§8ΣΩ. ταὐτὰ δέ γε, ὡς σὺ φῄς, οἱ μὲν δίκαια ἡγοῦνται, οἱ δὲ ἄδικα, περὶ ἃ καὶ ἀμφισβητοῦντες στασιάζουσί τε καὶ πολεμοῦσιν ἀλλήλοις·
Socrates: But indeed, the very same things, as you say, some believe to be just, and others unjust, about which, differing, they also experience faction and make war with one another.
ἆρα οὐχ οὕτω;
Is it not so?
ΕΥΘ. οὕτω.
Euthyphro: It is so.
ΣΩ. ταὔτʼ ἄρα, ὡς ἔοικεν, μισεῖταί τε ὑπὸ τῶν θεῶν καὶ φιλεῖται, καὶ θεομισῆ τε καὶ θεοφιλῆ ταὔτʼ ἂν εἴη.
Socrates: The same things, then, as it seems, are both hated by the gods and loved by them, and the same things would be both hated by the gods and dear to the gods.
ΕΥΘ. ἔοικεν.
Euthyphro: It seems so.
ΣΩ. καὶ ὅσια ἄρα καὶ ἀνόσια τὰ αὐτὰ ἂν εἴη, ὦ Εὐθύφρων, τούτῳ τῷ λόγῳ.
Socrates: And the same things, Euthyphro, would be both pious and impious, according to this argument.
ΕΥΘ. κινδυνεύει.
Euthyphro: It is likely.
ΣΩ. οὐκ ἄρα ὃ ἠρόμην ἀπεκρίνω, ὦ θαυμάσιε.
Socrates: Then you did not answer what I asked, my admirable friend.
οὐ γὰρ τοῦτό γε ἠρώτων, ὃ τυγχάνει ταὐτὸν ὂν ὅσιόν τε καὶ ἀνόσιον· ὃ δʼ ἂν θεοφιλὲς ᾖ καὶ θεομισές ἐστιν, ὡς ἔοικεν.
For I was not asking for this, which happens to be the very same thing both pious and impious; but what is dear to the gods is also, as it seems, hated by the gods.
ὥστε, ὦ Εὐθύφρων, ὃ σὺ νῦν ποιεῖς τὸν πατέρα κολάζων, οὐδὲν θαυμαστὸν εἰ τοῦτο δρῶν τῷ μὲν Διὶ προσφιλὲς ποιεῖς, τῷ δὲ Κρόνῳ καὶ τῷ Οὐρανῷ ἐχθρόν, καὶ τῷ μὲν Ἡφαίστῳ φίλον, τῇ δὲ Ἥρᾳ ἐχθρόν, καὶ εἴ τις ἄλλος τῶν θεῶν ἕτερος ἑτέρῳ διαφέρεται περὶ αὐτοῦ, καὶ ἐκείνοις κατὰ τὰ αὐτά.
So that, Euthyphro, it is not at all surprising if, in doing what you are now doing in punishing your father, you are doing what is dear to Zeus, but hateful to Cronus and Uranus, and dear to Hephaestus, but hateful to Hera, and if any other of the gods differs with another about this matter, the same applies to them as well.
ΕΥΘ. ἀλλʼ οἶμαι, ὦ Σώκρατες, περί γε τούτου τῶν θεῶν οὐδένα ἕτερον ἑτέρῳ διαφέρεσθαι, ὡς οὐ δεῖ δίκην διδόναι ἐκεῖνον ὃς ἂν ἀδίκως τινὰ ἀποκτείνῃ.
Euthyphro: But I think, Socrates, that about this at least none of the gods differs with another: that he who has killed anyone unjustly must pay the penalty.
ΣΩ. τί δέ;
Socrates: What then?
ἀνθρώπων, ὦ Εὐθύφρων, ἤδη τινὸς ἤκουσας ἀμφισβητοῦντος ὡς τὸν ἀδίκως ἀποκτείναντα ἢ ἄλλο ἀδίκως ποιοῦντα ὁτιοῦν οὐ δεῖ δίκην διδόναι;
Have you ever, Euthyphro, heard any human being disputing that he who has killed unjustly or does anything else unjustly whatsoever must not pay the penalty?
ΕΥΘ. οὐδὲν μὲν οὖν παύονται ταῦτα ἀμφισβητοῦντες καὶ ἄλλοθι καὶ ἐν τοῖς δικαστηρίοις· ἀδικοῦντες γὰρ πάμπολλα, πάντα ποιοῦσι καὶ λέγουσι φεύγοντες τὴν δίκην.
Euthyphro: Indeed, they never stop disputing these things, both elsewhere and in the law courts; for committing very many injustices, they do and say everything to escape the penalty.
ΣΩ. ἦ καὶ ὁμολογοῦσιν, ὦ Εὐθύφρων, ἀδικεῖν, καὶ ὁμολογοῦντες ὅμως οὐ δεῖν φασὶ σφᾶς διδόναι δίκην;
Socrates: Do they also admit, Euthyphro, that they commit injustice, and admitting it, do they nevertheless say they must not pay the penalty?
ΕΥΘ. οὐδαμῶς τοῦτό γε.
Euthyphro: By no means this.
ΣΩ. οὐκ ἄρα πᾶν γε ποιοῦσι καὶ λέγουσι·
Socrates: Then they do not do and say everything.
τοῦτο γὰρ οἶμαι οὐ τολμῶσι λέγειν οὐδʼ ἀμφισβητεῖν, ὡς οὐχὶ εἴπερ ἀδικοῦσί γε δοτέον δίκην, ἀλλʼ οἶμαι οὔ φασιν ἀδικεῖν·
For this, I think, they do not dare to say or dispute: that if indeed they commit injustice they must not pay the penalty; but, I think, they deny that they commit injustice.
ἦ γάρ;
Is it not so?
ΕΥΘ. ἀληθῆ λέγεις.
Euthyphro: You speak truly.
ΣΩ. οὐκ ἄρα ἐκεῖνό γε ἀμφισβητοῦσιν, ὡς οὐ τὸν ἀδικοῦντα δεῖ διδόναι δίκην, ἀλλʼ ἐκεῖνο ἴσως ἀμφισβητοῦσιν, τὸ τίς ἐστιν ὁ ἀδικῶν καὶ τί δρῶν καὶ πότε.
Socrates: Then they do not dispute that, namely that the one committing injustice must pay the penalty, but they dispute this, perhaps: who is the one committing injustice, and doing what, and when.
ΕΥΘ. ἀληθῆ λέγεις.
Euthyphro: You speak truly.
ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν αὐτά γε ταῦτα καὶ οἱ θεοὶ πεπόνθασιν, εἴπερ στασιάζουσι περὶ τῶν δικαίων καὶ ἀδίκων ὡς ὁ σὸς λόγος, καὶ οἱ μέν φασιν ἀλλήλους ἀδικεῖν, οἱ δὲ οὔ φασιν;
Socrates: Therefore, have not the gods also experienced these very things, if indeed they experience faction about the just and the unjust according to your argument, and some say that they wrong one another, while others deny it?
ἐπεὶ ἐκεῖνό γε δήπου, ὦ θαυμάσιε, οὐδεὶς οὔτε θεῶν οὔτε ἀνθρώπων τολμᾷ λέγειν, ὡς οὐ τῷ γε ἀδικοῦντι δοτέον δίκην.
For surely, my admirable friend, no one, either of gods or of men, dares to say this: that the one committing injustice must not pay the penalty.
ΕΥΘ. ναί, τοῦτο μὲν ἀληθὲς λέγεις, ὦ Σώκρατες, τό γε κεφάλαιον.
Euthyphro: Yes, in this indeed you speak truly, Socrates, at least on the main point.
ΣΩ. ἀλλʼ ἕκαστόν γε οἶμαι, ὦ Εὐθύφρων, τῶν πραχθέντων ἀμφισβητοῦσιν οἱ ἀμφισβητοῦντες, καὶ ἄνθρωποι καὶ θεοί, εἴπερ ἀμφισβητοῦσιν θεοί·
Socrates: But indeed, I think, Euthyphro, that those who dispute, both men and gods, if indeed gods dispute, dispute about each of the things done.
πράξεώς τινος πέρι διαφερόμενοι οἱ μὲν δικαίως φασὶν αὐτὴν πεπρᾶχθαι, οἱ δὲ ἀδίκως·
Differing about some action, some say that it was done justly, and others unjustly.
ἆρʼ οὐχ οὕτω;
Is it not so?
ΕΥΘ. πάνυ γε.
Euthyphro: Certainly.