§157ΣΩ. καὶ τἆλλα δὴ οὕτω, σκληρὸν καὶ θερμὸν καὶ πάντα, τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον ὑποληπτέον, αὐτὸ μὲν καθʼ αὑτὸ μηδὲν εἶναι, ὃ δὴ καὶ τότε ἐλέγομεν, ἐν δὲ τῇ πρὸς ἄλληλα ὁμιλίᾳ πάντα γίγνεσθαι καὶ παντοῖα ἀπὸ τῆς κινήσεως, ἐπεὶ καὶ τὸ ποιοῦν εἶναί τι καὶ τὸ πάσχον αὐτῶν ἐπὶ ἑνὸς νοῆσαι, ὥς φασιν, οὐκ εἶναι παγίως.
SOCRATES: And indeed we must conceive the other things in this way—hard and hot and all of them—in the same manner, namely, that nothing is itself by itself (which indeed we were also saying then), but in their intercourse with one another all things become, and become of every sort, from motion; since even to conceive of their active or passive element on a single case, as they say, is not firmly possible.
οὔτε γὰρ ποιοῦν ἐστί τι πρὶν ἂν τῷ πάσχοντι συνέλθῃ, οὔτε πάσχον πρὶν ἂν τῷ ποιοῦντι· τό τέ τινι συνελθὸν καὶ ποιοῦν ἄλλῳ αὖ προσπεσὸν πάσχον ἀνεφάνη.
For there is neither an active thing before it meets with the passive, nor a passive before it meets with the active; and that which, having met with one thing, is active, when it collides with another in turn, is revealed as passive.
ὥστε ἐξ ἁπάντων τούτων, ὅπερ ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἐλέγομεν, οὐδὲν εἶναι ἓν αὐτὸ καθʼ αὑτό, ἀλλά τινι ἀεὶ γίγνεσθαι, τὸ δʼ εἶναι πανταχόθεν ἐξαιρετέον, οὐχ ὅτι ἡμεῖς πολλὰ καὶ ἄρτι ἠναγκάσμεθα ὑπὸ συνηθείας καὶ ἀνεπιστημοσύνης χρῆσθαι αὐτῷ.
So that from all these things, as we were saying from the beginning, nothing is one itself by itself, but is always becoming for something, and 'to be' must be removed from everywhere, not but that we have been forced, both often and just now, by habit and lack of knowledge, to use it.
τὸ δʼ οὐ δεῖ, ὡς ὁ τῶν σοφῶν λόγος, οὔτε τι συγχωρεῖν οὔτε του οὔτʼ ἐμοῦ οὔτε τόδε οὔτʼ ἐκεῖνο οὔτε ἄλλο οὐδὲν ὄνομα ὅτι ἂν ἱστῇ, ἀλλὰ κατὰ φύσιν φθέγγεσθαι γιγνόμενα καὶ ποιούμενα καὶ ἀπολλύμενα καὶ ἀλλοιούμενα· ὡς ἐάν τί τις στήσῃ τῷ λόγῳ, εὐέλεγκτος ὁ τοῦτο ποιῶν.
But we must not do so, according to the argument of the wise, nor must we allow 'something' or 'of someone' or 'my' or 'this' or 'that' or any other name that makes things stand still, but we should speak according to nature of things becoming, being produced, perishing, and altering; since if anyone makes anything stand still in speech, he who does so is easily refuted.
δεῖ δὲ καὶ κατὰ μέρος οὕτω λέγειν καὶ περὶ πολλῶν ἁθροισθέντων, ᾧ δὴ ἁθροίσματι ἄνθρωπόν τε τίθενται καὶ λίθον καὶ ἕκαστον ζῷόν τε καὶ εἶδος.
And we must speak in this way both part by part and about many things gathered together, to which aggregate they apply the names of 'man' and 'stone' and each animal and class.
ταῦτα δή, ὦ Θεαίτητε, ἆρʼ ἡδέα δοκεῖ σοι εἶναι, καὶ γεύοιο ἂν αὐτῶν ὡς ἀρεσκόντων;
Do these things, Theaetetus, seem pleasant to you, and would you taste of them as being to your liking?
ΘΕΑΙ. οὐκ οἶδα ἔγωγε, ὦ Σώκρατες· καὶ γὰρ οὐδὲ περὶ σοῦ δύναμαι κατανοῆσαι πότερα δοκοῦντά σοι λέγεις αὐτὰ ἢ ἐμοῦ ἀποπειρᾷ.
THEAETETUS: I do not know, Socrates; for indeed I cannot even understand about you, whether you say these things as believing them yourself, or are making trial of me.
ΣΩ. οὐ μνημονεύεις, ὦ φίλε, ὅτι ἐγὼ μὲν οὔτʼ οἶδα οὔτε ποιοῦμαι τῶν τοιούτων οὐδὲν ἐμόν, ἀλλʼ εἰμὶ αὐτῶν ἄγονος, σὲ δὲ μαιεύομαι καὶ τούτου ἕνεκα ἐπᾴδω τε καὶ παρατίθημι ἑκάστων τῶν σοφῶν ἀπογεύσασθαι, ἕως ἂν εἰς φῶς τὸ σὸν δόγμα συνεξαγάγω· ἐξαχθέντος δὲ τότʼ ἤδη σκέψομαι εἴτʼ ἀνεμιαῖον εἴτε γόνιμον ἀναφανήσεται.
SOCRATES: Do you not remember, my friend, that I neither know nor make any of these things my own, but am barren of them, but I am acting as midwife to you, and for this reason I sing incantations and set before you dishes from each of the wise to taste, until I can help bring your own opinion out into the light; and once it is brought out, then I will examine whether it turns out to be a wind-egg or fertile.
ἀλλὰ θαρρῶν καὶ καρτερῶν εὖ καὶ ἀνδρείως ἀποκρίνου ἃ ἂν φαίνηταί σοι περὶ ὧν ἂν ἐρωτῶ.
But with courage and endurance, answer well and manly whatever appears to you concerning the things I ask.
ΘΕΑΙ. ἐρώτα δή.
THEAETETUS: Ask then.
ΣΩ. λέγε τοίνυν πάλιν εἴ σοι ἀρέσκει τὸ μή τι εἶναι ἀλλὰ γίγνεσθαι ἀεὶ ἀγαθὸν καὶ καλὸν καὶ πάντα ἃ ἄρτι διῇμεν.
SOCRATES: Say then again if it pleases you that nothing 'is' but is always 'becoming'—good and beautiful and all the things we just went through.
ΘΕΑΙ. ἀλλʼ ἔμοιγε, ἐπειδὴ σοῦ ἀκούω οὕτω διεξιόντος, θαυμασίως φαίνεται ὡς ἔχειν λόγον καὶ ὑποληπτέον ᾗπερ διελήλυθας.
THEAETETUS: Indeed, to me at least, since I hear you going through it in this way, it appears wonderfully to make sense and that we must conceive it in the way you have gone through.
ΣΩ. μὴ τοίνυν ἀπολίπωμεν ὅσον ἐλλεῖπον αὐτοῦ.
SOCRATES: Let us not, then, leave behind what is lacking of it.
λείπεται δὲ ἐνυπνίων τε πέρι καὶ νόσων τῶν τε ἄλλων καὶ μανίας, ὅσα τε παρακούειν ἢ παρορᾶν ἤ τι ἄλλο παραισθάνεσθαι λέγεται.
And there remains the matter of dreams and diseases, especially madness, and all that is said to be mishearing, misseeing, or otherwise misperceiving.
οἶσθα γάρ που ὅτι ἐν πᾶσι τούτοις ὁμολογουμένως ἐλέγχεσθαι δοκεῖ ὃν ἄρτι διῇμεν λόγον, ὡς παντὸς μᾶλλον ἡμῖν ψευδεῖς αἰσθήσεις ἐν αὐτοῖς γιγνομένας, καὶ πολλοῦ δεῖ τὰ φαινόμενα ἑκάστῳ ταῦτα καὶ εἶναι, ἀλλὰ πᾶν τοὐναντίον οὐδὲν ὧν φαίνεται εἶναι.
For you know, I suppose, that in all these cases the argument we just went through seems admittedly to be refuted, since false perceptions occur in us in these states more than anything, and far from the things appearing to each person being actually so, on the contrary, nothing of what appears actually is.