§95ΦΑΙΔ. οὐκ ἄρα, ὦ ἄριστε, ἡμῖν οὐδαμῇ καλῶς ἔχει ψυχὴν ἁρμονίαν τινὰ φάναι εἶναι· οὔτε γὰρ ἄν, ὡς ἔοικεν, Ὁμήρῳ θείῳ ποιητῇ ὁμολογοῖμεν οὔτε αὐτοὶ ἡμῖν αὐτοῖς. ἔχει οὕτως, ἔφη.
Phaedo: "Therefore, my excellent friend, it is in no way right for us to say that the soul is some kind of harmony; for, as it seems, we would agree neither with Homer, the divine poet, nor indeed with ourselves." "It is so," he said.
εἶεν δή, ἦ δ’ ὃς ὁ Σωκράτης, τὰ μὲν Ἁρμονίας ἡμῖν τῆς Θηβαϊκῆς ἵλεά πως, ὡς ἔοικε, μετρίως γέγονεν· τί δὲ δὴ τὰ Κάδμου, ἔφη, ὦ Κέβης, πῶς ἱλασόμεθα καὶ τίνι λόγῳ; σύ μοι δοκεῖς, ἔφη ὁ Κέβης, ἐξευρήσειν·
"Well then," said Socrates, "the things of Harmonia, our Theban goddess, have indeed, as it seems, become moderately propitious to us; but what of Cadmus's, Cebes?" he said, "how shall we propitiate him, and with what argument?" "You seem to me," said Cebes, "likely to find a way.
τουτονὶ γοῦν τὸν λόγον τὸν πρὸς τὴν ἁρμονίαν θαυμαστῶς μοι εἶπες ὡς παρὰ δόξαν.
At any rate, you spoke this argument against harmony to me in a wonderfully unexpected manner.
Σιμμίου γὰρ λέγοντος ὅτε ἠπόρει, πάνυ ἐθαύμαζον εἴ τι ἕξει τις χρήσασθαι τῷ λόγῳ αὐτοῦ·
For while Simmias was speaking when he was perplexed, I was completely wondering if anyone would have any use for his argument.
πάνυ οὖν μοι ἀτόπως ἔδοξεν εὐθὺς τὴν πρώτην ἔφοδον οὐ δέξασθαι τοῦ σοῦ λόγου.
It seemed to me, therefore, very strange that it did not even withstand the very first onset of your argument.
ταὐτὰ δὴ οὐκ ἂν θαυμάσαιμι καὶ τὸν τοῦ Κάδμου λόγον εἰ πάθοι. ὠγαθέ, ἔφη ὁ Σωκράτης, μὴ μέγα λέγε, μή τις ἡμῖν βασκανία περιτρέψῃ τὸν λόγον τὸν μέλλοντα ἔσεσθαι.
Consequently, I would not be surprised if the argument of Cadmus suffered the same fate." "My good friend," said Socrates, "do not speak boastfully, lest some evil eye should throw into confusion the argument that is to come.
ἀλλὰ δὴ ταῦτα μὲν τῷ θεῷ μελήσει, ἡμεῖς δὲ Ὁμηρικῶς ἐγγὺς ἰόντες πειρώμεθα εἰ ἄρα τι λέγεις. ἔστι δὲ δὴ τὸ κεφάλαιον ὧν ζητεῖς·
But indeed, these things will be the concern of the god, while we, approaching in Homeric fashion, shall try to see if you have a point.
ἀξιοῖς ἐπιδειχθῆναι ἡμῶν τὴν ψυχὴν ἀνώλεθρόν τε καὶ ἀθάνατον οὖσαν, εἰ φιλόσοφος ἀνὴρ μέλλων ἀποθανεῖσθαι, θαρρῶν τε καὶ ἡγούμενος ἀποθανὼν ἐκεῖ εὖ πράξειν διαφερόντως ἢ εἰ ἐν ἄλλῳ βίῳ βιοὺς ἐτελεύτα, μὴ ἀνόητόν τε καὶ ἠλίθιον θάρρος θαρρήσει.
And the main point of what you seek is this: you demand that our soul be shown to be indestructible and immortal, if a philosopher who is about to die, being confident and thinking that after death he will fare exceptionally well there, rather than if he had ended his life having lived in some other way, is not to hold a foolish and silly confidence.
τὸ δὲ ἀποφαίνειν ὅτι ἰσχυρόν τί ἐστιν ἡ ψυχὴ καὶ θεοειδὲς καὶ ἦν ἔτι πρότερον, πρὶν ἡμᾶς ἀνθρώπους γενέσθαι, οὐδὲν κωλύειν φῂς πάντα ταῦτα μηνύειν ἀθανασίαν μὲν μή, ὅτι δὲ πολυχρόνιόν τέ ἐστιν ψυχὴ καὶ ἦν που πρότερον ἀμήχανον ὅσον χρόνον καὶ ᾔδει τε καὶ ἔπραττεν πολλὰ ἄττα· ἀλλὰ γὰρ οὐδέν τι μᾶλλον ἦν ἀθάνατον, ἀλλὰ καὶ αὐτὸ τὸ εἰς ἀνθρώπου σῶμα ἐλθεῖν ἀρχὴ ἦν αὐτῇ ὀλέθρου, ὥσπερ νόσος· καὶ ταλαιπωρουμένη τε δὴ τοῦτον τὸν βίον ζῴη καὶ τελευτῶσά γε ἐν τῷ καλουμένῳ θανάτῳ ἀπολλύοιτο.
And as for showing that the soul is something strong and godlike and existed even before we human beings were born, you say that all these things do not prevent it from indicating not immortality, but that the soul is long-lived and existed somewhere before for an immense amount of time and knew and did many things; yet, it was none the more immortal for that, but the very entry into a human body was the beginning of its destruction, like a disease; and so it would live this life in distress, and at last perish in what is called death.
διαφέρειν δὲ δὴ φῂς οὐδὲν εἴτε ἅπαξ εἰς σῶμα ἔρχεται εἴτε πολλάκις, πρός γε τὸ ἕκαστον ἡμῶν φοβεῖσθαι· προσήκει γὰρ φοβεῖσθαι, εἰ μὴ ἀνόητος εἴη, τῷ μὴ εἰδότι μηδὲ ἔχοντι λόγον διδόναι ὡς ἀθάνατόν ἐστι.
And you say it makes no difference whether it enters a body once or many times, as far as the fear of each of us is concerned; for it is fitting to fear, unless one is foolish, for anyone who does not know and cannot give an account that the soul is immortal.
τοιαῦτ’ ἄττα ἐστίν, οἶμαι, ὦ Κέβης, ἃ λέγεις· καὶ ἐξεπίτηδες πολλάκις ἀναλαμβάνω, ἵνα μή τι διαφύγῃ ἡμᾶς, εἴ τέ τι βούλει, προσθῇς ἢ ἀφέλῃς. καὶ ὁ Κέβης, ἀλλ’ οὐδὲν ἔγωγε ἐν τῷ παρόντι, ἔφη, οὔτε ἀφελεῖν οὔτε προσθεῖναι δέομαι· ἔστι δὲ ταῦτα ἃ λέγω. ὁ οὖν Σωκράτης συχνὸν χρόνον ἐπισχὼν καὶ πρὸς ἑαυτόν τι σκεψάμενος, οὐ φαῦλον πρᾶγμα, ἔφη, ὦ Κέβης, ζητεῖς· ὅλως γὰρ δεῖ περὶ γενέσεως καὶ φθορᾶς τὴν αἰτίαν διαπραγματεύσασθαι.
These, I think, Cebes, are the kinds of things you say; and I intentionally repeat them often so that nothing may escape us, and so that you may add or subtract anything if you wish." And Cebes said, "But I, for my part, at present, have no need to subtract or add anything; these are indeed the things I say." Socrates, then, having paused for a considerable time and pondered something to himself, said, "It is no small matter, Cebes, that you are seeking; for it is necessary to investigate thoroughly the cause of generation and destruction as a whole."