§3#2γράφεται δὲ διχῶς ἥδε ἡ ῥῆσις, ἐπί τισι μὲν ἀντιγράφοις οὕτως, ἐπί τισι δὲ ἄνευ τοῦ εἰσίν, ἆρά γε φρενιτικοί;
This passage is written in two ways, in some manuscripts thus, and in some without εἰσίν, ἆρά γε φρενιτικοί;.
ἀλλὰ νῦν μὲν τὸ πρῶτον ἐρευνῶμεν.
But for now, let us first examine the first point.
ἐπειδὴ δύο τὰ πρῶτά ἐστι κώματος εἴδη, καὶ τὸ μὲν τοῖς ληθαργικοῖς ἀεὶ, τὸ δὲ τοῖς φρενιτικοῖς ἔστιν ὅτε συμπίπτει, ἀπορεῖ νῦν Ἱπποκράτης, εἰ δεῖ τοὺς οὕτως ἔχοντας ὀνομάζειν φρενιτικούς.
Since there are two primary kinds of coma, and the one always happens to the lethargic, and the other sometimes to the phrenetic, Hippocrates is now at a loss whether one should call those in this condition phrenetic.
τοῦτο δὲ οὐχ ὅπως ἄπορον, ἀλλ’ ἔμπαλιν ῥᾳδίως εὑρετὸν καὶ πρόχειρον εἶναι δοκεῖ.
But this seems not only not to be a matter of doubt, but on the contrary, easily discoverable and obvious.
ἐπειδὴ γάρ ἐστι δύο κώματα, καὶ τὸ μὲν ὑπνῶδες τὸ τῶν ληθαργικῶν ἴδιον οὐ δύναται ἐνταῦθα νοηθῆναι, τὸ γὰρ ἄγρυπνοι προσκείμενον οὐκ ἐπιτρέπει σημαίνεσθαι τοῦτο, περὶ τοῦ λοιποῦ κώματος τὸ ἆρά γε φρενιτικόν ἐστιν ἀπαγγέλλειν φαίνεται. πῶς ἄρα ἀπορεῖ;
For since there are two comas, and the sleepy one proper to the lethargic cannot be understood here (for the addition of ἄγρυπνοι does not allow this to be meant), he seems to be declaring about the remaining coma, "are they indeed phrenetic?" How then is he at a loss?
συλλογιστική ἐστί, φησιν, ἡ ἆρα λέξις, οὐκ ἀπορητική.
The word ἆρα, he says, is syllogistic, not dubitative.
ἀλλὰ τοῦτο μὲν ἐὰν μὴ βάρβαρον εἶχε τὴν ἑρμηνείαν καὶ πάσης Ἑλληνικῆς συνηθείας ἀλλοτρίαν, ἴσως ἂν ἀπεδεχόμην· ὅτε δὲ οὔτε οἱ ἄλλοι Ἕλληνες οὔτε ὁ Ἱπποκράτης τοιαύτῃ προτάσεων συντάξει οὐχ εὑρίσκονται χρώμενοι, πῶς ἂν δεχοίμην συλλογιστικὸν εἶναι τὸ ἆρα ἐπίῤῥημα;
But this indeed, if it did not have a barbarous interpretation and one alien to all Greek usage, I would perhaps have accepted; but since neither other Greeks nor Hippocrates are found using such a syntax of propositions, how could I accept that the adverb ἆρα is syllogistic?
πρὶν γὰρ ἢ λήμμασι χρῆσθαι ἐν τῷ λόγῳ καὶ προτάξαι αὐτὰ τοῦ συμπεράσματος, οὐκ ἔστι συλλογίζεσθαι.
For before employing premises in a discourse and placing them before the conclusion, it is not possible to reason syllogistically.
φέρε εἰπεῖν, ὅπως τὸ λεγόμενον σαφὲς γένηται καὶ τοῖς ἧττον γεγυμνασμένοις, τὸ ἆρά γε ἡμέρα ἐστί; καὶ, ἆρά γε ἐλεύσεται σήμερον; ἀπορητικὸν ἔχει ἐπίῤῥημα.
For example, so that what is said may become clear even to those who are less trained, the expressions ἆρά γε ἡμέρα ἐστί; and ἆρά γε ἐλεύσεται σήμερον; contain a dubitative adverb.
ἂν δὲ λόγῳ ἀποφαίνειν αὐτοῖς βουληθῶ, ἤτοι ἁπλῶς λέγων οὕτω χωρὶς πάσης ἀποδείξεως, ἐλεύσεται σήμερον· ἤτοι μετ’ ἀποδείξεως οὕτως, ἐὰν ἥλιος ὑπὲρ γῆν ἐστιν, ἡμέρα ἐστίν· ἐὰν περιπατεῖ, κινεῖται ἄρα.
But if I wish to declare to them in a discourse, either speaking simply without any proof in this way, "he will come today"; or with proof in this way, "if the sun is above the earth, it is day"; "if he walks, he moves therefore (ἄρα)".
ὅταν δὲ χωρὶς ἀποδείξεως ἀποφαίνωμέν τι, οὐ δεόμεθα τοῦ ἄρα ἐπιῤῥήματος, περιττὸς γάρ ἐστιν ὁ λόγος, καὶ οὐδεὶς οὕτω φησὶν, ἡμέρα ἐστὶν ἄρα, οὔθ’ οὕτως, ἀρά γε ἡμέρα ἐστὶν, ἐπειδὰν ἐξῇ λέγειν οὕτως ἁπλῶς, ἡμέρα ἐστίν.
But when we declare something without proof, we do not need the adverb ἄρα, for the expression is superfluous, and no one says in this way, "it is day therefore", nor in this way, "is it indeed day", when it is possible to say simply in this way, "it is day".
οὔθ’ οὕτω κατ’ ἀπόδειξιν οἷόν τέ ἐστι χρῆσθαι αὐτὸν τῷ ἆρά γε.
Nor is it possible for him to use ἆρά γε in this way in a proof.
πῶς γὰρ ἂν εἴη ἀπόδειξις, πάσης ἀποδείξεως ἐξ ἑτέρων λημμάτων ἕτερον λῆμμα καταλαμβανούσης;
For how could there be a proof, since every proof grasps another premise from other premises?
ἀλλὰ μηδὲν φαίνεται νῦν λῆμμα συλλογιστικὸν εἰς ἀπόδειξιν λαμβάνων.
But he appears now to be taking no syllogistic premise for a proof.
πῶς οὖν τὸ ἆρά γε ἐπίῤῥημα γενήσεται ἀντ’ ἀπορητικοῦ συλλογιστικὸν καὶ συμπεραντικόν;
How then will the adverb ἆρά γε become syllogistic and conclusive instead of dubitative?
μετὰ γάρ τινων οὔτε τὸν αὐτὸν τόπον κατέχουσι τὸ ἀπορητικὸν ἐπίῤῥημα καὶ τὸ συλλογιστικόν τε καὶ συμπεραντικὸν καλούμενον, ἀλλὰ τὸ μὲν ἀπορητικὸν πρόκειται ἀεὶ, τὸ δὲ συλλογιστικὸν καὶ συμπεραντικὸν μεταξὺ τοῦ ὀνόματος καὶ τοῦ κατηγορουμένου καθίσταται.
For in relation to some words, the dubitative adverb and the one called syllogistic and conclusive do not occupy the same position, but the dubitative is always preposed, while the syllogistic and conclusive is placed between the noun and the predicate.
ἀποροῦντες γὰρ λέγομεν, ἆρά γε ἡμέρα ἐστί; συλλογιζόμενοι δὲ οὕτως, ἡμέρα ἄρα ἐστί.
For when we are in doubt we say, ἆρά γε ἡμέρα ἐστί; but when we reason syllogistically, in this way, ἡμέρα ἄρα ἐστί.
πῶς οὖν νῦν προετέθη;
How then was it now preposed?
ὡς οὐ συλλογιστικὸν ὑπάρχον, προετέθη.
It was preposed as not being syllogistic.
οὐ γὰρ εἴρηται οὕτω, φρενιτικοὶ ἄρα εἰσὶν, ἀλλ’ ἁπλῶς, ἆρά γε φρενιτικοί εἰσιν; ἀποροῦντος φανερῶς τοῦ Ἱπποκράτους, καὶ μὴ τολμῶντος ἀποφήνασθαι βεβαίως ὑπὲρ αὐτῶν, ὥσπερ ἀμέλει πολλάκις φαίνεται ποιῶν.
For it was not said in this way, "they are phrenetic therefore", but simply, ἆρά γε φρενιτικοί εἰσιν; with Hippocrates clearly doubting, and not venturing to declare firmly about them, just as indeed he often appears doing.
ἀρκέσει δ’ ἓν ἢ δεύτερον παράδειγμα, χάριν τοῦ μὴ διατρίβειν ἐπὶ πλέον ἐν οὕτω σαφεῖ πράγματι.
One or a second example will suffice, for the sake of not lingering longer on such a clear matter.
ἐν μὲν οὖν τῷ πρώτῳ τῶν ἐπιδημιῶν φησι, μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα δυσεντεριώδεες ἐγένοντο οὗτοι πάντες.
In the first book of the Epidemics, indeed, he says: "But after these things they all became dysenteric.
ἆρά γε ὅτι οὔρησαν ὑδατώδεα, σκεπτέον. ἐνταῦθα τὸ σκεπτέον προσκείμενον, οὐδὲ τὸν ἀναιδέστατον ἄλλως ἀκούειν ἐάσει τοῦ ἄρα συνδέσμου, πλὴν ὡς ἀπορητικοῦ.
Should we consider whether it was because they passed watery urine?" Here, the addition of "should we consider" will not let even the most shameless person understand the conjunction ἄρα otherwise than as dubitative.
ἐν δὲ τῷ ἕκτῳ τῶν ἐπιδημιῶν τὸ μετ’ οὔρησιν σύναγμά, φησι, παιδίοισι μᾶλλον, ἆρά γε ὅτι θερμότερα; ἐν αὐτῷ δὲ τῷ προῤῥητικῷ, ἐν φρενιτικοῖσι λευκὴ διαχώρησις κακὸν, ὡς καὶ Ἀρχεκράτει.
And in the sixth book of the Epidemics, he says: "The sediment after urination is more common in children; is it indeed because they are warmer?" And in the Prorrheticon itself: "In the phrenetic, white stool is bad, as indeed in Archecrates.
ἆρά γε ἐπὶ τούτοισι καὶ νωθρότης γίνεται; καὶ πάλιν, ἐν ἀφωνίῃ πνεῦμα, οἷον τοῖσι πνιγομένοισι πρόχειρον, πονηρόν.
Does dullness also occur upon these?" And again, in "loss of voice, respiration that is shallow, like that of those who are being choked, is bad.
ἆρά γε καὶ παρακρουστικὸν τὸ τοιοῦτον; εἰ τοίνυν χρὴ κεφαλὴν ἐπιδοῦναι τῷ λόγῳ, καὶ μήτ’ ἄλλος τις τῶν Ἑλλήνων οὕτω κέχρηται τῷ ἆρα συνδέσμῳ μήθ’ Ἱπποκράτης αὐτὸς, ὡς ἐγὼ νῦν ἔδειξα, μέμψαιτ’ ἄν τις, οἶμαι, τοὺς ἐξηγησαμένους ὡς οὐκ ἀπορητικὸν σύνδεσμον.
Is such a thing indeed also delirious?" If, therefore, one must put a head on the discourse, and since neither any other of the Greeks has used the conjunction ἆρα in this way, nor Hippocrates himself, as I have now shown, one would, I think, blame those who have explained it as a non-dubitative conjunction.