§236ΞΕ. οὔκουν ὅσοι γε τῶν μεγάλων πού τι πλάττουσιν ἔργων ἢ γράφουσιν.
STR. Not those, at least, who sculpt or paint any large works.
εἰ γὰρ ἀποδιδοῖεν τὴν τῶν καλῶν ἀληθινὴν συμμετρίαν, οἶσθʼ ὅτι σμικρότερα μὲν τοῦ δέοντος τὰ ἄνω, μείζω δὲ τὰ κάτω φαίνοιτʼ ἂν διὰ τὸ τὰ μὲν πόρρωθεν, τὰ δʼ ἐγγύθεν ὑφʼ ἡμῶν ὁρᾶσθαι.
For if they were to reproduce the true proportion of beautiful things, you know that the upper parts would appear smaller than they should, and the lower parts larger, because the former are seen by us from far off, and the latter from close at hand.
ΘΕΑΙ. πάνυ μὲν οὖν.
THEAI. Yes, absolutely.
ΞΕ. ἆρʼ οὖν οὐ χαίρειν τὸ ἀληθὲς ἐάσαντες οἱ δημιουργοὶ νῦν οὐ τὰς οὔσας συμμετρίας ἀλλὰ τὰς δοξούσας εἶναι καλὰς τοῖς εἰδώλοις ἐναπεργάζονται;
STR. Is it not then the case that, bidding farewell to the truth, craftsmen nowadays produce in their images not the real proportions, but those that will appear to be beautiful?
ΘΕΑΙ. παντάπασί γε.
THEAI. Quite so.
ΞΕ. τὸ μὲν ἄρα ἕτερον οὐ δίκαιον, εἰκός γε ὄν, εἰκόνα καλεῖν;
STR. Is it not then just to call the one, since it is like, a likeness?
ΘΕΑΙ. ναί.
THEAI. Yes.
ΞΕ. καὶ τῆς γε μιμητικῆς τὸ ἐπὶ τούτῳ μέρος κλητέον ὅπερ εἴπομεν ἐν τῷ πρόσθεν, εἰκαστικήν;
STR. And must we not call the part of the imitative art that is concerned with this, as we said before, the likeness-making art?
ΘΕΑΙ. κλητέον.
THEAI. It must be so called.
ΞΕ. τί δέ;
STR.
τὸ φαινόμενον μὲν διὰ τὴν οὐκ ἐκ καλοῦ θέαν ἐοικέναι τῷ καλῷ, δύναμιν δὲ εἴ τις λάβοι τὰ τηλικαῦτα ἱκανῶς ὁρᾶν, μηδʼ εἰκὸς ᾧ φησιν ἐοικέναι, τί καλοῦμεν;
What about that which, because it is not viewed from a beautiful vantage point, appears to be like the beautiful, but if someone were to gain the power to see such large things adequately, is not even like that which it claims to be like? What do we call this?
ἆρʼ οὐκ, ἐπείπερ φαίνεται μέν, ἔοικε δὲ οὔ, φάντασμα;
Since it appears to be, but is not actually like, is it not an appearance?
ΘΕΑΙ. τί μήν;
THEAI. Of course, what else?
ΞΕ. οὐκοῦν πάμπολυ καὶ κατὰ τὴν ζωγραφίαν τοῦτο τὸ μέρος ἐστὶ καὶ κατὰ σύμπασαν μιμητικήν;
STR. Is not this part then very large, both in painting and in the whole of the imitative art?
ΘΕΑΙ. πῶς δʼ οὔ;
THEAI. How indeed could it not be?
ΞΕ. τὴν δὴ φάντασμα ἀλλʼ οὐκ εἰκόνα ἀπεργαζομένην τέχνην ἆρʼ οὐ φανταστικὴν ὀρθότατʼ ἂν προσαγορεύοιμεν;
STR. Should we not then most correctly call the art which produces an appearance, and not a likeness, the appearance-making art?
ΘΕΑΙ. πολύ γε.
THEAI. Most certainly.
ΞΕ. τούτω τοίνυν τὼ δύο ἔλεγον εἴδη τῆς εἰδωλοποιικῆς, εἰκαστικὴν καὶ φανταστικήν.
STR. These then are the two forms of image-making I was speaking of, the likeness-making and the appearance-making.
ΘΕΑΙ. ὀρθῶς.
THEAI. Correctly.
ΞΕ. ὃ δέ γε καὶ τότʼ ἠμφεγνόουν, ἐν ποτέρᾳ τὸν σοφιστὴν θετέον, οὐδὲ νῦν πω δύναμαι θεάσασθαι σαφῶς, ἀλλʼ ὄντως θαυμαστὸς ἁνὴρ καὶ κατιδεῖν παγχάλεπος, ἐπεὶ καὶ νῦν μάλα εὖ καὶ κομψῶς εἰς ἄπορον εἶδος διερευνήσασθαι καταπέφευγεν.
STR. But as to what I was doubting even then, in which of the two we must place the sophist, I am not even now able to see clearly, indeed, the man is truly wondrous and extremely difficult to discern, since even now he has fled, very cleverly and subtly, into a class that is difficult to investigate.
ΘΕΑΙ. ἔοικεν.
THEAI. So it seems.
ΞΕ. ἆρʼ οὖν αὐτὸ γιγνώσκων σύμφης, ἤ σε οἷον ῥύμη τις ὑπὸ τοῦ λόγου συνειθισμένον συνεπεσπάσατο πρὸς τὸ ταχὺ συμφῆσαι;
STR. Do you agree because you yourself understand this, or has a certain momentum of the argument, to which you are accustomed, swept you along to agree so quickly?
ΘΕΑΙ. πῶς καὶ πρὸς τί τοῦτο εἴρηκας;
THEAI. How and in regard to what do you say this?
ΞΕ. ὄντως, ὦ μακάριε, ἐσμὲν ἐν παντάπασι χαλεπῇ σκέψει.
STR. Truly, my blessed friend, we are in an altogether difficult investigation.
τὸ γὰρ φαίνεσθαι τοῦτο καὶ τὸ δοκεῖν, εἶναι δὲ μή, καὶ τὸ λέγειν μὲν ἄττα, ἀληθῆ δὲ μή, πάντα ταῦτά ἐστι μεστὰ ἀπορίας ἀεὶ ἐν τῷ πρόσθεν χρόνῳ καὶ νῦν.
For this 'appearing' and 'seeming', but not being, and 'saying' certain things, but not true things, all of this is full of difficulty, both in the past and now.
ὅπως γὰρ εἰπόντα χρὴ ψευδῆ λέγειν ἢ δοξάζειν ὄντως εἶναι, καὶ τοῦτο φθεγξάμενον ἐναντιολογίᾳ μὴ συνέχεσθαι, παντάπασιν, ὦ Θεαίτητε, χαλεπόν.
For how one is to say that false things are said or opined to really be, and when uttering this not to be caught in a self-contradiction, is altogether, O Theaetetus, difficult.
§237ΘΕΑΙ. τί δή;
THEAI. Why is that?
ΞΕ. τετόλμηκεν ὁ λόγος οὗτος ὑποθέσθαι τὸ μὴ ὂν εἶναι· ψεῦδος γὰρ οὐκ ἂν ἄλλως ἐγίγνετο ὄν.
STR. This argument has dared to assume that 'that which is not' is; for falsehood would not otherwise have come to be.
Παρμενίδης δὲ ὁ μέγας, ὦ παῖ, παισὶν ἡμῖν οὖσιν ἀρχόμενός τε καὶ διὰ τέλους τοῦτο ἀπεμαρτύρατο, πεζῇ τε ὧδε ἑκάστοτε λέγων καὶ μετὰ μέτρων—
"
οὐ γὰρ μήποτε τοῦτο δαμῇ, φησίν, εἶναι μὴ ἐόντα· ἀλλὰ σὺ τῆσδʼ ἀφʼ ὁδοῦ διζήμενος εἶργε νόημα. "
παρʼ ἐκείνου τε οὖν μαρτυρεῖται, καὶ μάλιστά γε δὴ πάντων ὁ λόγος αὐτὸς ἂν δηλώσειε μέτρια βασανισθείς.
And the great Parmenides, my boy, when we were children, from beginning to end testified against this, saying so on each occasion both in prose and in verse: "For never shall this be proved," he says, "that things that are not are; but keep your thought away from this path of inquiry." So we have testimony from him, and most of all the argument itself would make it clear if it were tested moderately.
τοῦτο οὖν αὐτὸ πρῶτον θεασώμεθα, εἰ μή τί σοι διαφέρει.
Let us then examine this very thing first, if it makes no difference to you.
ΘΕΑΙ. τὸ μὲν ἐμὸν ὅπῃ βούλει τίθεσο, τὸν δὲ λόγον ᾗ βέλτιστα διέξεισι σκοπῶν αὐτός τε ἴθι κἀμὲ κατὰ ταύτην τὴν ὁδὸν ἄγε.
THEAI. Position my part however you wish; but as for the argument, go where it will best proceed, examining it yourself and leading me along that path.
ΞΕ. ἀλλὰ χρὴ δρᾶν ταῦτα.
STR. Well, we must do that.
καί μοι λέγε· τὸ μηδαμῶς ὂν τολμῶμέν που φθέγγεσθαι;
And tell me: do we venture to utter 'that which in no way is'?
ΘΕΑΙ. πῶς γὰρ οὔ;
THEAI. How indeed could we not?
ΞΕ. μὴ τοίνυν ἔριδος ἕνεκα μηδὲ παιδιᾶς, ἀλλʼ εἰ σπουδῇ δέοι συννοήσαντά τινα ἀποκρίνασθαι τῶν ἀκροατῶν ποῖ χρὴ τοὔνομʼ ἐπιφέρειν τοῦτο, τὸ μὴ ὄν, τί δοκοῦμεν ἂν εἰς τί καὶ ἐπὶ ποῖον αὐτόν τε καταχρήσασθαι καὶ τῷ πυνθανομένῳ δεικνύναι;
STR. Then, not for the sake of dispute or play, but if one of the hearers had to answer seriously, having reflected on where one must apply this name, 'that which is not', what do we think he would apply it to, and what kind of thing would he point out to the inquirer?
ΘΕΑΙ. χαλεπὸν ἤρου καὶ σχεδὸν εἰπεῖν οἵῳ γε ἐμοὶ παντάπασιν ἄπορον.
THEAI. You ask a difficult question, and one which, to say the least, for someone like me is altogether impossible to answer.
ΞΕ. ἀλλʼ οὖν τοῦτό γε δῆλον, ὅτι τῶν ὄντων ἐπί τι τὸ μὴ ὂν οὐκ οἰστέον.
STR. But at least this is clear, that 'that which is not' must not be applied to any of the things that are.
ΘΕΑΙ. πῶς γὰρ ἄν;
THEAI. How indeed could it be?
ΞΕ. οὐκοῦν ἐπείπερ οὐκ ἐπὶ τὸ ὄν, οὐδʼ ἐπὶ τὸ τὶ φέρων ὀρθῶς ἄν τις φέροι.
STR. Therefore, since it is not applied to 'that which is', neither would someone correctly apply it if he applied it to 'something'.
ΘΕΑΙ. πῶς δή;
THEAI. How so?
ΞΕ. καὶ τοῦτο ἡμῖν που φανερόν, ὡς καὶ τὸ
τὶ
τοῦτο ἐπʼ ὄντι λέγομεν ἑκάστοτε· μόνον γὰρ αὐτὸ λέγειν, ὥσπερ γυμνὸν καὶ ἀπηρημωμένον ἀπὸ τῶν ὄντων ἁπάντων, ἀδύνατον·
STR. This too is surely clear to us, that we say this 'something' on each occasion in reference to some existing thing; for to speak of it alone, as if naked and isolated from all existing things, is impossible.
ἦ γάρ;
Is it not?
ΘΕΑΙ. ἀδύνατον.
THEAI. Impossible.
ΞΕ. ἆρα τῇδε σκοπῶν σύμφης, ὡς ἀνάγκη τόν τι λέγοντα ἕν γέ τι λέγειν;
STR. Do you agree, looking at it this way, that it is necessary for the one who says 'something' to say at least some 'one' thing?
ΘΕΑΙ. οὕτως.
THEAI. Yes.
ΞΕ. ἑνὸς γὰρ δὴ τό γε
τὶ
φήσεις σημεῖον εἶναι, τὸ δὲ
τινὲ
δυοῖν, τὸ δὲ
τινὲς
πολλῶν.
STR. For you will say that 'something' is a sign of one, 'some two' of two, and 'some' of many.
ΘΕΑΙ. πῶς γὰρ οὔ;
THEAI. How indeed could it not be?
ΞΕ. τὸν δὲ δὴ μὴ τὶ λέγοντα ἀναγκαιότατον, ὡς ἔοικε, παντάπασι μηδὲν λέγειν.
STR. And for the one who does not say 'something', it is most necessary, as it seems, to say absolutely nothing.
ΘΕΑΙ. ἀναγκαιότατον μὲν οὖν.
THEAI. Yes, most necessary indeed.
ΞΕ. ἆρʼ οὖν οὐδὲ τοῦτο συγχωρητέον, τὸ τὸν τοιοῦτον λέγειν μέν, λέγειν μέντοι μηδέν, ἀλλʼ οὐδὲ λέγειν φατέον, ὅς γʼ ἂν ἐπιχειρῇ μὴ ὂν φθέγγεσθαι;
STR. Must we then not even concede this, that such a person speaks, but speaks nothing, but we must say that he does not even speak at all, whoever attempts to utter 'that which is not'?
ΘΕΑΙ. τέλος γοῦν ἂν ἀπορίας ὁ λόγος ἔχοι.
THEAI. The argument would indeed reach the limit of difficulty.