὅστις πώποτε ἐπὶ κρίσιν ὥρμησε τοῦ τὰ ὄντα διορίσασθαι πόσα τε καὶ ποῖά ἐστιν.
STR. Parmenides seems to me to have discussed with us very easily, and anyone whoever set out to define the things that are, as to how many and of what sort they are.
ΘΕΑΙ. πῇ;
THEAI. In what way?
ΞΕ. μῦθόν τινα ἕκαστος φαίνεταί μοι διηγεῖσθαι παισὶν ὡς οὖσιν ἡμῖν, ὁ μὲν ὡς τρία τὰ ὄντα, πολεμεῖ δὲ ἀλλήλοις ἐνίοτε αὐτῶν ἄττα πῃ, τοτὲ δὲ καὶ φίλα γιγνόμενα γάμους τε καὶ τόκους καὶ τροφὰς τῶν ἐκγόνων παρέχεται· δύο δὲ ἕτερος εἰπών, ὑγρὸν καὶ ξηρὸν ἢ θερμὸν καὶ ψυχρόν, συνοικίζει τε αὐτὰ καὶ ἐκδίδωσι·
STR. Each of them seems to me to tell some myth to us as if we were children: one saying that the things that are are three, and that some of them sometimes fight with one another, and at other times become friendly and bring about marriages, births, and the rearing of their offspring; and another saying there are two—wet and dry, or hot and cold—marries them off and makes them live together.
τὸ δὲ παρʼ ἡμῖν Ἐλεατικὸν ἔθνος, ἀπὸ Ξενοφάνους τε καὶ ἔτι πρόσθεν ἀρξάμενον, ὡς ἑνὸς ὄντος τῶν πάντων καλουμένων οὕτω διεξέρχεται τοῖς μύθοις.
And our Eleatic tribe, starting from Xenophanes and even earlier, goes through their myths on the assumption that what are called 'all things' are one.
Ἰάδες δὲ καὶ Σικελαί τινες ὕστερον Μοῦσαι συνενόησαν ὅτι συμπλέκειν ἀσφαλέστατον ἀμφότερα καὶ λέγειν ὡς τὸ ὂν πολλά τε καὶ ἕν ἐστιν, ἔχθρᾳ δὲ καὶ φιλίᾳ συνέχεται.
But certain Ionian and Sicilian Muses later perceived that it is safest to weave both together and to say that what is is both many and one, and is held together by enmity and friendship.