§90ΦΑΙΔ. εἰ γάρ που μετὰ τέχνης ἐχρῆτο, ὥσπερ ἔχει οὕτως ἂν ἡγήσατο, τοὺς μὲν χρηστοὺς καὶ πονηροὺς σφόδρα ὀλίγους εἶναι ἑκατέρους, τοὺς δὲ μεταξὺ πλείστους. πῶς λέγεις; ἔφην ἐγώ. ὥσπερ, ἦ δ’ ὅς, περὶ τῶν σφόδρα σμικρῶν καὶ μεγάλων·
Phaedo: “Indeed, if he had dealt with them with art, he would have believed that, as the matter truly is, both the good and the wicked are extremely few in each case, while those in between are the most numerous.” “How do you mean?” I said. “‘Just as,’ he said, ‘concerning the extremely small and large.
οἴει τι σπανιώτερον εἶναι ἢ σφόδρα μέγαν ἢ σφόδρα σμικρὸν ἐξευρεῖν ἄνθρωπον ἢ κύνα ἢ ἄλλο ὁτιοῦν;
Do you think it is anything rarer than to find an extremely large or extremely small human being, or dog, or anything else whatever?
ἢ αὖ ταχὺν ἢ βραδὺν ἢ αἰσχρὸν ἢ καλὸν ἢ λευκὸν ἢ μέλανα;
Or again, swift or slow, ugly or beautiful, white or black?
ἢ οὐχὶ ᾔσθησαι ὅτι πάντων τῶν τοιούτων τὰ μὲν ἄκρα τῶν ἐσχάτων σπάνια καὶ ὀλίγα, τὰ δὲ μεταξὺ ἄφθονα καὶ πολλά; πάνυ γε, ἦν δ’ ἐγώ.
Or have you not perceived that of all such things, the extremes of the outermost points are rare and few, while those in between are abundant and many?’” “‘Certainly,’ I said.
οὐκοῦν οἴει, ἔφη, εἰ πονηρίας ἀγὼν προτεθείη, πάνυ ἂν ὀλίγους καὶ ἐνταῦθα τοὺς πρώτους φανῆναι; εἰκός γε, ἦν δ’ ἐγώ. εἰκὸς γάρ, ἔφη. ἀλλὰ ταύτῃ μὲν οὐχ ὅμοιοι οἱ λόγοι τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, ἀλλὰ σοῦ νυνδὴ προάγοντος ἐγὼ ἐφεσπόμην, ἀλλ’ ἐκείνῃ, ᾗ, ἐπειδάν τις πιστεύσῃ λόγῳ τινὶ ἀληθεῖ εἶναι ἄνευ τῆς περὶ τοὺς λόγους τέχνης, κἄπειτα ὀλίγον ὕστερον αὐτῷ δόξῃ ψευδὴς εἶναι, ἐνίοτε μὲν ὤν, ἐνίοτε δ’ οὐκ ὤν, καὶ αὖθις ἕτερος καὶ ἕτερος· — καὶ μάλιστα δὴ οἱ περὶ τοὺς ἀντιλογικοὺς λόγους διατρίψαντες οἶσθ’ ὅτι τελευτῶντες οἴονται σοφώτατοι γεγονέναι καὶ κατανενοηκέναι μόνοι ὅτι οὔτε τῶν πραγμάτων οὐδενὸς οὐδὲν ὑγιὲς οὐδὲ βέβαιον οὔτε τῶν λόγων, ἀλλὰ πάντα τὰ ὄντα ἀτεχνῶς ὥσπερ ἐν Εὐρίπῳ ἄνω κάτω στρέφεται καὶ χρόνον οὐδένα ἐν οὐδενὶ μένει. πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ἔφην ἐγώ, ἀληθῆ λέγεις. οὐκοῦν, ὦ Φαίδων, ἔφη, οἰκτρὸν ἂν εἴη τὸ πάθος, εἰ ὄντος δή τινος ἀληθοῦς καὶ βεβαίου λόγου καὶ δυνατοῦ κατανοῆσαι, ἔπειτα διὰ τὸ παραγίγνεσθαι τοιούτοις τισὶ λόγοις, τοῖς αὐτοῖς τοτὲ μὲν δοκοῦσιν ἀληθέσιν εἶναι, τοτὲ δὲ μή, μὴ ἑαυτόν τις αἰτιῷτο μηδὲ τὴν ἑαυτοῦ ἀτεχνίαν, ἀλλὰ τελευτῶν διὰ τὸ ἀλγεῖν ἅσμενος ἐπὶ τοὺς λόγους ἀφ’ ἑαυτοῦ τὴν αἰτίαν ἀπώσαιτο καὶ ἤδη τὸν λοιπὸν βίον μισῶν τε καὶ λοιδορῶν τοὺς λόγους διατελοῖ, τῶν δὲ ὄντων τῆς ἀληθείας τε καὶ ἐπιστήμης στερηθείη. νὴ τὸν Δία, ἦν δ’ ἐγώ, οἰκτρὸν δῆτα. πρῶτον μὲν τοίνυν, ἔφη, τοῦτο εὐλαβηθῶμεν, καὶ μὴ παρίωμεν εἰς τὴν ψυχὴν ὡς τῶν λόγων κινδυνεύει οὐδὲν ὑγιὲς εἶναι, ἀλλὰ πολὺ μᾶλλον ὅτι ἡμεῖς οὔπω ὑγιῶς ἔχομεν, ἀλλὰ ἀνδριστέον καὶ προθυμητέον ὑγιῶς ἔχειν, σοὶ μὲν οὖν καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις καὶ τοῦ ἔπειτα βίου παντὸς ἕνεκα, ἐμοὶ δὲ αὐτοῦ ἕνεκα τοῦ θανάτου, ὡς κινδυνεύω ἔγωγε ἐν τῷ παρόντι περὶ αὐτοῦ τούτου οὐ φιλοσόφως ἔχειν ἀλλ’ ὥσπερ οἱ πάνυ ἀπαίδευτοι φιλονίκως. §91ΦΑΙΔ. καὶ γὰρ ἐκεῖνοι ὅταν περί του ἀμφισβητῶσιν, ὅπῃ μὲν ἔχει περὶ ὧν ἂν ὁ λόγος ᾖ οὐ φροντίζουσιν, ὅπως δὲ ἃ αὐτοὶ ἔθεντο ταῦτα δόξει τοῖς παροῦσιν, τοῦτο προθυμοῦνται.
‘Therefore,’ he said, ‘do you think that, if a contest of wickedness were proposed, there too the first would appear to be very few?’” “‘It is likely,’ I said. “‘For it is likely,’ he said. ‘But in this respect, arguments are not like human beings—rather, I was just now following where you led—but in that respect, in which, whenever one trusts a certain argument to be true without the art of arguments, and then a little later it seems to him to be false, sometimes being so, and sometimes not, and again another and another;—and especially those, you know, who have spent their time in contentious arguments, end by believing that they have become the wisest of all and that they alone have understood that there is nothing sound or secure in any of the things that exist nor in arguments, but that all existing things simply turn upside down, just as in the Euripus, and remain in nothing for any time.’” “‘Certainly,’ I said, ‘you speak very truly.’ “‘Therefore, Phaedo,’ he said, ‘would it not be a pitiable passion, if, when there is some true, secure argument capable of being understood, then because of being present at such arguments, which at one time seem to be true and at another time not, one should not blame oneself nor one’s own lack of art, but ending, out of pain, should gladly thrust the blame away from oneself onto the arguments, and continue for the rest of his life hating and reviling arguments, and be deprived of the truth and knowledge of existing things?’” “‘By Zeus,’ I said, ‘it would indeed be pitiable.’ “‘First then,’ he said, ‘let us beware of this, and let us not admit into our soul the thought that there is likely nothing sound in arguments, but much rather that we ourselves are not yet soundly disposed, but we must act like men and be eager to become sound—you and the others for the sake of all your remaining life, and I for the sake of death itself, since I risk at present being disposed towards this very thing not philosophically, but like those who are altogether uneducated, contentiously.’ For those people, when they dispute about something, do not care how the things about which the argument is behave, but they are eager that the things they themselves laid down should seem so to those present.
καὶ ἐγώ μοι δοκῶ ἐν τῷ παρόντι τοσοῦτον μόνον ἐκείνων διοίσειν· οὐ γὰρ ὅπως τοῖς παροῦσιν ἃ ἐγὼ λέγω δόξει ἀληθῆ εἶναι προθυμήσομαι, εἰ μὴ εἴη πάρεργον, ἀλλ’ ὅπως αὐτῷ ἐμοὶ ὅτι μάλιστα δόξει οὕτως ἔχειν.
And I seem to myself at present to differ from them only in this much: for I shall not be eager that what I say should seem true to those present, unless it should be a by-product, but rather that it should seem to be so to my own self as much as possible.
λογίζομαι γάρ, ὦ φίλε ἑταῖρε — θέασαι ὡς πλεονεκτικῶς — εἰ μὲν τυγχάνει ἀληθῆ ὄντα ἃ λέγω, καλῶς δὴ ἔχει τὸ πεισθῆναι· εἰ δὲ μηδέν ἐστι τελευτήσαντι, ἀλλ’ οὖν τοῦτόν γε τὸν χρόνον αὐτὸν τὸν πρὸ τοῦ θανάτου ἧττον τοῖς παροῦσιν ἀηδὴς ἔσομαι ὀδυρόμενος, ἡ δὲ ἄνοιά μοι αὕτη οὐ συνδιατελεῖ — κακὸν γὰρ ἂν ἦν — ἀλλ’ ὀλίγον ὕστερον ἀπολεῖται.
For I calculate, my dear companion—see how selfishly!—if what I say happens to be true, it is indeed well to be persuaded; but if there is nothing for one who has died, at any rate during this time, the time before death, I shall be less unpleasant to those present by lamenting, and this folly of mine will not continue with me—for that would have been an evil—but will perish a little later.
παρεσκευασμένος δή, ἔφη, ὦ Σιμμία τε καὶ Κέβης, οὑτωσὶ ἔρχομαι ἐπὶ τὸν λόγον·
Having prepared myself, then, Simmias and Cebes,’ he said, ‘in this way, I come to the argument.
ὑμεῖς μέντοι, ἂν ἐμοὶ πείθησθε, σμικρὸν φροντίσαντες Σωκράτους, τῆς δὲ ἀληθείας πολὺ μᾶλλον, ἐὰν μέν τι ὑμῖν δοκῶ ἀληθὲς λέγειν, συνομολογήσατε, εἰ δὲ μή, παντὶ λόγῳ ἀντιτείνετε, εὐλαβούμενοι ὅπως μὴ ἐγὼ ὑπὸ προθυμίας ἅμα ἐμαυτόν τε καὶ ὑμᾶς ἐξαπατήσας, ὥσπερ μέλιττα τὸ κέντρον ἐγκαταλιπὼν οἰχήσομαι. ἀλλ᾽ ἰτέον, ἔφη.
But you, if you will be persuaded by me, having cared little for Socrates, but much more for the truth, if I seem to you to say anything true, agree with me, but if not, oppose me with every argument, taking care lest I, out of eagerness, deceive both myself and you at the same time, and go away like a bee leaving its sting behind.
πρῶτόν με ὑπομνήσατε ἃ ἐλέγετε, ἐὰν μὴ φαίνωμαι μεμνημένος.
But we must go on,’ he said. ‘First remind me of what you were saying, if I do not appear to remember.
Σιμμίας μὲν γάρ, ὡς ἐγᾦμαι, ἀπιστεῖ τε καὶ φοβεῖται μὴ ἡ ψυχὴ ὅμως καὶ θειότερον καὶ κάλλιον ὂν τοῦ σώματος προαπολλύηται ἐν ἁρμονίας εἴδει οὖσα·
For Simmias, as I believe, disbelieves and fears lest the soul, though being both more divine and more beautiful than the body, should perish before it, being in the form of harmony.
Κέβης δέ μοι ἔδοξε τοῦτο μὲν ἐμοὶ συγχωρεῖν, πολυχρονιώτερόν γε εἶναι ψυχὴν σώματος, ἀλλὰ τόδε ἄδηλον παντί, μὴ πολλὰ δὴ σώματα καὶ πολλάκις κατατρίψασα ἡ ψυχὴ τὸ τελευταῖον σῶμα καταλιποῦσα νῦν αὐτὴ ἀπολλύηται, καὶ ᾖ αὐτὸ τοῦτο θάνατος, ψυχῆς ὄλεθρος, ἐπεὶ σῶμά γε ἀεὶ ἀπολλύμενον οὐδὲν παύεται.
And Cebes seemed to me to concede this to me, that the soul is more long-lasting than the body, but this remains unclear to everyone, whether the soul, having worn out many bodies many times, having left the last body, does not now perish itself, and this very thing is death, the destruction of the soul, since the body never stops perishing.
ἆρα ἄλλ’ ἢ ταῦτ’ ἐστίν, ὦ Σιμμία τε καὶ Κέβης, ἃ δεῖ ἡμᾶς ἐπισκοπεῖσθαι; συνωμολογείτην δὴ ταῦτ’ εἶναι ἄμφω. πότερον οὖν, ἔφη, πάντας τοὺς ἔμπροσθε λόγους οὐκ ἀποδέχεσθε, ἢ τοὺς μέν, τοὺς δ’ οὔ; τοὺς μέν, ἐφάτην, τοὺς δ’ οὔ.
Is it anything else than these things, Simmias and Cebes, which we must examine?’” They both agreed that these were the things. “Do you then,” he said, “not accept all the previous arguments, or some of them, and some not?” “Some,” they said, “and some not.”