§1#1. . . τὸν ζ΄ ἔτι θεάσασθαι περιμενεῖς καὶ τὸν η΄ καὶ ὅλως πάνυ πολλὰ ἐφεξῆς.
... will you wait to observe yet the seventh, and the eighth, and in general very many in succession?
τί ποτ’ οὖν ἔτι συκοφαντήσεις καὶ ἀσύστατον ἐρεῖς τὴν ἐμπειρίαν καὶ τὸ πλειστάκις ἀπεριόριστον καὶ ὕποπτον ἀποφανεῖς;
Why on earth, then, will you still slander and call experience inconsistent, and show "for the most part" to be indefinite and suspect?
ὃ πῶς συστήσεται λέγων οὐχ εὑρίσκειν οἴει σὲ μᾶλλον ἡμᾶς ἢ σαυτὸν καταβάλλειν;
By saying that you do not find how this is established, do you think you are casting us down, or rather yourself?
ἐμοὶ μὲν γὰρ δοκεῖ, σαυτὸν μᾶλλον.
For to me, indeed, it seems you are casting down yourself rather.
ὄντοιν γὰρ δυοῖν, ἑνὸς μὲν τοῦ διὰ μόνης εὑρίσκεσθαί τι τηρήσεως, ὅπερ ἐγώ τε βούλομαι καὶ ὑμεῖς ἄκοντες μὲν [καὶ] ὁμολογεῖτε, ἀλλ’ ὅμως· δευτέρου δὲ τοῦ πῶς, ὃ ἐγὼ μὲν οὔτε δυνατὸν οὔτε χρήσιμον εἶναί φημι, σὸν δὲ λοιπὸν εἴη ἂν ἔργον τοῦ〈το〉 εὑρεῖν, ἄπορον αὐτὸ ἀποφαίνων τῷ σοφίσματι σαυτὸν καταβαλεῖς, ἡμᾶς δ’ οὐδὲν ἀδικήσεις.
For there being two things: one, that something is found through observation alone, which is what I desire and which you, though unwillingly, indeed acknowledge, but nevertheless do so; and the second, "how" (it is), which I indeed say is neither possible nor useful, but which would remain your task to find; yet by showing it to be insoluble through your sophistry, you will cast yourself down, and do us no harm.
οὐ γὰρ περὶ τοῦ πῶς ἕκαστον γίνεται τεχνικὸν ὁ ἀγὼν ἡμῖν ἐστιν, ἀλλ’ ὅτι γίνεται μόνον, ὅπερ ἐναργῶς ἔχομεν ὁμολογούμενον.
For our contest is not about how each thing becomes artistic, but only that it does become so, which we hold to be clearly agreed upon.
σὺ δὲ ὁ τὰς αἰτίας πολυπραγμονῶν δίκαιος εἶ καὶ τὸ πῶς ἐκδιδάσκειν.
But you, who busy yourself with causes, are the one who ought to teach also the "how".
ἀλλ’ ἔοικας ἔμπαλιν τοῦ δέοντος ἰέναι καὶ ὅμοιόν τι ποιεῖν τοῖς ἐπεὶ μὴ γινώσκουσιν, ὅπερ ὁρῶσιν, μηδ’ ὁρᾶν ὁμολογοῦσιν ἢ ἐπειδὴ τίνα τρόπον γίνεται τὰ γινόμενα καὶ φθείρεται τὰ φθειρόμενα καὶ τὰ κινούμενα [μὴ] κινεῖται μὴ γινώσκουσιν, οὔτε γένεσιν οὔτε φθορὰν οὔτε κίνησιν ἀπολείπουσιν.
But you seem to go in the opposite direction of what is proper, and to do something similar to those who, because they do not know what they see, do not even acknowledge that they see, or who, because they do not know in what manner things that come to be come to be, and things that perish perish, and things that move move, do not admit any generation, corruption, or motion.
ἀλλ’ ὅτι ἡ μεγίστη παντὸς λόγου διαβολὴ ἡ πρὸς τὸ ἐναργές ἐστι μάχη, τίς οὐκ οἶδεν;
But who does not know that the greatest slander against any argument is its battle against the self-evident?
ὃς γὰρ οὐδ’ ἄρξασθαι δύναται τῆς ἐναργείας χωρίς, πῶς ἂν οὗτος πιστὸς εἴη, παρ’ ἧς ἔλαβε τὰς ἀρχάς, κατὰ ταύτης θρασυνόμενος;
For how could anyone be trustworthy who cannot even make a beginning without the self-evident, yet acts insolently against that very thing from which he received his principles?
τοῦτο καὶ Δημόκριτος εἰδὼς ὁπότε τὰ φαινόμενα διέβαλε “νόμῳ χροιή, νόμῳ γλυκύ, νόμῳ πικρόν”, εἰπὼν “ἐτεῆ δ’ ἄτομα καὶ κενόν”. ἐποίησε τὰς αἰσθήσεις λεγούσας πρὸς τὴν διάνοιαν οὕτως· “τάλαινα φρήν, παρ’ ἡμέων λαβοῦσα τὰς πίστεις ἡμέας καταβάλλεις;
Democritus also knew this when he discredited the phenomena, saying "by convention is color, by convention sweet, by convention bitter," and "in reality there are atoms and void." He made the senses speak to the intellect in this way: "Wretched mind, having received your proofs from us, do you overthrow us?
πτῶμά τοι τὸ κατάβλημα”. δέον οὖν καταγνῶναι τοῦ λόγου τῆς ἀπιστίας, ὃς οὕτως ἐστὶν μοχθηρός, ὥσθ’ ὁ πιθανώτατος αὐτοῦ μάχεται τοῖς φαινομένοις, ἀφ’ ὧν ἤρξατο, τὸ ἐναντίον ἐργάζεσθε· τῶν ὡς γίγνεται μὲν οὐκ ἐχόντων λόγον, ὡς ὁ λόγος. δὲ βούλεται μὴ γιγνομένων κατεγνώκατε·
Your fall will be your ruin!" Therefore, although one ought to condemn the untrustworthiness of the argument—which is so wretched that even its most plausible part fights against the phenomena from which it began—you do the opposite; you have condemned those things which, while having no explanation of how they come to be, do not come to be as the argument wishes.
ἐμοὶ δ’ αὖ τὸ τοιοῦτο ἔλεγχος εἶναι δοκεῖ μέγιστος τοῦ λόγου· “τίς γὰρ ἂν ἔτι νοῦν ἔχων πιστεύσειεν αὐτῷ περὶ τῶν ἀδήλων, ὃς οὕτως ἐστὶ μοχθηρός, ὥστε τοῖς ἐναργέσιν ἐναντία τίθεσθαι”. 〈. . . . . . . . . 〉 πολλῶν γὰρ ἔτι δέονται οἱ ἐμπειρικοὶ πρὸς ὃ βούλονται, κἂν τοῦτ’ αὐτοῖς συγχωρήσωμεν.
But to me, on the contrary, such a thing seems to be the greatest refutation of the argument: "For who, possessing intellect, would still believe it concerning non-evident things, when it is so wretched as to set itself in opposition to what is self-evident?" <...> For the Empiricists still lack many things for what they want, even if we concede this to them.
εἰ γὰρ μὴ ἴσα δείξαιμι τὰ λειπόμενα τοῖς προειρημένοις ἀτόποις, οὐδὲν οὐδ’ ἐκείνων ὄφελος εἶναί μοι βούλομαι.
For if I do not show that the remaining difficulties are equal to the aforementioned absurdities, I do not wish there to be any benefit to me even from those.
σὺ μὲν οὖν εὖ οἶδ’ ὅτι τεθαύμακας οὐ μὰ Δία ἡμῶν, ἀλλὰ τῆς τῶν ἐμπειρικῶν εὐηθείας, εἰ τοσάδε καὶ ἐπὶ τοσοῖσδε συγχωρηθέντα λαβόντες οὐδὲν δή τι πλέον ἔχουσιν, ἀλλ’ ἕτερα τῶν προτέρων αὐτοὺς οὐκ ἐλάττω διαδέχεται σφάλματα.
You, then, I know well, have wondered—not, by Zeus, at us, but at the folly of the Empiricists—seeing that, having received so many and such great concessions, they have gained nothing more, but other errors, no less than the former, succeed them.
παντελὴς γὰρ ἄγνοια καὶ ὑπερβάλλουσά τις ἀναίδεια καὶ σχεδὸν ὑπὲρ τὰ βοσκήματα ἡ ἀναισθησία, εἰ μήτε ἀπὸ τίνος ἄρξονται ἔχοντες μήτ’, εἰ τοῦτ’ αὐτοῖς τις δοίη, πλειστάκις ὡσαύτως ἰδεῖν τι δυνάμενοι μηδὲ τοσαύτας μυριάδας τὰς ἐν τοῖς νοσοῦσιν ἑτερότητας ἰδεῖν ἢ μνημονεῦσαι ἢ ἀπογράψασθαι [δυνατὸν] — ἢ τίς ἂν ἔτι βιβλιοθήκη τὴν τοσαύτην ἱστορίαν χωρήσειε, τίς δ’ ἂν ψυχὴ τὴν τοσούτων καταδέξαιτο μνήμην; — ὅμως οὐδ’ οὕτως αὶσθάνονται. ὅτι διαπαίζοντες αὐτοὺς ταῦτα συγχωροῦμεν, ἀλλ’ ὡς ἐπὶ βεβαίοις ὑπάρχουσιν ἔτι φιλοτιμοῦνται περὶ τῶν ἑξῆς.
For it is utter ignorance, and a surpassing impudence, and an insensibility almost beyond that of cattle, if they neither have where to begin, nor, if someone should grant them this, are able to see something in the same way many times, nor to see or remember or record so many myriads of differences among patients—or what library indeed would contain such a vast history, and what soul would receive the memory of so many things?—nevertheless, they do not even thus perceive that we concede these things to them by way of mockery, but as though they were firmly established, they still pride themselves on the subsequent points.
ἐγὼ τοίνυν οὐ δι’ ἐκείνους — περιττὸν γὰρ λίθοις διαλέγεσθαι — ἀλλ’ ἕνεκα τοῦ τελειῶσαι τὸν λόγον ἐναργῶς ἐπιδείξω ὅτι, κἂν πλειστάκις ὡσαύτως ὁρᾶσθαί τι συγχωρηθῇ, οὐδὲν ἐκ τούτου θεώρημα τεχνικὸν συστήσονται.
I, therefore, not for their sake—for it is superfluous to argue with stones— but for the sake of completing the argument, will clearly demonstrate that, even if it be conceded that something is observed in the same way many times, no artistic theorem will be established from this.