Humanitext Reader

Plato · Phaedo §94

The Soul Ruling the Body and the Refutation of Harmony

Passage 35 of 55 · Greek

Summary

Socrates points out the absurdity that if the soul were a harmony, all souls would be equally good and vice would not exist. He further argues, quoting Homer, that the soul does not follow the physical elements but rather rules and opposes them.

§94ΦΑΙΔ. μᾶλλον δέ γέ που, ὦ Σιμμία, κατὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον κακίας οὐδεμία ψυχὴ μεθέξει, εἴπερ ἁρμονία ἐστίν·
Phaedo: "'Rather, I suppose, Simmias, according to the correct reasoning, no soul will share in vice at all, if indeed it is a harmony.
ἁρμονία γὰρ δήπου παντελῶς αὐτὸ τοῦτο οὖσα, ἁρμονία, ἀναρμοστίας οὔποτ’ ἂν μετάσχοι. οὐ μέντοι. οὐδέ γε δήπου ψυχή, οὖσα παντελῶς ψυχή, κακίας. πῶς γὰρ ἔκ γε τῶν προειρημένων; ἐκ τούτου ἄρα τοῦ λόγου ἡμῖν πᾶσαι ψυχαὶ πάντων ζῴων ὁμοίως ἀγαθαὶ ἔσονται, εἴπερ ὁμοίως ψυχαὶ πεφύκασιν αὐτὸ τοῦτο, ψυχαί, εἶναι. ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες.
For a harmony, being completely this very thing, a harmony, could surely never share in discord.' 'Certainly not.' 'Nor indeed, I suppose, could a soul, being completely a soul, share in vice.' 'For how could it, at least from what has been said before?' 'According to this argument, then, all souls of all living creatures will be equally good, if indeed they are by nature equally souls, this very thing, souls.' 'So it seems to me, Socrates,' he said.
ἦ καὶ καλῶς δοκεῖ, ἦ δ’ ὅς, οὕτω λέγεσθαι, καὶ πάσχειν ἂν ταῦτα ὁ λόγος εἰ ὀρθὴ ἡ ὑπόθεσις ἦν, τὸ ψυχὴν ἁρμονίαν εἶναι; οὐδ’ ὁπωστιοῦν, ἔφη.
'And does it seem to be well said,' he said, 'and would our argument have suffered these consequences if the hypothesis were correct, namely that the soul is a harmony?' 'In no way at all,' he said.
τί δέ; ἦ δ’ ὅς·
'But what of this?' he said.
τῶν ἐν ἀνθρώπῳ πάντων ἔσθ’ ὅτι ἄλλο λέγεις ἄρχειν ἢ ψυχὴν ἄλλως τε καὶ φρόνιμον; οὐκ ἔγωγε. πότερον συγχωροῦσαν τοῖς κατὰ τὸ σῶμα πάθεσιν ἢ καὶ ἐναντιουμένην;
'Of all the things in a human being, is there anything else you would say rules other than the soul, especially a wise one?' 'Not I.' 'Does it do so by yielding to the passions of the body, or also by opposing them?
λέγω δὲ τὸ τοιόνδε, οἷον καύματος ἐνόντος καὶ δίψους ἐπὶ τοὐναντίον ἕλκειν, τὸ μὴ πίνειν, καὶ πείνης ἐνούσης ἐπὶ τὸ μὴ ἐσθίειν, καὶ ἄλλα μυρία που ὁρῶμεν ἐναντιουμένην τὴν ψυχὴν τοῖς κατὰ τὸ σῶμα· ἢ οὔ; πάνυ μὲν οὖν. οὐκοῦν αὖ ὡμολογήσαμεν ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν μήποτ’ ἂν αὐτήν, ἁρμονίαν γε οὖσαν, ἐναντία ᾄδειν οἷς ἐπιτείνοιτο καὶ χαλῷτο καὶ ψάλλοιτο καὶ ἄλλο ὁτιοῦν πάθος πάσχοι ἐκεῖνα ἐξ ὧν τυγχάνοι οὖσα, ἀλλ’ ἕπεσθαι ἐκείνοις καὶ οὔποτ’ ἂν ἡγεμονεύειν; ὡμολογήσαμεν, ἔφη· πῶς γὰρ οὔ;
I mean something like this: when there is heat and thirst, dragging in the opposite direction, to not drinking, and when there is hunger, to not eating; and surely we see in countless other instances the soul opposing the things of the body, do we not?' 'Certainly we do.' 'And yet, did we not agree in what went before that, being a harmony, it could never sound in opposition to the tensions, relaxations, pluckings, or any other affection of the elements of which it happens to consist, but must follow them and never lead?' 'We did agree,' he said, 'for how could we not?' 'What then?
τί οὖν; νῦν οὐ πᾶν τοὐναντίον ἡμῖν φαίνεται ἐργαζομένη, ἡγεμονεύουσά τε ἐκείνων πάντων ἐξ ὧν φησί τις αὐτὴν εἶναι, καὶ ἐναντιουμένη ὀλίγου πάντα διὰ παντὸς τοῦ βίου καὶ δεσπόζουσα πάντας τρόπους, τὰ μὲν χαλεπώτερον κολάζουσα καὶ μετ’ ἀλγηδόνων, τά τε κατὰ τὴν γυμναστικὴν καὶ τὴν ἰατρικήν, τὰ δὲ πρᾳότερον, καὶ τὰ μὲν ἀπειλοῦσα, τὰ δὲ νουθετοῦσα, ταῖς ἐπιθυμίαις καὶ ὀργαῖς καὶ φόβοις ὡς ἄλλη οὖσα ἄλλῳ πράγματι διαλεγομένη;
Does it not now appear to us to be doing the very opposite, ruling over all those things from which someone says it is composed, and opposing them in almost everything through all of life, and mastering them in every way, punishing some more harshly and with pain, as in gymnastics and medicine, and others more gently, now threatening, now admonishing, conversing with desires and angers and fears as if being one thing speaking to another?
οἷόν που καὶ Ὅμηρος ἐν Ὀδυσσείᾳ πεποίηκεν, οὗ λέγει τὸν Ὀδυσσέα· " στῆθος δὲ πλήξας κραδίην ἠνίπαπε μύθῳ· " " τέτλαθι δή, κραδίη· καὶ κύντερον ἄλλο ποτ᾽ ἔτλης. " ἆρ’ οἴει αὐτὸν ταῦτα ποιῆσαι διανοούμενον ὡς ἁρμονίας αὐτῆς οὔσης καὶ οἵας ἄγεσθαι ὑπὸ τῶν τοῦ σώματος παθημάτων, ἀλλ’ οὐχ οἵας ἄγειν τε ταῦτα καὶ δεσπόζειν, καὶ οὔσης αὐτῆς πολὺ θειοτέρου τινὸς πράγματος ἢ καθ’ ἁρμονίαν; νὴ Δία, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ.
Just as Homer has written in the Odyssey, where he says of Odysseus: "He smote his breast, and chid his heart with words: Endure, my heart; you have endured worse than this before." Do you think he wrote this thinking that the soul was a harmony, and such as to be led by the passions of the body, and not rather such as to lead and master them, being itself a far more divine thing than a harmony?' 'By Zeus, Socrates,' he said, 'so it seems to me.'"

Notes

  1. 94bπάσχειν ἂν ταῦτα ὁ λόγος εἰ ὀρθὴ ἡ ὑπόθεσις ἦν — This is a counterfactual conditional construction. The protasis has εἰ with the imperfect indicative (ἦν), and the apodosis contains the infinitive with ἄν (πάσχειν ἂν) dependent on the governing verb δοκεῖ. It expresses a situation contrary to fact: if the hypothesis were correct (which it is not), the argument would suffer these consequences.
  2. 94cἐναντία ᾄδειν οἷς ἐπιτείνοιτο — The relative pronoun οἷς is in the dative case due to the omission or attraction of its antecedent. The optative verbs (ἐπιτείνοιτο, χαλῷτο, ψάλλοιτο) in the relative clause represent the oblique optative (optative of indirect discourse) because they report a past agreement introduced by ὡμολογήσαμεν.
  3. 94dὡς ἄλλη οὖσα ἄλλῳ πράγματι διαλεγομένη — The particle ὡς with the nominative participles (οὖσα, διαλεγομένη) expresses a subjective comparison or manner ("as if being..."). The juxtaposition of ἄλλη (feminine, agreeing with "soul") and ἄλλῳ (neuter, agreeing with "thing") is a characteristic Greek idiom emphasizing the sharp distinction between two entities, indicating that the soul, as one distinct entity, is addressing another distinct entity (the body or its passions).
  4. 94eὡς ἁρμονίας αὐτῆς οὔσης καὶ οἵας ἄγεσθαι — This phrase features a genitive absolute construction introduced by ὡς (ὡς ἁρμονίας αὐτῆς οὔσης), representing the subjective thought of the subject (Homer). The genitive adjective οἵας agrees with the subject of the absolute clause, ἁρμονίας, and is completed by the infinitives (passive ἄγεσθαι, "to be led", and active ἄγειν, "to lead") to define the characteristic nature of the harmony.

Cite this passage

Plato, Phaedo §94. Humanitext Reader, https://reader.humanitext.ai/en/text/urn:cts:greekLit:tlg0059.tlg004.humanitext-grc2:94

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