§415ΣΩ. καὶ ἐγώ σοι συμβούλομαι, ὦ Ἑρμόγενες.
SOCRATES: And I also advise you so, Hermogenes.
ἀλλὰ μὴ λίαν, ὦ δαιμόνιε, ἀκριβολογοῦ,
"μή μʼ ἀπογυιώσῃς μένεος. "
ἔρχομαι γὰρ ἐπὶ τὴν κορυφὴν ὧν εἴρηκα, ἐπειδὰν μετὰ τέχνην μηχανὴν ἐπισκεψώμεθα.
But do not inquire too precisely, my dear sir, lest "you sap my strength." For I am coming to the summit of what I have spoken, once we examine 'machine' after 'art'.
μηχανὴ
γάρ μοι δοκεῖ τοῦ ἄνειν ἐπὶ πολὺ σημεῖον εἶναι· τὸ γὰρ
μῆκός
πως τὸ πολὺ σημαίνει· ἐξ ἀμφοῖν οὖν τούτοιν σύγκειται,
μήκους
τε καὶ τοῦ
ἄνειν,
τὸ ὄνομα ἡ
μηχανή.
For 'machine' seems to me to be a sign of "accomplishing much"; for "length" somehow signifies "much"; therefore, from both of these, "length" and "accomplishing", the name 'machine' is composed.
ἀλλʼ, ὅπερ νυνδὴ εἶπον, ἐπὶ τὴν κορυφὴν δεῖ τῶν εἰρημένων ἐλθεῖν· ἀρετὴ
γὰρ καὶ
κακία
ὅτι βούλεται τὰ ὀνόματα ζητητέα.
But, as I said just now, we must come to the summit of what has been spoken; we must seek what the names 'virtue' and 'vice' want to mean.
τὸ μὲν οὖν ἕτερον οὔπω καθορῶ, τὸ δʼ ἕτερον δοκεῖ μοι κατάδηλον εἶναι.
Now, the one I do not yet see, but the other seems to me to be completely clear.
συμφωνεῖ γὰρ τοῖς ἔμπροσθεν πᾶσιν.
For it agrees with all the preceding.
ἅτε γὰρ ἰόντων τῶν πραγμάτων, πᾶν τὸ κακῶς ἰὸν
κακία
ἂν εἴη· τοῦτο δὲ ὅταν ἐν ψυχῇ ᾖ, τὸ κακῶς ἰέναι ἐπὶ τὰ πράγματα, μάλιστα τὴν τοῦ ὅλου ἐπωνυμίαν ἔχει τῆς κακίας.
Since existing things are moving, all that moves badly would be 'vice'; and whenever this is in the soul, moving badly towards things, it especially has the name of 'vice' for the whole.
τὸ δὲ κακῶς ἰέναι ὅτι ποτʼ ἔστιν, δοκεῖ μοι δηλοῦν καὶ ἐν τῇ
δειλίᾳ,
ὃ οὔπω διήλθομεν ἀλλʼ ὑπερέβημεν, δέον αὐτὸ μετὰ τὴν ἀνδρείαν σκέψασθαι· δοκοῦμεν δέ μοι καὶ ἄλλα πολλὰ ὑπερβεβηκέναι.
And what on earth "moving badly" is, it seems to me to reveal also in 'cowardice', which we have not yet gone through but passed over, though it was necessary to examine it after courage; indeed, we seem to me to have passed over many other things as well.
ἡ δʼ οὖν δειλία τῆς ψυχῆς σημαίνει δεσμὸν εἶναι ἰσχυρόν· τὸ γὰρ
λίαν
ἰσχύς τίς ἐστιν.
At any rate, cowardice of the soul signifies a strong bond; for "too much" is a kind of strength.
δεσμὸς οὖν ὁ λίαν καὶ ὁ μέγιστος τῆς ψυχῆς ἡ δειλία ἂν εἴη· ὥσπερ γε καὶ ἡ ἀπορία κακόν, καὶ πᾶν, ὡς ἔοικεν, ὅτι ἂν ἐμποδὼν ᾖ τῷ ἰέναι καὶ πορεύεσθαι.
Therefore, cowardice would be the excessive and greatest bond of the soul; just as 'difficulty' is an evil, and indeed, as it seems, everything that is an obstacle to going and proceeding.
τοῦτʼ οὖν φαίνεται τὸ κακῶς ἰέναι δηλοῦν, τὸ ἰσχομένως τε καὶ ἐμποδιζομένως πορεύεσθαι, ὃ δὴ ψυχὴ ὅταν ἔχῃ, κακίᾳ μεστὴ γίγνεται.
This, then, seems to reveal "moving badly", namely, to proceed in a restrained and hindered manner, which indeed the soul, whenever it has it, becomes full of vice.
εἰ δʼ ἐπὶ τοιούτοις ἡ
κακία
ἐστὶν τοὔνομα, τοὐναντίον τούτου ἡ
ἀρετὴ
ἂν εἴη, σημαῖνον πρῶτον μὲν εὐπορίαν, ἔπειτα δὲ λελυμένην τὴν ῥοὴν τῆς ἀγαθῆς ψυχῆς εἶναι ἀεί, ὥστε τὸ ἀσχέτως καὶ τὸ ἀκωλύτως ἀεὶ ῥέον ἐπωνυμίαν εἴληφεν, ὡς ἔοικε, τοῦτο τοὔνομα, ὃ ὀρθῶς μὲν ἔχει
ἀειρείτην
καλεῖν, συγκεκρότηται δὲ καὶ καλεῖται
ἀρετή.
But if 'vice' is the name for such things, the opposite of this would be 'virtue', signifying first "ease of passage", and then that the flow of the good soul is always released, so that that which flows always without restraint and hindrance has received, as it seems, this name, which it is correct to call "always-flowing", but it has been compressed and is called 'virtue'.
καὶ ἴσως με αὖ φήσεις πλάττειν· ἐγὼ δέ φημι, εἴπερ ὃ ἔμπροσθεν εἶπον ὀρθῶς ἔχει, ἡ
κακία,
καὶ τοῦτο τὸ ὄνομα τὴν
ἀρετὴν
ὀρθῶς ἔχειν.
And perhaps you will say again that I am fabricating; but I say that if what I said before is correct, namely 'vice', then this name 'virtue' is also correct.
§416ΕΡΜ. τὸ δὲ δὴ
κακόν,
διʼ οὗ πολλὰ τῶν ἔμπροσθεν εἴρηκας, τί ἂν νοοῖ τοὔνομα;
HERMOGENES: But what about 'evil' itself, by means of which you have spoken of many of the preceding things, what would that name mean?
ΣΩ. ἄτοπόν τι νὴ Δία ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ καὶ χαλεπὸν συμβαλεῖν.
SOCRATES: By Zeus, it seems to me to be something strange and difficult to understand.
ἐπάγω οὖν καὶ τούτῳ ἐκείνην τὴν μηχανήν.
I will apply that same device to this as well.
ΕΡΜ. ποίαν ταύτην;
HERMOGENES: What sort of device is that?
ΣΩ. τὴν τοῦ βαρβαρικόν τι καὶ τοῦτο φάναι εἶναι.
SOCRATES: To say that this too is something foreign.
ΕΡΜ. καὶ ἔοικάς γε ὀρθῶς λέγοντι.
HERMOGENES: And you seem to be speaking correctly.
ἀλλʼ εἰ δοκεῖ, ταῦτα μὲν ἐῶμεν, τὸ δὲ
καλὸν
καὶ
αἰσχρὸν
πειρώμεθα ἰδεῖν πῇ εὐλόγως ἔχει.
But if it seems best, let us leave these things aside, and let us try to see how 'beautiful' and 'ugly' make sense.
ΣΩ. τὸ μὲν τοίνυν
αἰσχρὸν
καὶ δὴ κατάδηλόν μοι φαίνεται ὃ νοεῖ· καὶ τοῦτο γὰρ τοῖς ἔμπροσθεν ὁμολογεῖται.
SOCRATES: Well, then, 'ugly' already seems completely clear to me as to what it means; for this also is agreed with the preceding.
τὸ γὰρ ἐμποδίζον καὶ ἴσχον τῆς ῥοῆς τὰ ὄντα λοιδορεῖν μοι φαίνεται διὰ παντὸς ὁ τὰ ὀνόματα τιθείς, καὶ νῦν τῷ ἀεὶ ἴσχοντι τὸν ῥοῦν τοῦτο τὸ ὄνομα ἔθετο τὸ
ἀεισχοροῦν
· νῦν δὲ συγκροτήσαντες
αἰσχρὸν
καλοῦσιν.
For the one who established names seems to me to abuse throughout that which hinders and restrains the flow of existing things, and now for that which always restrains the flow he established this name, "always-restraining-the-flow"; but now, having compressed it, they call it 'ugly'.
ΕΡΜ. τί δὲ τὸ
καλόν
;
HERMOGENES: But what about 'beautiful'?
ΣΩ. τοῦτο χαλεπώτερον κατανοῆσαι.
SOCRATES: This is more difficult to understand.
καίτοι λέγει γε αὐτό· ἁρμονίᾳ μόνον καὶ μήκει τοῦ οὖ παρῆκται.
And yet it speaks itself; it has only been distorted by harmony and by the length of the ou.
ΕΡΜ. πῶς δή;
HERMOGENES: How so?
ΣΩ. τῆς διανοίας τις ἔοικεν ἐπωνυμία εἶναι τοῦτο τὸ ὄνομα.
SOCRATES: This name seems to be some name of intellect.
ΕΡΜ. πῶς λέγεις;
HERMOGENES: How do you mean?
ΣΩ. φέρε, τί οἴει σὺ εἶναι τὸ αἴτιον κληθῆναι ἑκάστῳ τῶν ὄντων;
SOCRATES: Tell me, what do you think is the cause of each of the existing things being called?
ἆρʼ οὐκ ἐκεῖνο τὸ τὰ ὀνόματα θέμενον;
Is it not that which established the names?
ΕΡΜ. πάντως που.
HERMOGENES: By all means.
ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν διάνοια ἂν εἴη τοῦτο ἤτοι θεῶν ἢ ἀνθρώπων ἢ ἀμφότερα;
SOCRATES: Would this not be the intellect of either gods or humans, or both?
ΕΡΜ. ναί.
HERMOGENES: Yes.
ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν τὸ καλέσαν τὰ πράγματα καὶ τὸ καλοῦν ταὐτόν ἐστιν τοῦτο, διάνοια;
SOCRATES: Is not that which called things and that which calls the same, namely, intellect?
ΕΡΜ. φαίνεται.
HERMOGENES: It seems so.
ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν καὶ ὅσα μὲν ἂν νοῦς τε καὶ διάνοια ἐργάσηται, ταῦτά ἐστι τὰ ἐπαινετά, ἃ δὲ μή, ψεκτά;
SOCRATES: And are not all things that mind and intellect produce praiseworthy, and those they do not, blameworthy?
ΕΡΜ. πάνυ γε.
HERMOGENES: Certainly.
ΣΩ. τὸ οὖν ἰατρικὸν ἰατρικὰ ἐργάζεται καὶ τὸ τεκτονικὸν τεκτονικά;
SOCRATES: Does the medical, then, produce medical things, and the builder's, builder's things?
ἢ πῶς λέγεις;
Or how do you say?
ΕΡΜ. οὕτως ἔγωγε.
HERMOGENES: Thus I do.
ΣΩ. καὶ τὸ καλοῦν ἄρα καλά;
SOCRATES: And does that which calls, then, produce beautiful things?
ΕΡΜ. δεῖ γέ τοι.
HERMOGENES: It must.
ΣΩ. ἔστι δέ γε τοῦτο, ὥς φαμεν, διάνοια;
SOCRATES: And this, as we say, is intellect?
ΕΡΜ. πάνυ γε.
HERMOGENES: Certainly.
ΣΩ. ὀρθῶς ἄρα φρονήσεως αὕτη ἡ ἐπωνυμία ἐστὶν τὸ
καλὸν
τῆς τὰ τοιαῦτα ἀπεργαζομένης, ἃ δὴ καλὰ φάσκοντες εἶναι ἀσπαζόμεθα.
SOCRATES: Correctly, then, 'beautiful' is this name of wisdom which produces such things, which we welcome, saying they are beautiful.
ΕΡΜ. φαίνεται.
HERMOGENES: It seems so.
ΣΩ. τί οὖν ἔτι ἡμῖν λοιπὸν τῶν τοιούτων;
SOCRATES: What then is still left for us of such things?