§7ΕΥΘ. ἔστι τοίνυν τὸ μὲν τοῖς θεοῖς προσφιλὲς ὅσιον, τὸ δὲ μὴ προσφιλὲς ἀνόσιον.
Euthyphro: Now then, that which is dear to the gods is pious, and that which is not dear to them is impious.
ΣΩ. παγκάλως, ὦ Εὐθύφρων, καὶ ὡς ἐγὼ ἐζήτουν ἀποκρίνασθαί σε, οὕτω νῦν ἀπεκρίνω.
Socrates: Most excellently, Euthyphro, and just as I was seeking for you to answer, so now you have answered.
εἰ μέντοι ἀληθῶς, τοῦτο οὔπω οἶδα, ἀλλὰ σὺ δῆλον ὅτι ἐπεκδιδάξεις ὡς ἔστιν ἀληθῆ ἃ λέγεις.
Whether truly, however, this I do not yet know, but you clearly will teach me in addition how what you say is true.
ΕΥΘ. πάνυ μὲν οὖν.
Euthyphro: Most certainly.
ΣΩ. φέρε δή, ἐπισκεψώμεθα τί λέγομεν.
Socrates: Come then, let us examine what we are saying.
τὸ μὲν θεοφιλές τε καὶ θεοφιλὴς ἄνθρωπος ὅσιος, τὸ δὲ θεομισὲς καὶ ὁ θεομισὴς ἀνόσιος· οὐ ταὐτὸν δʼ ἐστίν, ἀλλὰ τὸ ἐναντιώτατον, τὸ ὅσιον τῷ ἀνοσίῳ· οὐχ οὕτως;
That which is dear to the gods and the man dear to the gods are pious, while that which is hated by the gods and the man hated by the gods are impious; and they are not the same, but the very opposite, the pious and the impious; is it not so?
ΕΥΘ. οὕτω μὲν οὖν.
Euthyphro: So indeed it is.
ΣΩ. καὶ εὖ γε φαίνεται εἰρῆσθαι;
Socrates: And it seems to have been well said?
ΕΥΘ. δοκῶ, ὦ Σώκρατες.
Euthyphro: I think so, Socrates.
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ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν καὶ ὅτι στασιάζουσιν οἱ θεοί, ὦ Εὐθύφρων, καὶ διαφέρονται ἀλλήλοις καὶ ἔχθρα ἐστὶν ἐν αὐτοῖς πρὸς ἀλλήλους, καὶ τοῦτο εἴρηται;
Socrates: And was this also said, Euthyphro, that the gods experience faction, and differ with one another, and that there is enmity among them toward one another?
ΕΥΘ. εἴρηται γάρ.
Euthyphro: Yes, for it was said.
ΣΩ. ἔχθραν δὲ καὶ ὀργάς, ὦ ἄριστε, ἡ περὶ τίνων διαφορὰ ποιεῖ;
Socrates: But what kind of difference, my excellent friend, produces enmity and anger?
ὧδε δὲ σκοπῶμεν.
Let us look at it in this way.
ἆρʼ ἂν εἰ διαφεροίμεθα ἐγώ τε καὶ σὺ περὶ ἀριθμοῦ ὁπότερα πλείω, ἡ περὶ τούτων διαφορὰ ἐχθροὺς ἂν ἡμᾶς ποιοῖ καὶ ὀργίζεσθαι ἀλλήλοις, ἢ ἐπὶ λογισμὸν ἐλθόντες περί γε τῶν τοιούτων ταχὺ ἂν ἀπαλλαγεῖμεν;
If you and I were to differ about number, as to which of two groups is more, would our difference about these things make us enemies and angry with one another, or, by coming to calculation, would we quickly be rid of it, at least concerning such things?
ΕΥΘ. πάνυ γε.
Euthyphro: Certainly.
ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν καὶ περὶ τοῦ μείζονος καὶ ἐλάττονος εἰ διαφεροίμεθα, ἐπὶ τὸ μετρεῖν ἐλθόντες ταχὺ παυσαίμεθʼ ἂν τῆς διαφορᾶς;
Socrates: And if we should differ about the larger and the smaller, would we not, by coming to measuring, quickly stop the difference?
ΕΥΘ. ἔστι ταῦτα.
Euthyphro: That is so.
ΣΩ. καὶ ἐπί γε τὸ ἱστάναι ἐλθόντες, ὡς ἐγᾦμαι, περὶ τοῦ βαρυτέρου τε καὶ κουφοτέρου διακριθεῖμεν ἄν;
Socrates: And indeed, by coming to weighing, as I think, we would decide about the heavier and the lighter?
ΕΥΘ. πῶς γὰρ οὔ;
Euthyphro: Of course, how not?
ΣΩ. περὶ τίνος δὲ δὴ διενεχθέντες καὶ ἐπὶ τίνα κρίσιν οὐ δυνάμενοι ἀφικέσθαι ἐχθροί γε ἂν ἀλλήλοις εἶμεν καὶ ὀργιζοίμεθα;
Socrates: But about what, then, having differed and being unable to arrive at what decision, would we be enemies to one another and be angry?
ἴσως οὐ πρόχειρόν σοί ἐστιν, ἀλλʼ ἐμοῦ λέγοντος σκόπει εἰ τάδε ἐστὶ τό τε δίκαιον καὶ τὸ ἄδικον καὶ καλὸν καὶ αἰσχρὸν καὶ ἀγαθὸν καὶ κακόν.
Perhaps it is not at hand for you, but while I am speaking, consider if it is these things: the just and the unjust, and noble and shameful, and good and bad.
ἆρα οὐ ταῦτά ἐστιν περὶ ὧν διενεχθέντες καὶ οὐ δυνάμενοι ἐπὶ ἱκανὴν κρίσιν αὐτῶν ἐλθεῖν ἐχθροὶ ἀλλήλοις γιγνόμεθα, ὅταν γιγνώμεθα, καὶ ἐγὼ καὶ σὺ καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι ἄνθρωποι πάντες;
Are these not the things about which, having differed and being unable to arrive at a sufficient decision about them, we become enemies to one another, whenever we do become so, both I and you and all other men?
ΕΥΘ. ἀλλʼ ἔστιν αὕτη ἡ διαφορά, ὦ Σώκρατες, καὶ περὶ τούτων.
Euthyphro: But this is indeed the difference, Socrates, and about these things.
ΣΩ. τί δὲ οἱ θεοί, ὦ Εὐθύφρων;
Socrates: And what about the gods, Euthyphro?
οὐκ εἴπερ τι διαφέρονται, διʼ αὐτὰ ταῦτα διαφέροιντʼ ἄν;
If indeed they differ about anything, would they not differ because of these very things?
ΕΥΘ. πολλὴ ἀνάγκη.
Euthyphro: It is very necessary.
ΣΩ. καὶ τῶν θεῶν ἄρα, ὦ γενναῖε Εὐθύφρων, ἄλλοι ἄλλα δίκαια ἡγοῦνται κατὰ τὸν σὸν λόγον, καὶ καλὰ καὶ αἰσχρὰ καὶ ἀγαθὰ καὶ κακά· οὐ γὰρ ἄν που ἐστασίαζον ἀλλήλοις εἰ μὴ περὶ τούτων διεφέροντο· ἦ γάρ;
Socrates: And so indeed among the gods, noble Euthyphro, some believe some things to be just according to your argument, and others believe others, and likewise with noble and shameful, and good and bad; for they would not, I suppose, experience faction with one another unless they differed about these things, would they?
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ΕΥΘ. ὀρθῶς λέγεις.
Euthyphro: You speak rightly.
ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν ἅπερ καλὰ ἡγοῦνται ἕκαστοι καὶ ἀγαθὰ καὶ δίκαια, ταῦτα καὶ φιλοῦσιν, τὰ δὲ ἐναντία τούτων μισοῦσιν;
Socrates: Therefore, whatever things each group believes to be noble and good and just, these they also love, and the opposites of these they hate?
ΕΥΘ. πάνυ γε.
Euthyphro: Certainly.