§1ὅτι μέν, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, Φίλιππος οὐκ ἐποιήσατο τὴν εἰρήνην πρὸς ὑμᾶς, ἀλλʼ ἀνεβάλετο τὸν πόλεμον, πᾶσιν ὑμῖν φανερὸν γέγονεν·
That Philip did not make peace with you, men of Athens, but merely postponed the war, has become manifest to you all.
ἐπειδὴ γὰρ Φαρσαλίοις Ἅλον παρέδωκε καὶ τὰ περὶ Φωκέας διῳκήσατο καὶ τὴν Θρᾴκην κατεστρέψατο πᾶσαν, αἰτίας οὐκ οὔσας πλασάμενος καὶ προφάσεις ἀδίκους ἐξευρὼν τῷ μὲν ἔργῳ πάλαι πολεμεῖ πρὸς τὴν πόλιν, τῷ δὲ λόγῳ νῦν ὁμολογεῖ διὰ τῆς ἐπιστολῆς ἧς ἔπεμψεν·
For after he delivered Halus to the Pharsalians, settled the affairs of the Phocians, and subdued the whole of Thrace, by fabricating charges that did not exist and devising unjust pretexts, he has in fact long been waging war against our city, while in word he now admits it through the letter which he sent.
§2ὅτι δὲ χρὴ μήτʼ ὀρρωδεῖν ὑμᾶς τὴν ἐκείνου δύναμιν μήτʼ ἀγεννῶς ἀντιταχθῆναι πρὸς αὐτόν, ἀλλὰ καὶ σώμασι καὶ χρήμασι καὶ ναυσὶ καὶ πᾶσιν ὡς ἁπλῶς εἰπεῖν ἀφειδῶς ὁρμῆσαι πρὸς τὸν πόλεμον, ἐγὼ πειράσομαι διδάσκειν.
But that you must neither dread his power nor oppose him in a cowardly manner, but rather hasten to the war unsparingly with your bodies, your money, your ships, and, to speak plainly, with all your resources, I will endeavor to show.
πρῶτον μὲν γὰρ εἰκός, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, τοὺς θεοὺς μεγίστους ὑμῖν ὑπάρχειν συμμάχους καὶ βοηθούς, ὧν ἐκεῖνος τὰς πίστεις ὑπεριδὼν καὶ τοὺς ὅρκους ὑπερβὰς λέλυκεν ἀδίκως τὴν εἰρήνην·
For in the first place, men of Athens, it is natural that the gods should be your greatest allies and helpers, since he, having disregarded their pledges and transgressed his oaths, has unjustly broken the peace.
§3ἔπειθʼ οἷς πρότερον ηὐξήθη, φενακίζων ἀεί τινας καὶ μεγάλʼ ἐπαγγελλόμενος εὐεργετήσειν, ταῦτα πάντα διεξελήλυθεν ἤδη, καὶ γιγνώσκεται μὲν ὑπὸ τῶν Περινθίων καὶ Βυζαντίων καὶ τῶν ἐκείνοις συμμαχούντων ὡς ἐπιθυμεῖ προσενεχθῆναι τούτοις τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον ὅνπερ Ὀλυνθίοις πρότερον,
Secondly, those means by which he formerly grew powerful—always deceiving someone and promising great benefits—have now all run their course; and it is recognized by the Perinthians, the Byzantines, and their allies, that he desires to deal with them in the very same manner as he formerly did with the Olynthians.
§4οὐκ ἀγνοεῖται δʼ ὑπὸ Θετταλῶν δεσπόζειν, ἀλλʼ οὐχ ἡγεῖσθαι τῶν συμμάχων προαιρούμενος, ὑποπτεύεται δʼ ὑπὸ Θηβαίων Νίκαιαν μὲν φρουρᾷ κατέχων, εἰς δὲ τὴν ἀμφικτυονίαν εἰσδεδυκώς, τὰς δὲ πρεσβείας τὰς ἐκ Πελοποννήσου πρὸς αὑτὸν ἄγων καὶ τὴν ἐκείνων συμμαχίαν παραιρούμενος·
Nor is it unobserved by the Thessalians that he chooses to be a master rather than a leader of his allies; and he is suspected by the Thebans because he holds Nicaea with a garrison, has wormed his way into the Amphictyony, and is drawing the embassies from the Peloponnese to himself, thereby stealing away their alliance.
ὥστε τῶν αὐτῷ πρὸ τοῦ φίλων ὄντων τοὺς μὲν νῦν πολεμεῖν ἀκαταλλάκτως, τοὺς δὲ μηκέτι προθύμους εἶναι συναγωνιστάς, ἅπαντας δʼ ὑφορᾶσθαι καὶ διαβεβλῆσθαι πρὸς αὐτόν.
Consequently, of those who were formerly his friends, some are now waging implacable war against him, others are no longer eager fellow-combatants, and all view him with suspicion and are alienated from him.
§5ἔτι τοίνυν (οὐδὲ γὰρ τοῦτʼ ἔστι μικρόν) οἱ κατὰ τὴν Ἀσίαν σατράπαι καθεστῶτες ἔναγχος μὲν ξένους εἰσπέμψαντες ἐκώλυσαν ἐκπολιορκηθῆναι Πέρινθον, νῦν δὲ τῆς ἔχθρας αὐτοῖς ἐνεστώσης καὶ τοῦ κινδύνου πλησίον ὄντος, εἰ χειρωθήσεται Βυζάντιον, §6οὐ μόνον αὐτοὶ προθύμως συμπολεμήσουσιν, ἀλλὰ καὶ βασιλέα χρήματα χορηγεῖν ἡμῖν προτρέψονται, ὃς τοσοῦτον μὲν κέκτηται πλοῦτον ὅσον οὐδʼ οἱ λοιποὶ πάντες, τηλικαύτην δʼ ἔχει ῥώμην πρὸς τὰς ἐνθάδε πράξεις ὥστε καὶ πρότερον, ἡνίκα Λακεδαιμονίοις ἐπολεμοῦμεν, ὁποτέροις πρόσθοιτο, τούτους ἐποίει κρατεῖν τῶν ἑτέρων, καὶ νῦν μεθʼ ἡμῶν γενόμενος ῥᾳδίως καταπολεμήσει τὴν Φιλίππου δύναμιν.
Furthermore (for this is no small matter either), the satraps established in Asia recently prevented Perinthus from being taken by storm by sending in mercenaries; and now, since their hostility towards him has begun, and the danger will be close at hand if Byzantium is subdued, they will not only themselves fight alongside us eagerly, but will also urge the Great King to supply us with money—the King who possesses more wealth than all the rest combined, and has such great influence over affairs here that previously, when we were at war with the Lacedaemonians, whichever side he joined, he made them prevail over the other; and now, if he aligns with us, he will easily crush the power of Philip.
§7πρὸς τοίνυν τούτοις τηλικούτοις οὖσιν, οὐκ ἐρῶ μὲν ὡς οὐ διὰ τὴν εἰρήνην πολλὰ προείληφεν ἡμῶν χωρία καὶ λιμένας καὶ τοιαῦθʼ ἕτερα χρήσιμα πρὸς πόλεμον, ὁρῶ δʼ ὡς ὅταν μὲν ὑπʼ εὐνοίας τὰ πράγματα συνέχηται καὶ πᾶσι ταὐτὰ συμφέρῃ τοῖς μετέχουσι τῶν πολέμων, μένει τὰ συσταθέντα βεβαίως·
Now in addition to these weightiest considerations, I will not indeed deny that he has seized many of our strongholds, harbors, and other such useful things for war by means of the peace; yet I see that when affairs are held together by goodwill and when the same interests unite all participants in wars, the established structures remain secure.
ὅταν δʼ ἐξ ἐπιβουλῆς καὶ πλεονεξίας ἀπάτῃ καὶ βίᾳ κατέχηται, καθάπερ ὑπὸ τούτου νῦν, μικρὰ πρόφασις καὶ τὸ τυχὸν πταῖσμα ταχέως αὐτὰ διέσεισε καὶ κατέλυσεν.
But when they are held together through intrigue and greed, by deceit and force, as they are now by this man, a small pretext and any chance stumble quickly shakes and dissolves them.
§8καὶ πολλάκις εὑρίσκω λογιζόμενος οὐ μόνον, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, τὰ συμμαχικὰ τῷ Φιλίππῳ πρὸς ὑποψίαν ἥκοντα καὶ δυσμένειαν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὰ τῆς ἰδίας ἀρχῆς οὐ συνηρμοσμένα καλῶς οὐδʼ οἰκείως οὐδʼ ὡς οἴεταί τις.
And as I reflect, men of Athens, I frequently find not only that Philip's alliances have come to suspicion and hostility, but also that his own empire is not well or securely fitted together, nor in such a state as one might think.
ὅλως μὲν γὰρ ἡ Μακεδονικὴ δύναμις ἐν μὲν προσθήκης μέρει ῥοπὴν ἔχει τινὰ καὶ χρῆσιν, αὐτὴ δὲ καθʼ αὑτὴν ἀσθενής ἐστι καὶ πρὸς τηλικοῦτον ὄγκον πραγμάτων εὐκαταφρόνητος.
For in general, the Macedonian power possesses some weight and utility in the capacity of an addition, but on its own it is weak and contemptible in comparison to so vast a scale of affairs.