§228ΞΕ. τὸ μὲν οἷον νόσον ἐν σώματι, τὸ δʼ οἷον αἶσχος ἐγγιγνόμενον.
STR. One is like a disease in the body, the other like ugliness arising in it.
ΘΕΑΙ. οὐκ ἔμαθον.
THEAI. I do not understand.
ΞΕ. νόσον ἴσως καὶ στάσιν οὐ ταὐτὸν νενόμικας;
STR. Perhaps you do not regard disease and discord as the same thing?
ΘΕΑΙ. οὐδʼ αὖ πρὸς τοῦτο ἔχω τί χρή με ἀποκρίνασθαι.
THEAI. Again, to this I don't know what I ought to answer.
ΞΕ. πότερον ἄλλο τι στάσιν ἡγούμενος ἢ τὴν τοῦ φύσει συγγενοῦς ἔκ τινος διαφθορᾶς διαφοράν;
STR. Do you think discord is anything other than the disagreement of what is naturally related, arising from some corruption?
ΘΕΑΙ. οὐδέν.
THEAI. Nothing else.
ΞΕ. ἀλλʼ αἶσχος ἄλλο τι πλὴν τὸ τῆς ἀμετρίας πανταχοῦ δυσειδὲς ἐνὸν γένος;
STR. And is ugliness anything other than the class of disproportion, which is everywhere unsightly when present?
ΘΕΑΙ. οὐδαμῶς ἄλλο.
THEAI. By no means anything else.
ΞΕ. τί δέ;
STR. What then?
ἐν ψυχῇ δόξας ἐπιθυμίαις καὶ θυμὸν ἡδοναῖς καὶ λόγον λύπαις καὶ πάντα ἀλλήλοις ταῦτα τῶν φλαύρως ἐχόντων οὐκ ᾐσθήμεθα διαφερόμενα;
In the soul of those who are in a bad condition, have we not perceived opinions disagreeing with desires, anger with pleasures, reason with pains, and all of these things with one another?
ΘΕΑΙ. καὶ σφόδρα γε.
THEAI. Yes, very much so.
ΞΕ. συγγενῆ γε μὴν ἐξ ἀνάγκης σύμπαντα γέγονεν.
STR. Yet all of these are necessarily akin.
ΘΕΑΙ. πῶς γὰρ οὔ;
THEAI. How could they not be?
ΞΕ. στάσιν ἄρα καὶ νόσον τῆς ψυχῆς πονηρίαν λέγοντες ὀρθῶς ἐροῦμεν.
STR. Therefore, we shall speak correctly if we call wickedness a discord and a disease of the soul.
ΘΕΑΙ. ὀρθότατα μὲν οὖν.
THEAI. Most correctly, indeed.
ΞΕ. τί δʼ;
STR. What then?
ὅσʼ ἂν κινήσεως μετασχόντα καὶ σκοπόν τινα θέμενα πειρώμενα τούτου τυγχάνειν καθʼ ἑκάστην ὁρμὴν παράφορα αὐτοῦ γίγνηται καὶ ἀποτυγχάνῃ, πότερον αὐτὰ φήσομεν ὑπὸ συμμετρίας τῆς πρὸς ἄλληλα ἢ τοὐναντίον ὑπὸ ἀμετρίας αὐτὰ πάσχειν;
When things that share in motion and, having set a certain goal, try to attain it, but at each impulse go wide of it and miss it, shall we say they suffer this from their mutual proportion, or, on the contrary, from disproportion?
ΘΕΑΙ. δῆλον ὡς ὑπὸ ἀμετρίας.
THEAI. Clearly from disproportion.
ΞΕ. ἀλλὰ μὴν ψυχήν γε ἴσμεν ἄκουσαν πᾶσαν πᾶν ἀγνοοῦσαν.
STR. But indeed, we know that every soul is ignorant of anything only against its will.
ΘΕΑΙ. σφόδρα γε.
THEAI. Very much so.
ΞΕ. τό γε μὴν ἀγνοεῖν ἐστιν ἐπʼ ἀλήθειαν ὁρμωμένης ψυχῆς, παραφόρου συνέσεως γιγνομένης, οὐδὲν ἄλλο πλὴν παραφροσύνη.
STR. Yet being ignorant, when a soul is impelled toward truth but its understanding goes wide of it, is nothing other than a derangement.
ΘΕΑΙ. πάνυ μὲν οὖν.
THEAI. Entirely so.
ΞΕ. ψυχὴν ἄρα ἀνόητον αἰσχρὰν καὶ ἄμετρον θετέον.
STR. Therefore, we must regard an unintelligent soul as ugly and disproportionate.
ΘΕΑΙ. ἔοικεν.
THEAI. It seems so.
ΞΕ. ἔστι δὴ δύο ταῦτα, ὡς φαίνεται, κακῶν ἐν αὐτῇ γένη, τὸ μὲν πονηρία καλούμενον ὑπὸ τῶν πολλῶν, νόσος αὐτῆς σαφέστατα ὄν.
STR. There are then, as it appears, these two kinds of evils in it: one, called wickedness by the multitude, which is most clearly its disease.
ΘΕΑΙ. ναί.
THEAI. Yes.
ΞΕ. τὸ δέ γε ἄγνοιαν μὲν καλοῦσι, κακίαν δὲ αὐτὸ ἐν ψυχῇ μόνον γιγνόμενον οὐκ ἐθέλουσιν ὁμολογεῖν.
STR. And the other they call ignorance, but they are unwilling to admit that it is a vice when it occurs only in the soul.
ΘΕΑΙ. κομιδῇ συγχωρητέον, ὃ νυνδὴ λέξαντος ἠμφεγνόησά σου, τὸ δύο εἶναι γένη κακίας ἐν ψυχῇ, καὶ δειλίαν μὲν καὶ ἀκολασίαν καὶ ἀδικίαν σύμπαντα ἡγητέον νόσον ἐν ἡμῖν, τὸ δὲ τῆς πολλῆς καὶ παντοδαπῆς ἀγνοίας πάθος αἶσχος θετέον.
THEAI. I must entirely agree, though I was doubtful when you spoke of it just now, that there are two kinds of vice in the soul, and that cowardice, licentiousness, and injustice must all be regarded as a disease in us, while the state of great and manifold ignorance must be posited as ugliness.
ΞΕ. οὐκοῦν ἔν γε σώματι περὶ δύο παθήματε τούτω δύο τέχνα τινὲ ἐγενέσθην;
STR. Now, for these two afflictions in the body, have not two certain arts arisen?
ΘΕΑΙ. τίνε τούτω;
THEAI. Which two are these?
§229ΞΕ. περὶ μὲν αἶσχος γυμναστική, περὶ δὲ νόσον ἰατρική.
STR. Gymnastics for ugliness, and medicine for disease.
ΘΕΑΙ. φαίνεσθον.
THEAI. So they appear.
ΞΕ. οὐκοῦν καὶ περὶ μὲν ὕβριν καὶ ἀδικίαν καὶ δειλίαν ἡ κολαστικὴ πέφυκε τεχνῶν μάλιστα δὴ πασῶν προσήκουσα Δίκῃ.
STR. Then also for insolence, injustice, and cowardice, is not the chastising art, of all arts, by nature most closely related to Justice?
ΘΕΑΙ. τὸ γοῦν εἰκός, ὡς εἰπεῖν κατὰ τὴν ἀνθρωπίνην δόξαν.
THEAI. At least that is likely, to speak according to human opinion.
ΞΕ. τί δέ;
STR. What then?
περὶ σύμπασαν ἄγνοιαν μῶν ἄλλην τινὰ ἢ διδασκαλικὴν ὀρθότερον εἴποι τις ἄν;
For all ignorance, could anyone more correctly name any other art than instruction?
ΘΕΑΙ. οὐδεμίαν.
THEAI. None other.
ΞΕ. φέρε δή·
STR.
διδασκαλικῆς δὲ ἆρα ἓν μόνον γένος φατέον ἢ πλείω, δύο δέ τινε αὐτῆς εἶναι μεγίστω;
Come then, must we say there is only one kind of instruction, or more, and that there are two greatest kinds of it?
σκόπει.
Consider.
ΘΕΑΙ. σκοπῶ.
THEAI. I am considering.
ΞΕ. καί μοι δοκοῦμεν τῇδε ἄν πῃ τάχιστα εὑρεῖν.
STR. And I think we might find it quickest in this way.
ΘΕΑΙ. πῇ;
THEAI. In what way?
ΞΕ. τὴν ἄγνοιαν ἰδόντες εἴ πῃ κατὰ μέσον αὑτῆς τομὴν ἔχει τινά.
STR. By seeing if ignorance has some division along its middle.
διπλῆ γὰρ αὕτη γιγνομένη δῆλον ὅτι καὶ τὴν διδασκαλικὴν δύο ἀναγκάζει μόρια ἔχειν, ἓν ἐφʼ ἑνὶ τῶν αὑτῆς ἑκατέρῳ.
For if ignorance is twofold, clearly it forces instruction also to have two parts, one applied to each of its own two parts.
ΘΕΑΙ. τί οὖν;
THEAI. What then?
καταφανές πῄ σοι τὸ νῦν ζητούμενον;
Is what we are now seeking visible to you in some way?
ΞΕ. ἀγνοίας γοῦν μέγα τί μοι δοκῶ καὶ χαλεπὸν ἀφωρισμένον ὁρᾶν εἶδος, πᾶσι τοῖς ἄλλοις αὐτῆς ἀντίσταθμον μέρεσιν.
STR. At least I think I see a great and difficult kind of ignorance set apart, which is counterbalanced to all its other parts.
ΘΕΑΙ. ποῖον δή;
THEAI. What kind is it?
ΞΕ. τὸ μὴ κατειδότα τι δοκεῖν εἰδέναι· διʼ οὗ κινδυνεύει πάντα ὅσα διανοίᾳ σφαλλόμεθα γίγνεσθαι πᾶσιν.
STR. Not knowing something, yet thinking one knows it; through which, it is likely, all the errors we make in thought occur to all of us.
ΘΕΑΙ. ἀληθῆ.
THEAI. True.
ΞΕ. καὶ δὴ καὶ τούτῳ γε οἶμαι μόνῳ τῆς ἀγνοίας ἀμαθίαν τοὔνομα προσρηθῆναι.
STR. And indeed, I think that to this part of ignorance alone the name "stupidity" has been applied.
ΘΕΑΙ. πάνυ γε.
THEAI. Certainly.
ΞΕ. τί δὲ δὴ τῷ τῆς διδασκαλικῆς ἄρα μέρει τῷ τοῦτο ἀπαλλάττοντι λεκτέον;
STR. What then must we call the part of instruction that rids us of this?
ΘΕΑΙ. οἶμαι μὲν, ὦ ξένε, τὸ μὲν ἄλλο δημιουργικὰς διδασκαλίας, τοῦτο δὲ ἐνθάδε γε παιδείαν διʼ ἡμῶν κεκλῆσθαι.
THEAI. I think, stranger, that while the other part is called professional instruction, this part, among us at least, has been called education.
ΞΕ. καὶ γὰρ σχεδόν, ὦ Θεαίτητε, ἐν πᾶσιν Ἕλλησιν. ἀλλὰ γὰρ ἡμῖν ἔτι καὶ τοῦτο σκεπτέον, ἆρʼ ἄτομον ἤδη ἐστὶ πᾶν ἤ τινα ἔχον διαίρεσιν ἀξίαν ἐπωνυμίας.
STR. Indeed, Theaetetus, almost among all Greeks. But we must still consider this: is it already entirely indivisible, or does it have some division worthy of a name?
ΘΕΑΙ. οὐκοῦν χρὴ σκοπεῖν.
THEAI. Then we must consider.
ΞΕ. δοκεῖ τοίνυν μοι καὶ τοῦτο ἔτι πῃ σχίζεσθαι.
STR. It seems to me, then, that this too is still split in some way.
ΘΕΑΙ. κατὰ τί;
THEAI. In respect of what?
ΞΕ. τῆς ἐν τοῖς λόγοις διδασκαλικῆς ἡ μὲν τραχυτέρα τις ἔοικεν ὁδὸς εἶναι, τὸ δʼ ἕτερον αὐτῆς μόριον λειότερον.
STR. Of the instruction in speech, one seems to be a rougher path, and the other part of it smoother.
ΘΕΑΙ. τὸ ποῖον δὴ τούτων ἑκάτερον λέγομεν;
THEAI. Which indeed of these two do we mean by each?