Humanitext Reader

Plato · Sophist §232-233

The Sophist's Claim to Universal Knowledge

Passage 9 of 30 · Greek

Summary

The Stranger and Theaetetus examine the sophist's claimed ability to refute everything, concluding that since no single human can know all things, the sophist possesses not truth, but only a belief-like appearance of knowledge.

§232ΞΕ. ἆρʼ οὖν ἐννοεῖς, ὅταν ἐπιστήμων τις πολλῶν φαίνηται, μιᾶς δὲ τέχνης ὀνόματι προσαγορεύηται, τὸ φάντασμα τοῦτο ὡς οὐκ ἔσθʼ ὑγιές, ἀλλὰ δῆλον ὡς ὁ πάσχων αὐτὸ πρός τινα τέχνην οὐ δύναται κατιδεῖν ἐκεῖνο αὐτῆς εἰς ὃ πάντα τὰ μαθήματα ταῦτα βλέπει, διὸ καὶ πολλοῖς ὀνόμασιν ἀνθʼ ἑνὸς τὸν ἔχοντα αὐτὰ προσαγορεύει;
STR. Do you then realize, when someone appears to be knowledgeable about many things, but is called by the name of a single art, that this appearance is not sound, but rather it is clear that the person who experiences it is unable to look closely at that point of the art to which all these lessons are directed, and therefore calls the one who possesses them by many names instead of one?
ΘΕΑΙ. κινδυνεύει τοῦτο ταύτῃ πῃ μάλιστα πεφυκέναι.
THEAI. This seems most likely to be the case.
ΞΕ. μὴ τοίνυν ἡμεῖς γε αὐτὸ ἐν τῇ ζητήσει διʼ ἀργίαν πάσχωμεν, ἀλλʼ ἀναλάβωμεν ἓν πρῶτον τῶν περὶ τὸν σοφιστὴν εἰρημένων.
STR. Let us not, then, experience this in our inquiry through laziness, but let us take up again first one of the things said about the sophist.
ἓν γάρ τί μοι μάλιστα κατεφάνη αὐτὸν μηνῦον.
For one of them especially seemed to me to reveal him.
ΘΕΑΙ. τὸ ποῖον;
THEAI. Which one?
ΞΕ. ἀντιλογικὸν αὐτὸν ἔφαμεν εἶναί που.
STR. We said, I believe, that he is disputatious.
ΘΕΑΙ. ναί.
THEAI. Yes.
ΞΕ. τί δʼ;
STR. And what?
οὐ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων αὐτοῦ τούτου διδάσκαλον γίγνεσθαι;
Did we not also say that he becomes a teacher of this very thing to others?
ΘΕΑΙ. τί μήν;
THEAI. Of course.
ΞΕ. σκοπῶμεν δή, περὶ τίνος ἄρα καί φασιν οἱ τοιοῦτοι ποιεῖν ἀντιλογικούς.
STR. Let us consider then: about what indeed do such people claim to make men disputatious?
ἡ δὲ σκέψις ἡμῖν ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἔστω τῇδέ πῃ.
Let our inquiry from the beginning proceed in this way.
φέρε, περὶ τῶν θείων, ὅσʼ ἀφανῆ τοῖς πολλοῖς, ἆρʼ ἱκανοὺς ποιοῦσι τοῦτο δρᾶν;
Tell me, concerning divine things, which are invisible to the many, do they make men capable of doing this?
ΘΕΑΙ. λέγεται γοῦν δὴ περὶ αὐτῶν ταῦτα.
THEAI. At least that is what is said about them.
ΞΕ. τί δʼ ὅσα φανερὰ γῆς τε καὶ οὐρανοῦ καὶ τῶν περὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα;
STR. And what about the visible things of the earth and heaven and such matters?
ΘΕΑΙ. τί γάρ;
THEAI. What indeed?
ΞΕ. ἀλλὰ μὴν ἔν γε ταῖς ἰδίαις συνουσίαις, ὁπόταν γενέσεώς τε καὶ οὐσίας πέρι κατὰ πάντων λέγηταί τι, σύνισμεν ὡς αὐτοί τε ἀντειπεῖν δεινοὶ τούς τε ἄλλους ὅτι ποιοῦσιν ἅπερ αὐτοὶ δυνατούς;
STR. Furthermore, in private gatherings, whenever anything is said about generation and being concerning all things, we know that they themselves are clever at contradicting and make others capable of doing the very same, do we not?
ΘΕΑΙ. παντάπασί γε.
THEAI. Entirely so.
ΞΕ. τί δʼ αὖ περὶ νόμων καὶ συμπάντων τῶν πολιτικῶν, ἆρʼ οὐχ ὑπισχνοῦνται ποιεῖν ἀμφισβητητικούς;
STR. And again, concerning laws and all political matters, do they not promise to make men capable of disputing?
ΘΕΑΙ. οὐδεὶς γὰρ ἂν αὐτοῖς ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν διελέγετο μὴ τοῦτο ὑπισχνουμένοις.
THEAI. No one, so to speak, would converse with them if they did not promise this.
ΞΕ. τά γε μὴν περὶ πασῶν τε καὶ κατὰ μίαν ἑκάστην τέχνην, ἃ δεῖ πρὸς ἕκαστον αὐτὸν τὸν δημιουργὸν ἀντειπεῖν, δεδημοσιωμένα που καταβέβληται γεγραμμένα τῷ βουλομένῳ μαθεῖν.
STR. Moreover, regarding all arts and each individual art, what one must say in contradiction to each craftsman himself has been published in writing somewhere for anyone who wants to learn.
ΘΕΑΙ. τὰ Πρωταγόρειά μοι φαίνῃ περί τε πάλης καὶ τῶν ἄλλων τεχνῶν εἰρηκέναι.
THEAI. You seem to me to be speaking of Protagoras' writings about wrestling and other arts.
ΞΕ. καὶ πολλῶν γε, ὦ μακάριε, ἑτέρων.
STR. Yes, and of many other writers, my blessed friend.
ἀτὰρ δὴ τὸ τῆς ἀντιλογικῆς τέχνης ἆρʼ οὐκ ἐν κεφαλαίῳ περὶ πάντων πρὸς ἀμφισβήτησιν ἱκανή τις δύναμις ἔοικʼ εἶναι;
But as for the disputatious art, does it not seem, in short, to be a certain power sufficient for disputing about all things?
ΘΕΑΙ. φαίνεται γοῦν δὴ σχεδὸν οὐδὲν ὑπολιπεῖν.
THEAI. At least it seems to leave almost nothing out.
ΞΕ. σὺ δὴ πρὸς θεῶν, ὦ παῖ, δυνατὸν ἡγῇ τοῦτο;
STR. In the name of the gods, my boy, do you think this is possible?
τάχα γὰρ ἂν ὑμεῖς μὲν ὀξύτερον οἱ νέοι πρὸς αὐτὸ βλέποιτε, ἡμεῖς δὲ ἀμβλύτερον.
For perhaps you young people might see this more sharply, and we more bluntly.
§233ΘΕΑΙ. τὸ ποῖον, καὶ πρὸς τί μάλιστα λέγεις;
THEAI. What sort of thing, and to what especially do you refer?
οὐ γάρ που κατανοῶ τὸ νῦν ἐρωτώμενον.
For I do not quite understand what is now being asked.
ΞΕ. εἰ πάντα ἐπίστασθαί τινα ἀνθρώπων ἐστὶ δυνατόν.
STR. Whether it is possible for any human being to know all things.
ΘΕΑΙ. μακάριον μεντἂν ἡμῶν, ὦ ξένε, ἦν τὸ γένος.
THEAI. Our race, O stranger, would indeed be blessed.
ΞΕ. πῶς οὖν ἄν ποτέ τις πρός γε τὸν ἐπιστάμενον αὐτὸς ἀνεπιστήμων ὢν δύναιτʼ ἂν ὑγιές τι λέγων ἀντειπεῖν;
STR. How then could anyone who is himself without knowledge say anything sound in contradicting one who knows?
ΘΕΑΙ. οὐδαμῶς.
THEAI. In no way.
ΞΕ. τί ποτʼ οὖν ἂν εἴη τὸ τῆς σοφιστικῆς δυνάμεως θαῦμα;
STR. What then could be the wonder of the sophistical power?
ΘΕΑΙ. τοῦ δὴ πέρι;
THEAI. About what?
ΞΕ. καθʼ ὅντινα τρόπον ποτὲ δυνατοὶ τοῖς νέοις δόξαν παρασκευάζειν ὡς εἰσὶ πάντα πάντων αὐτοὶ σοφώτατοι.
STR. In what way they are ever capable of producing an opinion in the young that they themselves are the wisest of all in all matters.
δῆλον γὰρ ὡς εἰ μήτε ἀντέλεγον ὀρθῶς μήτε ἐκείνοις ἐφαίνοντο, φαινόμενοί τε εἰ μηδὲν αὖ μᾶλλον ἐδόκουν διὰ τὴν ἀμφισβήτησιν εἶναι φρόνιμοι, τὸ σὸν δὴ τοῦτο, σχολῇ ποτʼ ἂν αὐτοῖς τις χρήματα διδοὺς ἤθελεν ἂν τούτων αὐτῶν μαθητὴς γίγνεσθαι.
For it is clear that if they neither contradicted correctly nor appeared to do so to them, or if, even appearing to do so, they were not thought to be any wiser on account of their disputing—to use your own expression—hardly would anyone have wished to give them money and become their disciple in these very things.
ΘΕΑΙ. σχολῇ μεντἄν.
THEAI. Hardly indeed.
ΞΕ. νῦν δέ γʼ ἐθέλουσιν;
STR. But now do they wish to?
ΘΕΑΙ. καὶ μάλα.
THEAI. Very much so.
ΞΕ. δοκοῦσι γὰρ οἶμαι πρὸς ταῦτα ἐπιστημόνως ἔχειν αὐτοὶ πρὸς ἅπερ ἀντιλέγουσιν.
STR. For they are thought, I suppose, to be knowledgeable themselves about those very things about which they contradict.
ΘΕΑΙ. πῶς γὰρ οὔ;
THEAI. How could they not be?
ΞΕ. δρῶσι δέ γε τοῦτο πρὸς ἅπαντα, φαμέν;
STR. And we say that they do this concerning all things, do we not?
ΘΕΑΙ. ναί.
THEAI. Yes.
ΞΕ. πάντα ἄρα σοφοὶ τοῖς μαθηταῖς φαίνονται.
STR. To their disciples, then, they appear wise in all things.
ΘΕΑΙ. τί μήν;
THEAI. Of course.
ΞΕ. οὐκ ὄντες γε· ἀδύνατον γὰρ τοῦτό γε ἐφάνη.
STR. Though they are not; for this has appeared to be impossible.
ΘΕΑΙ. πῶς γὰρ οὐκ ἀδύνατον;
THEAI. How indeed could it not be impossible?
ΞΕ. δοξαστικὴν ἄρα τινὰ περὶ πάντων ἐπιστήμην ὁ σοφιστὴς ἡμῖν ἀλλʼ οὐκ ἀλήθειαν ἔχων ἀναπέφανται.
STR. The sophist, then, has appeared to us to possess a certain belief-like knowledge about all things, but not the truth.
ΘΕΑΙ. παντάπασι μὲν οὖν, καὶ κινδυνεύει γε τὸ νῦν εἰρημένον ὀρθότατα περὶ αὐτῶν εἰρῆσθαι.
THEAI. Entirely so, and what has just been said seems most likely to be said most correctly about them.
ΞΕ. λάβωμεν τοίνυν σαφέστερόν τι παράδειγμα περὶ τούτων.
STR. Let us then take a clearer example concerning these matters.
ΘΕΑΙ. τὸ ποῖον δή;
THEAI. What sort of example?
ΞΕ. τόδε.
STR. This one.
καί μοι πειρῶ προσέχων τὸν νοῦν εὖ μάλα ἀποκρίνασθαι.
And try to answer me with your mind very well applied.
ΘΕΑΙ. τὸ ποῖον;
THEAI. What is it?
ΞΕ. εἴ τις φαίη μὴ λέγειν μηδʼ ἀντιλέγειν, ἀλλὰ ποιεῖν καὶ δρᾶν μιᾷ τέχνῃ συνάπαντα ἐπίστασθαι πράγματα— ΘΕΑΙ. πῶς πάντα εἶπες;
STR. If someone should say, not that he speaks or contradicts, but that he knows how to make and do all things by a single art— THEAI. What do you mean by 'all'?
ΞΕ. τὴν ἀρχὴν τοῦ ῥηθέντος σύ γʼ ἡμῖν εὐθὺς ἀγνοεῖς· τὰ γὰρ σύμπαντα, ὡς ἔοικας, οὐ μανθάνεις.
STR. You immediately fail to understand the very beginning of what was said; for you do not seem to comprehend 'all things.' THEAI.
ΘΕΑΙ. οὐ γὰρ οὖν.
No, indeed.
ΞΕ. λέγω τοίνυν σὲ καὶ ἐμὲ τῶν πάντων καὶ πρὸς ἡμῖν τἆλλα ζῷα καὶ δένδρα.
STR. By 'all things' I mean you and me, and besides us, the other animals and trees.
ΘΕΑΙ. πῶς λέγεις;
THEAI. How do you mean?
ΞΕ. εἴ τις ἐμὲ καὶ σὲ καὶ τἆλλα φυτὰ πάντα ποιήσειν φαίη—
STR. If someone should say that he will make me and you and all other plants—

Notes

  1. 232aτὸ φάντασμα τοῦτο ὡς οὐκ ἔσθʼ ὑγιές — The nominative noun phrase `τὸ φάντασμα τοῦτο` (this appearance) is anticipated (prolepsis) as the object of the main verb `ἐννοεῖς` and functions semantically as the subject of the following `ὡς` clause.
  2. 232cτοὺς ἄλλους ὅτι ποιοῦσιν — `ὅτι` is understood as `ὅ τι` (neuter accusative of `ὅστις` used adverbially as "in whatever way" or "anything that"), modifying `ποιοῦσιν` (render/make) to mean "they render others also capable [of doing] the very things they themselves are capable of."
  3. 233bτὸ σὸν δὴ τοῦτο — An accusative of apposition or adverbial accusative phrase meaning "according to this of yours" or "as you say," referring back to Theaetetus' use of the adverb `σχολῇ` (hardly) in the preceding turn.

Cite this passage

Plato, Sophist §232-233. Humanitext Reader, https://reader.humanitext.ai/en/text/urn:cts:greekLit:tlg0059.tlg007.humanitext-grc2:232-233

Please note the AI-draft status of the translation and the date accessed.

Translation, notes and summary are AI-generated drafts, revised through reader feedback.