§205ΣΩ. ἀνδρικῶς γε, ὦ Θεαίτητε, μάχῃ.
SOCRATES: You are fighting manfully, Theaetetus.
τὸ πᾶν δὲ οὐχ ὅταν μηδὲν ἀπῇ, αὐτὸ τοῦτο πᾶν ἐστιν;
But is not 'the sum' this very thing: when nothing is missing, is it then the sum?
ΘΕΑΙ. ἀνάγκη.
THEAETETUS: Necessarily.
ΣΩ. ὅλον δὲ οὐ ταὐτὸν τοῦτο ἔσται, οὗ ἂν μηδαμῇ μηδὲν ἀποστατῇ;
SOCRATES: And will not 'the whole' be this same thing, from which nothing is missing anywhere?
οὗ δʼ ἂν ἀποστατῇ, οὔτε ὅλον οὔτε πᾶν, ἅμα γενόμενον ἐκ τοῦ αὐτοῦ τὸ αὐτό;
But that from which something is missing, is it neither a whole nor a sum, having become at the same time the same thing from the same cause?
ΘΕΑΙ. δοκεῖ μοι νῦν οὐδὲν διαφέρειν πᾶν τε καὶ ὅλον.
THEAETETUS: It seems to me now that the sum and the whole do not differ at all.
ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν ἐλέγομεν ὅτι οὗ ἂν μέρη ᾖ, τὸ ὅλον τε καὶ πᾶν τὰ πάντα μέρη ἔσται;
SOCRATES: Therefore, did we not say that where there are parts, the whole and the sum will be all the parts?
ΘΕΑΙ. πάνυ γε.
THEAETETUS: Certainly.
ΣΩ. πάλιν δή, ὅπερ ἄρτι ἐπεχείρουν, οὐκ, εἴπερ ἡ συλλαβὴ μὴ τὰ στοιχεῖά ἐστιν, ἀνάγκη αὐτὴν μὴ ὡς μέρη ἔχειν ἑαυτῆς τὰ στοιχεῖα, ἢ ταὐτὸν οὖσαν αὐτοῖς ὁμοίως ἐκείνοις γνωστὴν εἶναι;
SOCRATES: Again then, as I was trying to do just now, if the syllable is not the elements, is it not necessary either that it does not have the elements as its parts, or, if it is the same as them, that it is likewise knowable just as they are?
ΘΕΑΙ. οὕτως.
THEAETETUS: That is so.
ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν τοῦτο ἵνα μὴ γένηται, ἕτερον αὐτῶν αὐτὴν ἐθέμεθα;
SOCRATES: Therefore, lest this should happen, did we not posit it as different from them?
ΘΕΑΙ. ναί.
THEAETETUS: Yes.
ΣΩ. τί δʼ;
SOCRATES: What then?
εἰ μὴ τὰ στοιχεῖα συλλαβῆς μέρη ἐστίν, ἔχεις ἄλλʼ ἄττα εἰπεῖν ἃ μέρη μέν ἐστι συλλαβῆς, οὐ μέντοι στοιχεῖά γʼ ἐκείνης;
If the elements are not parts of a syllable, can you name any other things which are parts of a syllable, but are not indeed its elements?
ΘΕΑΙ. οὐδαμῶς.
THEAETETUS: By no means.
εἰ γάρ, ὦ Σώκρατες, μόριʼ ἄττʼ αὐτῆς συγχωροίην, γελοῖόν που τὰ στοιχεῖα ἀφέντα ἐπʼ ἄλλα ἰέναι.
For if, Socrates, I were to admit some other parts of it, it would surely be ridiculous to leave the elements and go to other things.
ΣΩ. παντάπασι δή, ὦ Θεαίτητε, κατὰ τὸν νῦν λόγον μία τις ἰδέα ἀμέριστος συλλαβὴ ἂν εἴη.
SOCRATES: Absolutely then, Theaetetus, according to the present argument, the syllable would be some single undivided form.
ΘΕΑΙ. ἔοικεν.
THEAETETUS: So it seems.
ΣΩ. μέμνησαι οὖν, ὦ φίλε, ὅτι ὀλίγον ἐν τῷ πρόσθεν ἀπεδεχόμεθα ἡγούμενοι εὖ λέγεσθαι ὅτι τῶν πρώτων οὐκ εἴη λόγος ἐξ ὧν τἆλλα σύγκειται, διότι αὐτὸ καθʼ αὑτὸ ἕκαστον εἴη ἀσύνθετον, καὶ οὐδὲ τὸ
εἶναι
περὶ αὐτοῦ ὀρθῶς ἔχοι προσφέροντα εἰπεῖν, οὐδὲ
τοῦτο,
ὡς ἕτερα καὶ ἀλλότρια λεγόμενα, καὶ αὕτη δὴ ἡ αἰτία ἄλογόν τε καὶ ἄγνωστον αὐτὸ ποιοῖ;
SOCRATES: Do you remember then, my friend, that a little while ago we accepted it as well said, that there is no account of the first elements of which other things are composed, because each of them itself by itself is uncompounded, and that it is not correct even to say 'to be' of it, nor 'this', since these are spoken of as different and foreign, and this very cause makes it inexplicable and unknowable?
ΘΕΑΙ. μέμνημαι.
THEAETETUS: I remember.
ΣΩ. ἦ οὖν ἄλλη τις ἢ αὕτη ἡ αἰτία τοῦ μονοειδές τε καὶ ἀμέριστον αὐτὸ εἶναι;
SOCRATES: Is there then any other cause than this of its being single-formed and undivided?
ἐγὼ μὲν γὰρ οὐχ ὁρῶ ἄλλην.
For my part, I do not see any other.
ΘΕΑΙ. οὐ γὰρ οὖν δὴ φαίνεται.
THEAETETUS: Indeed, none appears.
ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν εἰς ταὐτὸν ἐμπέπτωκεν ἡ συλλαβὴ εἶδος ἐκείνῳ, εἴπερ μέρη τε μὴ ἔχει καὶ μία ἐστὶν ἰδέα;
SOCRATES: Therefore, has not the syllable fallen into the same class as that, if indeed it does not have parts and is a single form?
ΘΕΑΙ. παντάπασι μὲν οὖν.
THEAETETUS: Absolutely.
ΣΩ. εἰ μὲν ἄρα πολλὰ στοιχεῖα ἡ συλλαβή ἐστιν καὶ ὅλον τι, μέρη δʼ αὐτῆς ταῦτα, ὁμοίως αἵ τε συλλαβαὶ γνωσταὶ καὶ ῥηταὶ καὶ τὰ στοιχεῖα, ἐπείπερ τὰ πάντα μέρη τῷ ὅλῳ ταὐτὸν ἐφάνη.
SOCRATES: If, therefore, the syllable is many elements and a certain whole, and these are its parts, then both syllables and elements are likewise knowable and speakable, since all the parts appeared to be the same as the whole.
ΘΕΑΙ. καὶ μάλα.
THEAETETUS: Very much so.
ΣΩ. εἰ δέ γε ἕν τε καὶ ἀμερές, ὁμοίως μὲν συλλαβή, ὡσαύτως δὲ στοιχεῖον ἄλογόν τε καὶ ἄγνωστον· ἡ γὰρ αὐτὴ αἰτία ποιήσει αὐτὰ τοιαῦτα.
SOCRATES: But if indeed it is one and undivided, then the syllable, likewise, and the element, in the same way, are inexplicable and unknowable; for the same cause will make them such.
ΘΕΑΙ. οὐκ ἔχω ἄλλως εἰπεῖν.
THEAETETUS: I cannot say otherwise.
ΣΩ. τοῦτο μὲν ἄρα μὴ ἀποδεχώμεθα, ὃς ἂν λέγῃ συλλαβὴν μὲν γνωστὸν καὶ ῥητόν, στοιχεῖον δὲ τοὐναντίον.
SOCRATES: Therefore, let us not accept it if anyone says that the syllable is knowable and speakable, but the element is the opposite.
ΘΕΑΙ. μὴ γάρ, εἴπερ τῷ λόγῳ πειθόμεθα.
THEAETETUS: No indeed, if we are to believe the argument.