§68ΦΑΙΔ. εἰ γὰρ διαβέβληνται μὲν πανταχῇ τῷ σώματι, αὐτὴν δὲ καθ’ αὑτὴν ἐπιθυμοῦσι τὴν ψυχὴν ἔχειν, τούτου δὲ γιγνομένου εἰ φοβοῖντο καὶ ἀγανακτοῖεν, οὐ πολλὴ ἂν ἀλογία εἴη, εἰ μὴ ἅσμενοι ἐκεῖσε ἴοιεν, οἷ ἀφικομένοις ἐλπίς ἐστιν οὗ διὰ βίου ἤρων τυχεῖν — ἤρων δὲ φρονήσεως — ᾧ τε διεβέβληντο, τούτου ἀπηλλάχθαι συνόντος αὐτοῖς;
Phaedo: For if they are at enmity with the body in every way, and desire to have the soul itself by itself, and if, when this happens, they should fear and be vexed, would it not be a great absurdity if they did not go gladly to that place where, upon arrival, there is hope of obtaining what they loved throughout life—and they loved wisdom—and of being released from that with which they were at enmity, when it was with them?
ἢ ἀνθρωπίνων μὲν παιδικῶν καὶ γυναικῶν καὶ ὑέων ἀποθανόντων πολλοὶ δὴ ἑκόντες ἠθέλησαν εἰς Ἅιδου μετελθεῖν, ὑπὸ ταύτης ἀγόμενοι τῆς ἐλπίδος, τῆς τοῦ ὄψεσθαί τε ἐκεῖ ὧν ἐπεθύμουν καὶ συνέσεσθαι· φρονήσεως δὲ ἄρα τις τῷ ὄντι ἐρῶν, καὶ λαβὼν σφόδρα τὴν αὐτὴν ταύτην ἐλπίδα, μηδαμοῦ ἄλλοθι ἐντεύξεσθαι αὐτῇ ἀξίως λόγου ἢ ἐν Ἅιδου, ἀγανακτήσει τε ἀποθνῄσκων καὶ οὐχ ἅσμενος εἶσιν αὐτόσε;
Or, while many indeed have been willing of their own accord to go to Hades when their human darlings, wives, and sons died, led by this very hope, the hope of seeing there those whom they desired and of being with them, shall a man who really loves wisdom, and has firmly conceived this same hope, that he will nowhere else meet with it in any worthy manner except in Hades, be vexed when dying and not go there gladly?
οἴεσθαί γε χρή, ἐὰν τῷ ὄντι γε ᾖ, ὦ ἑταῖρε, φιλόσοφος· σφόδρα γὰρ αὐτῷ ταῦτα δόξει, μηδαμοῦ ἄλλοθι καθαρῶς ἐντεύξεσθαι φρονήσει ἀλλ’ ἢ ἐκεῖ.
One must indeed believe so, my friend, if he is really a philosopher; for he will be firmly of this opinion, that he will nowhere else meet with wisdom in its purity except there.
εἰ δὲ τοῦτο οὕτως ἔχει, ὅπερ ἄρτι ἔλεγον, οὐ πολλὴ ἂν ἀλογία εἴη εἰ φοβοῖτο τὸν θάνατον ὁ τοιοῦτος;
And if this is so, as I was just saying, would it not be a great absurdity if such a man should fear death?
πολλὴ μέντοι νὴ Δία, ἦ δ’ ὅς.
"A great one indeed, by Zeus," he said.
οὐκοῦν ἱκανόν σοι τεκμήριον, ἔφη, τοῦτο ἀνδρός, ὃν ἂν ἴδῃς ἀγανακτοῦντα μέλλοντα ἀποθανεῖσθαι, ὅτι οὐκ ἄρ᾽ ἦν φιλόσοφος ἀλλά τις φιλοσώματος;
"Then," said Socrates, "is this not a sufficient proof for you, concerning a man whom you see being vexed when he is about to die, that he was after all no philosopher, but a lover of the body?
ὁ αὐτὸς δέ που οὗτος τυγχάνει ὢν καὶ φιλοχρήματος καὶ φιλότιμος, ἤτοι τὰ ἕτερα τούτων ἢ ἀμφότερα. πάνυ, ἔφη, ἔχει οὕτως ὡς λέγεις.
And this same person, I suppose, happens to be also a lover of wealth and a lover of honor, either one of these or both." "It is entirely as you say," he said.
ἆρ’ οὖν, ἔφη, ὦ Σιμμία, οὐ καὶ ἡ ὀνομαζομένη ἀνδρεία τοῖς οὕτω διακειμένοις μάλιστα προσήκει; πάντως δήπου, ἔφη.
"Does not, then, Simmias," he said, "what is called courage also belong most of all to those who are thus disposed?" "Certainly, by all means," he said.
οὐκοῦν καὶ ἡ σωφροσύνη, ἣν καὶ οἱ πολλοὶ ὀνομάζουσι σωφροσύνην, τὸ περὶ τὰς ἐπιθυμίας μὴ ἐπτοῆσθαι ἀλλ’ ὀλιγώρως ἔχειν καὶ κοσμίως, ἆρ’ οὐ τούτοις μόνοις προσήκει, τοῖς μάλιστα τοῦ σώματος ὀλιγωροῦσίν τε καὶ ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ ζῶσιν; ἀνάγκη, ἔφη.
"And does not temperance also, which even the multitude call temperance, namely, not to be excited about desires but to hold them in contempt and with order, belong to these alone, who most of all despise the body and live in philosophy?" "Necessarily so," he said.
εἰ γὰρ ἐθέλεις, ἦ δ’ ὅς, ἐννοῆσαι τήν γε τῶν ἄλλων ἀνδρείαν τε καὶ σωφροσύνην, δόξει σοι εἶναι ἄτοπος. πῶς δή, ὦ Σώκρατες; οἶσθα, ἦ δ’ ὅς, ὅτι τὸν θάνατον ἡγοῦνται πάντες οἱ ἄλλοι τῶν μεγάλων κακῶν; καὶ μάλ᾽, ἔφη.
"For if you are willing," he said, "to consider the courage and temperance of others, they will seem to you to be strange." "How so, Socrates?" "You know," he said, "that all other men regard death as one of the great evils?" "Very much so," he said.
οὐκοῦν φόβῳ μειζόνων κακῶν ὑπομένουσιν αὐτῶν οἱ ἀνδρεῖοι τὸν θάνατον, ὅταν ὑπομένωσιν; ἔστι ταῦτα. τῷ δεδιέναι ἄρα καὶ δέει ἀνδρεῖοί εἰσι πάντες πλὴν οἱ φιλόσοφοι· καίτοι ἄλογόν γε δέει τινὰ καὶ δειλίᾳ ἀνδρεῖον εἶναι. πάνυ μὲν οὖν.
"Do not, then, the courageous among them endure death, when they do endure it, through fear of greater evils?" "That is so." "Therefore, it is by being afraid and through fear that all except philosophers are courageous; and yet it is absurd for anyone to be courageous through fear and cowardice." "Most certainly." "And what of those among them who are orderly?
τί δὲ οἱ κόσμιοι αὐτῶν; οὐ ταὐτὸν τοῦτο πεπόνθασιν·
Have they not experienced this same thing?
ἀκολασίᾳ τινὶ σώφρονές εἰσιν;
Are they temperate through a kind of self-indulgence?
καίτοι φαμέν γε ἀδύνατον εἶναι, ἀλλ’ ὅμως αὐτοῖς συμβαίνει τούτῳ ὅμοιον τὸ πάθος τὸ περὶ ταύτην τὴν εὐήθη σωφροσύνην· φοβούμενοι γὰρ ἑτέρων ἡδονῶν στερηθῆναι καὶ ἐπιθυμοῦντες ἐκείνων, ἄλλων ἀπέχονται ὑπ’ ἄλλων κρατούμενοι.
And yet we say that this is impossible, but nevertheless a state similar to this happens to them in connection with this foolish temperance; for fearing to be deprived of other pleasures and desiring them, they abstain from some because they are mastered by others.