§29δεινόν τἂν εἴη, καὶ ὡς ἀληθῶς τότʼ ἄν με δικαίως εἰσάγοι τις εἰς δικαστήριον, ὅτι οὐ νομίζω θεοὺς εἶναι ἀπειθῶν τῇ μαντείᾳ καὶ δεδιὼς θάνατον καὶ οἰόμενος σοφὸς εἶναι οὐκ ὤν.
It would indeed be a terrible thing, and then truly someone might justly bring me to court on the charge that I do not believe in the existence of gods, because I disobey the oracle, fear death, and think I am wise when I am not.
τὸ γάρ τοι θάνατον δεδιέναι, ὦ ἄνδρες, οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἐστὶν ἢ δοκεῖν σοφὸν εἶναι μὴ ὄντα· δοκεῖν γὰρ εἰδέναι ἐστὶν ἃ οὐκ οἶδεν.
For to fear death, gentlemen, is nothing other than to think one is wise when one is not; for it is to think one knows what one does not know.
οἶδε μὲν γὰρ οὐδεὶς τὸν θάνατον οὐδʼ εἰ τυγχάνει τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ πάντων μέγιστον ὂν τῶν ἀγαθῶν, δεδίασι δʼ ὡς εὖ εἰδότες ὅτι μέγιστον τῶν κακῶν ἐστι.
For no one knows about death, not even whether it happens to be the greatest of all goods for a man, yet people fear it as if they knew well that it is the greatest of evils.
καίτοι πῶς οὐκ ἀμαθία ἐστὶν αὕτη ἡ ἐπονείδιστος, ἡ τοῦ οἴεσθαι εἰδέναι ἃ οὐκ οἶδεν;
And yet how is this not that reprehensible ignorance, that of thinking one knows what one does not know?
ἐγὼ δʼ, ὦ ἄνδρες, τούτῳ καὶ ἐνταῦθα ἴσως διαφέρω τῶν πολλῶν ἀνθρώπων, καὶ εἰ δή τῳ σοφώτερός του φαίην εἶναι, τούτῳ ἄν, ὅτι οὐκ εἰδὼς ἱκανῶς περὶ τῶν ἐν Ἅιδου οὕτω καὶ οἴομαι οὐκ εἰδέναι·
But I, gentlemen, perhaps differ from most men in this and here, and if indeed I should say that I am wiser than anyone in anything, it would be in this: that having no adequate knowledge about the things in Hades, I also think that I do not know.
τὸ δὲ ἀδικεῖν καὶ ἀπειθεῖν τῷ βελτίονι καὶ θεῷ καὶ ἀνθρώπῳ, ὅτι κακὸν καὶ αἰσχρόν ἐστιν οἶδα.
But to do injustice and to disobey one's superior, whether god or man, that I know to be evil and shameful.
πρὸ οὖν τῶν κακῶν ὧν οἶδα ὅτι κακά ἐστιν, ἃ μὴ οἶδα εἰ καὶ ἀγαθὰ ὄντα τυγχάνει οὐδέποτε φοβήσομαι οὐδὲ φεύξομαι·
Therefore, in preference to the evils which I know to be evils, I shall never fear nor flee those things which I do not know, whether they even happen to be goods.
ὥστε οὐδʼ εἴ με νῦν ὑμεῖς ἀφίετε Ἀνύτῳ ἀπιστήσαντες, ὃς ἔφη ἢ τὴν ἀρχὴν οὐ δεῖν ἐμὲ δεῦρο εἰσελθεῖν ἤ, ἐπειδὴ εἰσῆλθον, οὐχ οἷόν τʼ εἶναι τὸ μὴ ἀποκτεῖναί με, λέγων πρὸς ὑμᾶς ὡς εἰ διαφευξοίμην ἤδη ὑμῶν οἱ ὑεῖς ἐπιτηδεύοντες ἃ Σωκράτης διδάσκει πάντες παντάπασι διαφθαρήσονται, —εἴ μοι πρὸς ταῦτα εἴποιτε· ὦ Σώκρατες, νῦν μὲν Ἀνύτῳ οὐ πεισόμεθα ἀλλʼ ἀφίεμέν σε, ἐπὶ τούτῳ μέντοι, ἐφʼ ᾧτε μηκέτι ἐν ταύτῃ τῇ ζητήσει διατρίβειν μηδὲ φιλοσοφεῖν· ἐὰν δὲ ἁλῷς ἔτι τοῦτο πράττων, ἀποθανῇ
—εἰ οὖν με, ὅπερ εἶπον, ἐπὶ τούτοις ἀφίοιτε, εἴποιμʼ ἂν ὑμῖν ὅτι
ἐγὼ ὑμᾶς, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, ἀσπάζομαι μὲν καὶ φιλῶ, πείσομαι δὲ μᾶλλον τῷ θεῷ ἢ ὑμῖν, καὶ ἕωσπερ ἂν ἐμπνέω καὶ οἷός τε ὦ, οὐ μὴ παύσωμαι φιλοσοφῶν καὶ ὑμῖν παρακελευόμενός τε καὶ ἐνδεικνύμενος ὅτῳ ἂν ἀεὶ ἐντυγχάνω ὑμῶν, λέγων οἷάπερ εἴωθα, ὅτι
ὦ ἄριστε ἀνδρῶν, Ἀθηναῖος ὤν, πόλεως τῆς μεγίστης καὶ εὐδοκιμωτάτης εἰς σοφίαν καὶ ἰσχύν, χρημάτων μὲν οὐκ αἰσχύνῃ ἐπιμελούμενος ὅπως σοι ἔσται ὡς πλεῖστα, καὶ δόξης καὶ τιμῆς, φρονήσεως δὲ καὶ ἀληθείας καὶ τῆς ψυχῆς ὅπως ὡς βελτίστη ἔσται οὐκ ἐπιμελῇ οὐδὲ φροντίζεις;
So, even if you dismiss me now, refusing to believe Anytus—who said that either I should not have come here in the first place, or, since I did come, that it is impossible not to put me to death, telling you that if I escape, your sons, practicing what Socrates teaches, will all be utterly corrupted—if you should say to me in response to this: "Socrates, for now we will not believe Anytus, but we let you go, on this condition, however, that you no longer spend your time in this search nor practice philosophy; and if you are caught still doing this, you shall die." If you should, as I said, let me go on these terms, I would say to you: "Gentlemen of Athens, I respect and love you, but I shall obey the god rather than you, and as long as I draw breath and am able, I shall not cease practicing philosophy and exhorting and pointing it out to anyone of you I happen to meet, saying what I am accustomed to say: 'My good man, being an Athenian, of the greatest city and most renowned for wisdom and power, are you not ashamed that you care for money, how you may get as much as possible, and reputation and honor, but for wisdom and truth and the soul, how it may be as good as possible, you do not care or think?'"