Plato · Euthyphro §10

Distinction Between the Pious and the God-Loved

Passage 7 of 12 · Greek

Summary

Socrates analyzes the reason why the pious is loved by the gods, using the grammatical distinction between active/passive and actions/states. He leads Euthyphro to agree that the 'pious' and the 'god-loved' are conceptually distinct.

§10ΣΩ. τάχʼ, ὠγαθέ, βέλτιον εἰσόμεθα.

Socrates: We shall soon know better, my good friend.

ἐννόησον γὰρ τὸ τοιόνδε· ἆρα τὸ ὅσιον ὅτι ὅσιόν ἐστιν φιλεῖται ὑπὸ τῶν θεῶν, ἢ ὅτι φιλεῖται ὅσιόν ἐστιν;

For consider this: Is the pious loved by the gods because it is pious, or is it pious because it is loved?

ΕΥΘ. οὐκ οἶδʼ ὅτι λέγεις, ὦ Σώκρατες.

Euthyphro: I do not know what you mean, Socrates.

ΣΩ. ἀλλʼ ἐγὼ πειράσομαι σαφέστερον φράσαι.

Socrates: Well, I will try to speak more clearly.

λέγομέν τι φερόμενον καὶ φέρον καὶ ἀγόμενον καὶ ἄγον καὶ ὁρώμενον καὶ ὁρῶν καὶ πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα μανθάνεις ὅτι ἕτερα ἀλλήλων ἐστὶ καὶ ᾗ ἕτερα;

We speak of something carried and carrying, of something led and leading, of something seen and seeing; and do you understand that all these things are different from one another, and in what way they are different?

ΕΥΘ. ἔγωγέ μοι δοκῶ μανθάνειν.

Euthyphro: I think I understand.

ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν καὶ φιλούμενόν τί ἐστιν καὶ τούτου ἕτερον τὸ φιλοῦν;

Socrates: Is there then also something loved, and is the thing loving different from this?

ΕΥΘ. πῶς γὰρ οὔ;

Euthyphro: How could it not be?

ΣΩ. λέγε δή μοι, πότερον τὸ φερόμενον διότι φέρεται φερόμενόν ἐστιν, ἢ διʼ ἄλλο τι;

Socrates: Tell me then, is the carried thing a carried thing because it is carried, or because of something else?

γ ΕΥΘ. οὔκ, ἀλλὰ διὰ τοῦτο.

Euthyphro: No, but because of this.

ΣΩ. καὶ τὸ ἀγόμενον δὴ διότι ἄγεται, καὶ τὸ ὁρώμενον διότι ὁρᾶται;

Socrates: And the led thing indeed because it is led, and the seen thing because it is seen?

ΕΥΘ. πάνυ γε.

Euthyphro: Certainly.

ΣΩ. οὐκ ἄρα διότι ὁρώμενόν γέ ἐστιν, διὰ τοῦτο ὁρᾶται, ἀλλὰ τὸ ἐναντίον διότι ὁρᾶται, διὰ τοῦτο ὁρώμενον· οὐδὲ διότι ἀγόμενόν ἐστιν, διὰ τοῦτο ἄγεται, ἀλλὰ διότι ἄγεται, διὰ τοῦτο ἀγόμενον· οὐδὲ διότι φερόμενον φέρεται, ἀλλὰ διότι φέρεται φερόμενον.

Socrates: It is not then because it is a seen thing that it is seen, but on the contrary, because it is seen, it is a seen thing; nor because it is a led thing that it is led, but because it is led, it is a led thing; nor because it is a carried thing is it carried, but because it is carried, it is a carried thing.

ἆρα κατάδηλον, ὦ Εὐθύφρων, ὃ βούλομαι λέγειν;

Is it clear then, Euthyphro, what I want to say?

βούλομαι δὲ τόδε, ὅτι εἴ τι γίγνεται ἤ τι πάσχει, οὐχ ὅτι γιγνόμενόν ἐστι γίγνεται, ἀλλʼ ὅτι γίγνεται γιγνόμενόν ἐστιν· οὐδʼ ὅτι πάσχον ἐστὶ πάσχει, ἀλλʼ ὅτι πάσχει πάσχον ἐστίν·

I want to say this: if something becomes or if something is affected, it does not become because it is a becoming thing, but because it becomes, it is a becoming thing; nor does it suffer because it is a suffering thing, but because it suffers, it is a suffering thing.

ἢ οὐ συγχωρεῖς οὕτω;

Or do you not agree with this?

ΕΥΘ. ἔγωγε.

Euthyphro: I do.

ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν καὶ τὸ φιλούμενον ἢ γιγνόμενόν τί ἐστιν ἢ πάσχον τι ὑπό του;

Socrates: Is then the loved thing also either something becoming or something affected by something?

ΕΥΘ. πάνυ γε.

Euthyphro: Certainly.

ΣΩ. καὶ τοῦτο ἄρα οὕτως ἔχει ὥσπερ τὰ πρότερα· οὐχ ὅτι φιλούμενόν ἐστιν φιλεῖται ὑπὸ ὧν φιλεῖται, ἀλλʼ ὅτι φιλεῖται φιλούμενον;

Socrates: And this indeed is the case just as the previous ones: it is not because it is a loved thing that it is loved by those who love it, but because it is loved, it is a loved thing?

ΕΥΘ. ἀνάγκη.

Euthyphro: Necessarily.

ΣΩ. τί δὴ οὖν λέγομεν περὶ τοῦ ὁσίου, ὦ Εὐθύφρων;

Socrates: What then indeed do we say about the pious, Euthyphro?

ἄλλο τι φιλεῖται ὑπὸ θεῶν πάντων, ὡς ὁ σὸς λόγος;

Is it loved by all the gods, according to your statement?

γ ΕΥΘ. ναί.

Euthyphro: Yes.

ΣΩ. ἆρα διὰ τοῦτο, ὅτι ὅσιόν ἐστιν, ἢ διʼ ἄλλο τι;

Socrates: Is it then because of this, that it is pious, or because of something else?

ΕΥΘ. οὔκ, ἀλλὰ διὰ τοῦτο.

Euthyphro: No, but because of this.

ΣΩ. διότι ἄρα ὅσιόν ἐστιν φιλεῖται, ἀλλʼ οὐχ ὅτι φιλεῖται, διὰ τοῦτο ὅσιόν ἐστιν;

Socrates: It is loved indeed because it is pious, but it is not because it is loved that it is pious?

ΕΥΘ. ἔοικεν.

Euthyphro: It seems so.

ΣΩ. ἀλλὰ μὲν δὴ διότι γε φιλεῖται ὑπὸ θεῶν φιλούμενόν ἐστι καὶ θεοφιλές.

Socrates: But on the other hand, because indeed it is loved by the gods, it is a loved thing and god-loved.

ΕΥΘ. πῶς γὰρ οὔ;

Euthyphro: How could it not be?

ΣΩ. οὐκ ἄρα τὸ θεοφιλὲς ὅσιόν ἐστιν, ὦ Εὐθύφρων, οὐδὲ τὸ ὅσιον θεοφιλές, ὡς σὺ λέγεις, ἀλλʼ ἕτερον τοῦτο τούτου.

Socrates: Therefore the god-loved is not the same as the pious, Euthyphro, nor is the pious the same as the god-loved, as you say, but they are different from one another.

ΕΥΘ. πῶς δή, ὦ Σώκρατες;

Euthyphro: How so, Socrates?

γ ΣΩ. ὅτι ὁμολογοῦμεν τὸ μὲν ὅσιον διὰ τοῦτο φιλεῖσθαι, ὅτι ὅσιόν ἐστιν, ἀλλʼ οὐ διότι φιλεῖται ὅσιον εἶναι· ἦ γάρ;

Socrates: Because we agree that the pious is loved because of this, that it is pious, but it is not pious because it is loved; is that not so?

ΕΥΘ. ναί.

Euthyphro: Yes.

ΣΩ. τὸ δέ γε θεοφιλὲς ὅτι φιλεῖται ὑπὸ θεῶν, αὐτῷ τούτῳ τῷ φιλεῖσθαι θεοφιλὲς εἶναι, ἀλλʼ οὐχ ὅτι θεοφιλές, διὰ τοῦτο φιλεῖσθαι.

Socrates: But the god-loved, on the other hand, because it is loved by the gods, by this very fact of being loved is god-loved, but it is not loved because it is god-loved.

ΕΥΘ. ἀληθῆ λέγεις.

Euthyphro: What you say is true.

Notes

10aἆρα τὸ ὅσιον ὅτι ὅσιόν ἐστιν φιλεῖται ὑπὸ τῶν θεῶν, ἢ ὅτι φιλεῖται ὅσιόν ἐστιν; — The conjunction ὅτι in this sentence all function to express cause ("because"). Socrates is questioning the order of causality between objective property and divine approval: whether the pious is loved by the gods due to its inherent nature of being pious, or whether it is pious due to the fact of being loved by them.
10aὅτι ἕτερα ἀλλήλων ἐστὶ καὶ ᾗ ἕτερα — Within the indirect question clause introduced by ὅτι, the relative adverb ᾗ introduces a parallel clause. ᾗ expresses the manner or respect ("in what way" or "how"). Socrates is asking whether Euthyphro understands that active and passive participles/nouns are conceptually different (ἕτερα ἀλλήλων), and in what specific way they differ (ᾗ ἕτερα).
10cοὐχ ὅτι γιγνόμενόν ἐστι γίγνεται, ἀλλʼ ὅτι γίγνεται γιγνόμενόν ἐστιν — A contrast between a periphrastic expression using the verb "to be" (ἐστί) and a present participle (γιγνόμενόν ἐστι, "is in a state of becoming") and the simple verb (γίγνεται, "becomes/is made"). It illustrates the direction of causality using a grammatical relationship: a state of being does not precede the action/affection, but rather the state is established because the action/affection takes place.
10dἄλλο τι φιλεῖται — ἄλλο τι is an elliptical form of ἄλλο τι ἤ ("is it anything else than...? "), used to form a question that expects a strong affirmative agreement. Literally, "is it something other than being loved by all the gods?", implying "surely it is loved by all the gods, isn't it?"
10eαὐτῷ τούτῳ τῷ φιλεῖσθαι θεοφιλὲς εἶναι — The dative articular infinitive τῷ φιλεῖσθαι is modified by the demonstrative pronoun αὐτῷ τούτῳ, expressing means or cause ("by this very fact of being loved"). The infinitive εἶναι functions within the accusative and infinitive structure, depending on the implicit main verb of agreement continued from the previous sentence (ὁμολογοῦμεν).

Cite this passage

Plato, Euthyphro §10. Humanitext Reader, https://reader.humanitext.ai/en/text/urn:cts:greekLit:tlg0059.tlg001.humanitext-grc1:10

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