§6Καιρὸς οὖν ἡκέναι δοκεῖ τι φθέγξασθαι κᾀμὲ, βραχεῖαν μὴν ἐλπίδα τοῦ φράξαι τὴν δοξοσοφίαν ἔχοντα μὴ καταλείπειν ἀπείραστον, ἡγούμενον μέν τι δ’ εἶναι μηδ’ αὐτὸ τοῦτο βραχύ.
Therefore, the time seems to have come for me too to speak, having indeed a small hope of blocking their conceit, but not wishing to leave it untried, since I consider that even this very thing is not something small.
καὶ τοίνυν ἐφ’ ᾧ ὡμολόγηται μὲν ἡ ἀπὸ τῶν ἐναργεστάτων ἀρχὴ πάσης ἀποδείξεως, ἀλλ’ εὐθὺς ἡ πρώτη μετάβασις ἀπ’ αὐτῶν ἐπὶ τὸ τῶν ἀδήλων, οὐ συγχωρεῖται μὲν ὑπὸ τῶν Ἀκαδημαϊκῶν τε καὶ Σκεπτικῶν, ἡμῖν δὲ τοῦτο μὲν ἀλλήλοις συνεχώρει, ὅτι μὲν ἄλλο εὑρισκόμεθα τὴν ἐκείνων ἀπορίαν κρατύνοντες.
And indeed, although the starting point of every proof from the most evident things is agreed upon, but immediately the first transition from them to that of the non-evident things is not conceded by the Academics and Sceptics, while this indeed was conceded among us to one another, we are found to strengthen their difficulty in another respect.
ὄντων γὰρ ἐναργῶς τῶν μὲν πρὸς νόησιν, τῶν δὲ πρὸς αἴσθησιν, ἀλλήλοις ἐνίοτε μὲν δοκεῖ μάχεσθαι ταῦτα.
For while some things are clearly for the intellect and others for perception, these sometimes seem to conflict with one another.
καὶ πρῶτά γε τοῦτο αὐτὸ γεγυμνασμένου δεῖται, τοῦ δείξοντος οὐδέποτ’ ἀλλήλοις αὐτὰ διαφέρεσθαι.
And first of all, this very thing requires a trained person, who will show that they never differ from one another.
δεύτερον ἐπὶ τῷδε μέγιστόν ἐστιν, ἀπὸ τῶν ἐναργῶς φαινομένων γνωρίζειν τὰ τοιαῦτα· τινὲς γὰρ ὑπὸ προπετείας τοῖς μηδέπω φαινομένοις ἐναργῶς ὡς τοιούτοις συγκατατιθέμενοι σφάλλονται.
Secondly, after this, it is of the greatest importance to cognize such things from those that are clearly apparent; for some, through rashness, are deceived by assenting to things not yet clearly appearing as such.
καὶ τί θαυμάζειν, ἔφης, εἰ πρὸς διάνοιαν ἐναργῆ τοῦτο συμβαίνει τοῖς προπετέσιν, ὁρῶντας αὐτὸ κᾀπὶ τῶν πρὸς αἴσθησιν ἐνίους πάσχοντας ἑκάστην· ὅτι ἐξ ἀπόπτου γοῦν θεασάμενοι παραγενόμενόν τινα Δίωνά φασιν, εἰ οὕτως ἔτυχεν, εἶναι τὸν ἀφικνούμενον, ὡς βεβαίως εἰδότες· ὥστ’ ἐνίοτε πλησίον ὀφθεὶς ὁ παραγενόμενος ἐφάνη Θέων, οὐ Δίων ὑπάρχειν. εἰ μὲν οὖν ἀπαράλλακτος ἡ φαντασία τῶν πόῤῥωθεν ὁρωμένων ἐστὶ καὶ τῶν ἐγγύθεν, οὐ διαφωνοῦντες ἀλλήλοις ἐπὶ τῶν πόῤῥωθεν ὁρωμένων οὔτ’ ἐλέγξουσιν, οὔτ’ ἐλεγχθήσονταί ποτε· εἰ δ’ ἐστὶν ἄλλη ἐνέργεια τῶν πλησίον ὁρωμένων, ἄλλη δὲ τῶν οὐ πλησίον, οἷσι πειρωμένων τὴν ἐκ τοῦ πλησίον γιγνομένην, εἰκότως σφάλλονται.
"And why wonder," you said, "if this happens to the rash in respect to clear intellectual perception, seeing that some suffer this very thing even in the case of individual sensory perceptions; because, at any rate, having beheld from a distance someone approaching, they say it is Dion, as it may happen, who is arriving, as if knowing it for certain; so that sometimes, when seen near at hand, the newcomer is shown to be Theon, not Dion." If indeed, then, the impression of things seen from afar and from nearby were indistinguishable, those who disagree with one another about things seen from afar would neither refute nor ever be refuted; but if there is one activity of things seen nearby, and another of things not nearby, for those who attempt before the impression arising from nearby, they are naturally deceived.
τοῦτ’ οὖν αὐτὸ πρῶτον ἀναμνήσθητι, πρὶν ἐπὶ τὰ πρὸς διάνοιαν ἐναργῆ μετιέναι καὶ σύ ποτε προπετῶς, ὁρατὸν δέ τινα τὸν προσιόντα, φέρε μὲν ἵππον, ὡς ἔτυχε, πλησίον ἐγνῶσθαι Θεόδωρος ὤν· ἢ δι’ ὅλου τοῦ βίου σαυτὸν ἀνάσχες ἀπὸ τῆς τοιαύτης συγκαταθέσεως, ἣν ὀνομάζουσί τε πρόπτωσιν καὶ προπέτειαν.
Therefore, remember this very thing first, before you too ever rashly pass over to things clear to the intellect—namely, that some visible thing approaching, say a horse, as it may happen, is known from nearby, since you are Theodoros; or throughout your whole life restrain yourself from such assent, which they call rashness and precipitance.
ἐγὼ μὲν σοὶ λέγω μόνῳ, οὐδεὶς ἔχει με δεῖξαι τοιοῦτόν ποτε ἐσφαλμένον οὐδέν.
I tell you alone, no one can show that I have ever been deceived in any such way.
ἐκ μειρακίου γὰρ ἐπέχειν ἐμαυτὸν εἴθισα προπετοῦς συγκαταθέσεως, ὥσπερ ἐν τοῖς πρὸς αἴσθησιν, οὕτω καὶ τοῖς πρὸς λόγον φαινομένοις, ἐφ’ ἃ μεταβὰς ἤδη πάλιν ἀναμνησθῆναί σε κᾀνταῦθα παρακαλῶ, μηδενὶ ψευδῶς συγκαταθέμενον ἑαυτὸν, ὥσπερ ἑκάστης ἡμέρας ὁρῶ παμπόλλους τῶν φίλων, ἐνίους μὲν ἑνὶ τῶν εἰπόντων ὁτιοῦν πιστεύσαντας, εἰ δὲ δύο, καὶ τρεῖς, καὶ τέσσαρες εἴποιεν ταὐτὸν, οὐκ ἀντέχοντας, ἀλλὰ πάντως συγκατατιθεμένους ἑνὶ, προπετῶς δὲ καὶ ὃ τρισὶν, ἢ τέσσαρσιν, ἄνευ τοῦ διορίσασθαι, πότερον ἐνδέχεται πάντας αὐτοὺς ἐκ μιᾶς αἰτίας κοινῆς ἀληθεύειν, ἢ ψεύδεσθαι πάντας ἐκ μιᾶς αἰτίας κοινῆς.
For from youth I accustomed myself to withhold assent from rash assent, just as in things apparent to perception, so also in things apparent to reason, passing on to which now, I exhort you to remember again here too, not giving yourself over to assent falsely to anything, just as every day I see very many of my friends: some indeed believing any one of those who say anything, and if two, or three, or four say the same thing, not holding out, but completely assenting to one, or rashly also to what three or four say, without distinguishing whether it is possible for them all to speak truth from one common cause, or for all to lie from one common cause.
βέλτιον οὖν ἐνταῦθα βραδύνειν, ὥσπερ ἐγὼ ποιῶ, κᾂν ὅτι μάλιστά με καλῶσιν ἐπισκώπτοντες ἄπιστον οἱ προπετῶς συγκατατιθέμενοι.
It is better, therefore, to be slow here, just as I do, even if those who assent rashly call me "unbelieving" in mockery as much as possible.
τῶν φίλων γοῦν εἰσί τινες, οἳ πυθόμενοι παρά τινος, ἀφῖχθαι τόνδε τινὰ τῶν ἀποδημούντων, ἤγγειλαν μὲν ἡμῖν ἥκοντα τὸν ἄνθρωπον, ἠλέγχθησαν δὲ ψευδόμενοι, ὡς, ὅταν ἐπιτιμήσω, τοσοῦτον δέουσιν εἰς τὸν μέλλοντα παρασκευάσασθαι ἑαυτοὺς ἀσφαλεστέρους, ὥστ’ ἀγανακτοῦσι πρός με, καί φασιν, αὐτοὺς μὲν οὐκ εἶναι τῆς ψευδολογίας αἰτίους, πιστεῦσαι γὰρ εἰπόντι τόδε τινὶ, τὸ δ’ ἁμάρτημα μὲν ἐκείνου γεγονέναι, μὴ βουλόμενοι θεάσασθαι τὸ προστιθέμενον εἰς ἑαυτοὺς ἁπάσαις ταῖς προπετῶς συγκαταθέσεσιν.
At any rate, there are some of my friends who, having learned from someone that a certain one of those abroad had arrived, reported to us that the man had come, but were proven to be speaking falsely, so that when I rebuke them, they are so far from making themselves more secure for the future that they are annoyed with me, and say that they themselves are not the cause of the false report, for they believed someone who said so, and the error was that of the other person, not wishing to see the guilt attached to themselves by all their rash assents.
εἰ μὲν γὰρ, ὥσπερ ἐγὼ λέγειν εἴωθα, τόνδε μοί τινα περὶ τοῦδε τόδε τι διηγήσασθαι, καὶ αὐτοὶ κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον ἐποιοῦντο τοὺς λόγους, οὐκ ἂν ἐψεύδοντο.
For if, as I am accustomed to say, "a certain person related such and such a thing to me about this," they too made their statements in the same manner, they would not be speaking falsely.
νῦν δ’, ἐπεὶ τῷ πιστεύειν τῷ λέγοντι σφάλλονται, οὐκ ἐκεῖνον μόνον, ἀλλὰ καὶ σφᾶς αὐτοὺς συνεπέδειξαν αὐτῷ ψευδομένους, ἐνόν γε αὐτοῖς οὐκ ἀποφαινομένοις εἰπεῖν, ἀφῖχθαι τόνδε τινὰ τῶν ἀποδημούντων φίλων, ἀλλ’ ἀκηκοέναι παρὰ τοῦδε.
But as it is, since they are deceived by believing the speaker, they showed not only him but also themselves to be lying along with him, whereas it was open to them, not making an assertion, to say, not that a certain of our friends from abroad has arrived, but that they have heard so from this person.
ὁπότ’ οὖν ἐπὶ τοσούτων πραγμάτων οὐ μακρὸν ὕστερον αὐτοὺς ἐλεγχθέντων ψευδομένους οὐ παύονται προπετῶς συγκατατιθέμενοι, τί χρὴ νομίζειν ἐπὶ τῶν ἀδήλων αὐτοῖς ὄντων δυσκολωτέρων προσάπτεσθαι;
Since, then, in the case of such matters where they are proven false not long afterwards, they do not stop assenting rashly, what must one think they will do when they touch upon non-evident matters which are more difficult for them?
εὐκολώτερον μὲν γάρ ἐστιν, ἑνὸς ἀεὶ μνημονεύειν τοῦ περιμένειν ἐναργῶς ἐν ἀκριβεῖ, χαλεπώτατον δὲ, διότι τοῦτ’ αὐτὸ ποιεῖν οὐκ ἐθέλουσιν οἱ πολλοί.
For it is easier always to remember one thing: to wait for the clear evidence with accuracy, but it is most difficult because the majority do not wish to do this very thing.
καὶ ζητοῦντί γέ μοι τὴν αἰτίαν τῆς προπετείας αὐτῶν, εἰ μὴ ἄρα πλεονεξία κατεφάνη πάντ’ ἐργάζεσθαι τὰ τοιαῦτα.
And to me seeking the cause of their rashness, it appears clear, unless indeed ambition is shown to produce all such things.
τὸ γὰρ τάχ’ ὁτιοῦν ἢ δι’ αἰσθήσεως, ἢ διὰ νοήσεως εὑρίσκειν ἐπαινῶ μόνον ὁρῶντες, οἴονται βελτίους ἑαυτοὺς ἐπιδείξειν τῷ πέλας ἐν τῷ τάχει τῆς διαγνώσεως τάχος, ἀλλ’ ἀγνοίας ἐπιδείκνυνται.
For seeing that only finding anything quickly, either through perception or through intellect, is praised, they think they will show themselves to be better than their neighbor by the speed of their discernment, but they display only speed of ignorance.
ταῦτα μὲν οὖν ἔφην εὑρῆσθαί μοι κοινῇ πρὸς ἅπαντας, ὅσοι προπετῶς ἀποφαίνονται.
These things, then, I said had been found by me in common against all who make assertions rashly.