§92ΦΑΙΔ. τί οὖν, ἦ δ’ ὅς, περὶ ἐκείνου τοῦ λόγου λέγετε ἐν ᾧ ἔφαμεν τὴν μάθησιν ἀνάμνησιν εἶναι, καὶ τούτου οὕτως ἔχοντος ἀναγκαίως ἔχειν ἄλλοθι πρότερον ἡμῶν εἶναι τὴν ψυχήν, πρὶν ἐν τῷ σώματι ἐνδεθῆναι; ἐγὼ μέν, ἔφη ὁ Κέβης, καὶ τότε θαυμαστῶς ὡς ἐπείσθην ὑπ’ αὐτοῦ καὶ νῦν ἐμμένω ὡς οὐδενὶ λόγῳ. καὶ μήν, ἔφη ὁ Σιμμίας, καὶ αὐτὸς οὕτως ἔχω, καὶ πάνυ ἂν θαυμάζοιμι εἴ μοι περί γε τούτου ἄλλο ποτέ τι δόξειεν. καὶ ὁ Σωκράτης, ἀλλὰ ἀνάγκη σοι, ἔφη, ὦ ξένε Θηβαῖε, ἄλλα δόξαι, ἐάνπερ μείνῃ ἥδε ἡ οἴησις, τὸ ἁρμονίαν μὲν εἶναι σύνθετον πρᾶγμα, ψυχὴν δὲ ἁρμονίαν τινὰ ἐκ τῶν κατὰ τὸ σῶμα ἐντεταμένων συγκεῖσθαι· οὐ γάρ που ἀποδέξῃ γε σαυτοῦ λέγοντος ὡς πρότερον ἦν ἁρμονία συγκειμένη, πρὶν ἐκεῖνα εἶναι ἐξ ὧν ἔδει αὐτὴν συντεθῆναι.
Phaedo: “'What then,' he said, 'do you say about that argument in which we said that learning is recollection, and that, this being so, it is necessary that our soul existed somewhere else before, before it was bound in the body?' 'For my part,' said Cebes, 'I was wonderfully persuaded by it then, and now I abide by it as by no other argument.' 'And indeed,' said Simmias, 'I myself am in the same state, and I should be very surprised if any other opinion on this matter should ever seem right to me.' And Socrates said, 'But it is necessary for you, my Theban friend, to think otherwise, if indeed this opinion remains, namely, that harmony is a composite thing, and that the soul is a kind of harmony composed of the things stretched tight throughout the body; for you surely will not accept your own saying that a harmony was already composed and existed before those things existed from which it had to be composed.
ἢ ἀποδέξῃ; οὐδαμῶς, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες. αἰσθάνῃ οὖν, ἦ δ’ ὅς, ὅτι ταῦτά σοι συμβαίνει λέγειν, ὅταν φῇς μὲν εἶναι τὴν ψυχὴν πρὶν καὶ εἰς ἀνθρώπου εἶδός τε καὶ σῶμα ἀφικέσθαι, εἶναι δὲ αὐτὴν συγκειμένην ἐκ τῶν οὐδέπω ὄντων;
Or will you accept it?' 'In no way,' he said, 'Socrates.' 'Do you perceive then,' he said, 'that this is what happens when you say, on the one hand, that the soul exists even before it comes into a human form and body, and on the other hand, that it is composed of things that do not yet exist?
οὐ γὰρ δὴ ἁρμονία γέ σοι τοιοῦτόν ἐστιν ᾧ ἀπεικάζεις, ἀλλὰ πρότερον καὶ ἡ λύρα καὶ αἱ χορδαὶ καὶ οἱ φθόγγοι ἔτι ἀνάρμοστοι ὄντες γίγνονται, τελευταῖον δὲ πάντων συνίσταται ἡ ἁρμονία καὶ πρῶτον ἀπόλλυται.
For harmony is surely not like that thing to which you compare it, but first the lyre and the strings and the notes, being as yet untuned, come to be, and last of all the harmony is composed and first it perishes.
οὗτος οὖν σοι ὁ λόγος ἐκείνῳ πῶς συνᾴσεται; οὐδαμῶς, ἔφη ὁ Σιμμίας.
How then will this argument chord with that one?' 'In no way,' said Simmias.
καὶ μήν, ἦ δ’ ὅς, πρέπει γε εἴπερ τῳ ἄλλῳ λόγῳ συνῳδῷ εἶναι καὶ τῷ περὶ ἁρμονίας. πρέπει γάρ, ἔφη ὁ Σιμμίας.
'And yet,' he said, 'it is fitting, if for any other argument, that the one about harmony should be harmonious.' 'It is indeed fitting,' said Simmias.
οὗτος τοίνυν, ἔφη, σοὶ οὐ συνῳδός·
'This one, then,' he said, 'is not harmonious for you.
ἀλλ’ ὅρα πότερον αἱρῇ τῶν λόγων, τὴν μάθησιν ἀνάμνησιν εἶναι ἢ ψυχὴν ἁρμονίαν; πολὺ μᾶλλον, ἔφη, ἐκεῖνον, ὦ Σώκρατες.
But see which of the arguments you choose: that learning is recollection, or that the soul is a harmony?' 'Much rather the former, Socrates,' he said.
ὅδε μὲν γάρ μοι γέγονεν ἄνευ ἀποδείξεως μετὰ εἰκότος τινὸς καὶ εὐπρεπείας, ὅθεν καὶ τοῖς πολλοῖς δοκεῖ ἀνθρώποις·
'For the latter has come to me without proof, along with a certain likelihood and plausibility, which is why it also seems so to the many.
ἐγὼ δὲ τοῖς διὰ τῶν εἰκότων τὰς ἀποδείξεις ποιουμένοις λόγοις σύνοιδα οὖσιν ἀλαζόσιν, καὶ ἄν τις αὐτοὺς μὴ φυλάττηται, εὖ μάλα ἐξαπατῶσι, καὶ ἐν γεωμετρίᾳ καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις ἅπασιν.
But I am aware that arguments that make their proofs through likelihoods are impostors, and if one is not on guard against them, they deceive very thoroughly, both in geometry and in all other things.
ὁ δὲ περὶ τῆς ἀναμνήσεως καὶ μαθήσεως λόγος δι’ ὑποθέσεως ἀξίας ἀποδέξασθαι εἴρηται.
But the argument about recollection and learning has been stated through a hypothesis worthy of acceptance.
ἐρρήθη γάρ που οὕτως ἡμῶν εἶναι ἡ ψυχὴ καὶ πρὶν εἰς σῶμα ἀφικέσθαι, ὥσπερ αὐτῆς ἐστιν ἡ οὐσία ἔχουσα τὴν ἐπωνυμίαν τὴν τοῦ
ὃ ἔστιν
ἐγὼ δὲ ταύτην, ὡς ἐμαυτὸν πείθω, ἱκανῶς τε καὶ ὀρθῶς ἀποδέδεγμαι.
For it was said, I believe, that our soul exists also before coming into a body, just as its very essence does, which has the name of "that which is". And I, as I persuade myself, have accepted this sufficiently and correctly.
ἀνάγκη οὖν μοι, ὡς ἔοικε, διὰ ταῦτα μήτε ἐμαυτοῦ μήτε ἄλλου ἀποδέχεσθαι λέγοντος ὡς ψυχή ἐστιν ἁρμονία. τί δέ, ἦ δ’ ὅς, ὦ Σιμμία, τῇδε;
It is necessary for me then, as it seems, because of these things, to accept neither myself nor anyone else saying that the soul is a harmony.' 'But what about this, Simmias,' he said, 'in this way?'”