§1#2καὶ μή τις δόξῃ με τῷ Πλάτωνος χρήσεσθαι λόγῳ, ὡς εἴ τις μὲν τῶν ἐπιτηδεύσεων τὴν φύσιν γιγνώσκει τῆς ὕλης, περὶ ἣν καταγίνεται, αὕτη μὲν τέχνη ἐστίν, εἰ δὲ μή, ‘τριβὴ μέν τις καὶ ἐμπειρία, τέχνη δ’ οὔ’ — ‘ἐγὼ μὲν γάρ’, φησίν, ‘οὐ καλῶ τέχνην ὃ ἂν ᾖ ἄλογον πρᾶγμα’ —, οὐ χρῶμαι δ’ αὐτῷ οὐχ ὅτι οὐκ ἔστιν ἀληθής, μαινοίμην γὰρ ἂν εἰ τοῦτο λέγοιμι, ἀλλ’ ὅτι ἡ ἀναισχυντία τῶν ἐμπειρικῶν καὶ τοῦτο προσίεται, καὶ οὐδὲν αὑτοῖς μέλειν ἐροῦσιν, εἰ τούτου γε ἕνεκα μὴ τέχνην αὐτῶν τὸ ἐπιτήδευμα καλοῖμεν, ἀλλ’ ἄλλο τι.
And let no one think that I will use Plato’s argument, to the effect that if any of the occupations knows the nature of the material about which it is busy, this is a craft, but if not, "it is a certain knack and experience, but not a craft"—"for I indeed," he says, "do not call a craft that which is an irrational matter"—yet I do not use it, not because it is not true, for I would be mad if I said this, but because the impudence of the Empiricists accepts even this, and they will say that it does not matter to them at all if, for this reason at least, we should call their occupation not a craft but something else.
τίνες οὖν εἰσιν οἱ ἐμοὶ λόγοι;
What, then, are my arguments?
πρῶτον μὲν οὖν καὶ παρ’ αὐτῶν ἐκείνων συγκεχώρηται τὰ λήμματα.
First of all, the premises have been conceded even by those men themselves.
ἡ γὰρ τῶν πλειστάκις ὡσαύτως ἑωραμένων τήρησις καλεῖται μὲν οἶμαι παρ’ αὐτῶν ἐμπειρία· σύγκειται δ’ ἐκ πολλῶν τῶν καθάπαξ· ἄτεχνον δὲ τὸ καθάπαξ αὐτοί φασιν· εἴη ἂν τὸ πλειστάκις ἐκ πολλῶν ἀτέχνων συγκείμενον.
For the observation of things seen in the same way for the most part is called, I suppose, experience by them; and it is composed of many single instances; and they themselves say that the single instance is non-artistic; thus, "for the most part" would be composed of many non-artistic things.
καὶ ὧδ’ ἂν ὁ λόγος ἐρωτηθείη· εἰ τὸ καθάπαξ ἄτεχνον, τὸ δὲ πλειστάκις ἐκ πολλῶν τῶν καθάπαξ σύγκειται, ἄτεχνον τὸ πλειστάκις.
And the argument would be questioned in this way: if the single instance is non-artistic, and "for the most part" is composed of many single instances, "for the most part" is non-artistic.
ἀλλὰ μὴν τὸ καθάπαξ ἄτεχνον· καὶ τὸ πλειστάκις 〈ἄρα〉.
But indeed, the single instance is non-artistic; and "for the most part" 〈therefore〉 is too.
ἀλλ’ ἴσως οὐδ’ ὃ λέγομεν εἰδέναι φήσουσι· φεύγειν γὰρ ὁμολογήσουσι τά τ’ ἄλλα μαθήματα καὶ διαλεκτικήν.
But perhaps they will say they do not even know what we are saying; for they will acknowledge that they flee both other studies and dialectic.
εἰ βούλει τοίνυν, τοῦτον μὲν ἡμῖν αὐτοῖς εἰρημένον τὸν λόγον ἐῶμεν, ἐκείνους δ’ ἐρωτήσωμεν ἕτερόν τινα τοιοῦτον· ἆρα γε, ὦ ἐμπειρικοί, τὸ πλειστάκις ὁποσάκις ἐστὶν εἰπεῖν ἔχετε ἡμῖν;
If you wish, then, let us leave this argument as spoken by ourselves, and ask them another such question: "Are you indeed able, O Empiricists, to tell us how many times 'for the most part' is?
βουλόμεθα γὰρ δὴ καὶ αὐτοὶ γνῶναι παραπλησίως ὑμῖν διὰ τηρήσεως.
For indeed we ourselves wish to learn in a manner similar to you through observation.
ἵν’ οὖν μὴ ἀμετρίᾳ τοῦ δέοντος ἀφαμαρτάνωμεν ἢ πρὸ τῆς ἱκανῆς αὐτοῦ θέας ἥκειν ἐπὶ τὸ τέλος ἤδη νομίζοντες, ἢ περαιτέρω τοῦ προσήκοντος ἐκτείνεσθαι ἀγνωσίᾳ τοῦ μέτρου.
It is so that we might not, through lack of a proper measure, make a mistake, either thinking that we have already reached the end before a sufficient observation of it, or extending ourselves beyond what is proper through ignorance of the measure.
δεόμεθα ὑμῶν καὶ ἡμῖν δεῖξαι τὸ μέτρον, ἵνα καὶ αὐτοί τι μάθωμεν ἐκ τηρήσεως. ὦ μωρέ, φησὶ γελάσας, τὸ ἐν αὐτοῖς ἓν οὐκ ἔστιν ἁπάντων μέτρον, ἀλλὰ καθ’ ἕκαστον ἄλλο.
We beg of you to show us also the measure, so that we too may learn something from observation." "O foolish man," he says with a laugh, "the single common measure does not exist among them for all things, but there is a different one for each.
σύ δ’ ὅμοιον ἐπύθου ὡς εἰ καὶ σκυτοτόμον τις ἀξιοῖ διδάξαι αὐτὸν τὸν καλάποδα τίς ποτέ ἐστιν ᾦ πάντας ὑποδεῖ· οὔτε γὰρ ἐκεῖ[νων] τῶν ποδῶν ἓν μέτρον· ἄνισοι γάρ· οὔτ’ ἐνθάδε τῶν πραγμάτων· διάφορα γάρ. ἐγὼ δ’ ἀσμενίζω καὶ δέχομαι τὴν ἀπόκρισιν καὶ ἀγαπῶ πολὺ μᾶλλον ἢ εἰ ἓν ὑπέσχετό μοι πάντων ἐρεῖν.
You have asked something similar to as if someone should demand a shoemaker to teach him what on earth that shoe-last is with which he fits everyone; for neither is there one measure of those feet—for they are unequal—nor is there here one measure of things—for they are different." And I gladly welcome and accept the answer, and I am pleased much more than if he had promised to tell me one measure for all.
τότε μὲν γὰρ κἂν ὑπώπτευον, εἰ παρὰ πολὺ τῶν πραγμάτων διαφερόντων ἓν αὐτοῖς ἐπάξειν ἐπηγγέλλετο μέτρον.
For at that time, indeed, I would have suspected it, if, when things differ by so much, he promised to apply a single measure to them.
νυνὶ δ’ εἰ καθ’ ἕκαστον ἴδιόν τι δείξειέ μοι, πάνυ τεύξεσθαι τοῦ ἀληθοῦς ἤλπικα.
But now, if he should show me something specific for each, I have quite hoped to hit upon the truth.
καὶ δὴ οὖν ἀπὸ τῶν ἁπλουστέρων ἀρξάμενος πυνθάνομαι· ὁποσάκις ἂν εἴη μοι θεασαμένῳ τὸν μηνιγγότρωτον ἀκριβῶς εἰδέναι, πότερον διὰ παντὸς ἢ ὡς τὸ πολὺ ἢ σπανίως ἢ ἀμφιδόξως τεθνήξεται; ἀλλ’ οὐδεὶς αὐτῶν τὸ μέτρον οὔτε νῦν ἡμῖν ἀπεκρίνατο οὔτε ἐν τοῖς βιβλίοις ἔγραψε.
And so indeed, starting from the simpler things, I inquire: "How many times would it be necessary for me to observe a patient with a wounded meninges to know accurately whether he will die always, or for the most part, or rarely, or doubtfully?" But none of them has either answered the measure to us now, nor written it in their books.
μήποτ’ οὖν οὐδ’ ἔχουσί τι καθ’ ἕκαστον ὡρισμένον;
Could it be, then, that they do not even have anything defined for each individual case?
ὅτι μὲν οὖν καὶ ἤδη αὐτῶν ἔρρει τὰ πράγματα, παντὶ δῆλον.
That their affairs are already ruined, then, is clear to everyone.
ἀλλ’ ἐφεξῆς ἂν εἴη, καθάπερ ἀρχῆθεν αὐτοῖς 〈οἷς〉 διελέχθημεν προσεπ[τ]αίσαμεν, εὐγνωμόνως ἔτι καὶ νῦν ἡμᾶς ἐπισκέψασθαι κατὰ μόνας, πότερον ἐκείνοις μὲν ἀγνοεῖται τὸ 〈τοῦ〉 πλειστάκις μέτρον, ἔστι δ’ ἐν τῇ φύσει τῶν πραγμάτων, ἢ οὐδ’ ὅλως συστῆναι δυνατὸν ὑπάρχειν τι μέτρον ἐπὶ τοῦ πλειστάκις, ᾗ αὐτὸ ποιήσει πρότερον οὐκ ὂν τεχνικὸν νυνὶ τεχνικὸν εἶναι.
But next, just as we clashed from the beginning with those we conversed with, it would be proper for us still even now to examine by ourselves in a fair-minded way, whether the measure of "for the most part" is unknown to them indeed, but exists in the nature of things, or whether it is not possible at all for there to exist any measure for "for the most part" which will make what was previously not artistic to be artistic now.
ἐγὼ μὲν οὖν ἐπεσκεψάμην αὐτὸ πολλάκις· ἢ οὐκ ἂν αὐτοσχεδίως. . .
I, indeed, have examined this many times; otherwise, not offhand...