Humanitext Reader

Isocrates · Busiris §42-50

Criticism of Bad Apologies and Counsel on Philosophy

Passage 6 of 6 · Greek

Summary

The author refutes the interlocutor's absurd claim that the gods neglected their offspring, criticizing his defense as a poor apology that actually concedes the accusations. He warns that such improper discourses damage the reputation of philosophy as a whole and urges him, despite the author's youth, to heed this advice.

§42ἀλλʼ εἰ μὲν ἡμῶν τις τῆς τῶν ἀνθρώπων φύσεως κατασταίη κύριος, οὐδʼ ἂν τοὺς οἰκέτας ἐάσειεν εἶναι πονηρούς· ἐκείνων δὲ καταγιγνώσκομεν ὡς καὶ τοὺς ἐξ αὑτῶν γεγονότας περιεῖδον οὕτως ἀσεβεῖς καὶ παρανόμους ὄντας.
But if any one of us should become master of human nature, he would not even allow his servants to be wicked; yet we condemn them on the ground that they overlooked their own offspring being so impious and lawless.
καὶ σὺ μὲν οἴει καὶ τοὺς μηδὲν προσήκοντας, ἤν σοι πλησιάσωσι, βελτίους ποιήσειν, τοὺς δὲ θεοὺς οὐδεμίαν ἡγεῖ τῆς τῶν παίδων ἀρετῆς ἔχειν ἐπιμέλειαν.
And while you think that you will make even those who are in no way related to you better, if they come near you, you believe that the gods have no care for the virtue of their own children.
§43καίτοι κατὰ τὸν σὸν λόγον δυοῖν τοῖν αἰσχίστοιν οὐ διαμαρτάνουσιν· εἰ μὲν γὰρ μηδὲν δέονται χρηστοὺς αὐτοὺς εἶναι, χείρους εἰσὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων τὴν διάνοιαν, εἰ δὲ βούλονται μέν, ἀποροῦσι δʼ ὅπως ποιήσωσιν, ἐλάττω τῶν σοφιστῶν τὴν δύναμιν ἔχουσιν.
And yet, according to your argument, they do not escape two of the most shameful things; for if they do not at all wish them to be good, they are worse in mind than humans, but if they wish to but are at a loss how to do so, they have less power than the sophists.
§44πολλῶν δʼ ἐνόντων εἰπεῖν ἐξ ὧν ἄν τις καὶ τὸν ἔπαινον καὶ τὴν ἀπολογίαν μηκύνειεν, οὐχ ἡγοῦμαι δεῖν μακρολογεῖν· οὐ γὰρ ἐπίδειξιν τοῖς ἄλλοις ποιούμενος, ἀλλʼ ὑποδεῖξαί σοι βουλόμενος ὡς χρὴ τούτων ἑκάτερον ποιεῖν, διείλεγμαι περὶ αὐτῶν, ἐπεὶ τόν γε λόγον ὃν σὺ γέγραφας, οὐκ ἀπολογίαν ὑπὲρ Βουσίριδος, ἀλλʼ ὁμολογίαν τῶν ἐπικαλουμένων δικαίως ἄν τις εἶναι νομίσειεν.
Although there are many things to say by which one could prolong both the praise and the defense, I do not think it necessary to speak at length; for I have discussed these things not to make a display to others, but wishing to show you how one must do each of these, since anyone would justly consider the argument you have written to be not a defense on behalf of Busiris, but a concession of the accusations.
§45οὐ γὰρ ἀπολύεις αὐτὸν τῶν αἰτιῶν, ἀλλʼ ἀποφαίνεις ὡς καὶ τῶν ἄλλων τινὲς ταὐτὰ πεποιήκασι, ῥᾳθυμοτάτην τοῖς ἁμαρτάνουσιν εὑρίσκων καταφυγήν.
For you do not release him from the charges, but you show that some of the others also did the same things, finding a most easy refuge for those who do wrong.
εἰ γὰρ τῶν μὲν ἀδικημάτων μὴ ῥᾴδιον εὑρεῖν ὃ μήπω τυγχάνει γεγενημένον, τοὺς δʼ ἐφʼ ἑκάστοις αὐτῶν ἁλισκομένους μηδὲν ἡγοίμεθα δεινὸν ποιεῖν, ὅταν ἕτεροι ταὐτὰ φαίνωνται διαπεπραγμένοι, πῶς οὐκ ἂν καὶ τὰς ἀπολογίας ἅπασι ῥᾳδίας ποιήσαιμεν, καὶ τοῖς βουλομένοις εἶναι πονηροῖς πολλὴν ἐξουσίαν παρασκευάσαιμεν;
For if it is not easy to find which of the injustices has not yet happened to take place, and if we should believe that those caught in each of these do nothing terrible when others appear to have done the same, how should we not make defenses easy for everyone and provide great license for those who wish to be wicked?
§46μάλιστα δʼ ἂν κατίδοις τὴν εὐήθειαν τῶν εἰρημένων ἐπὶ σαυτοῦ θεωρήσας.
And you would understand the foolishness of what you have said most of all by looking at your own case.
ἐνθυμήθητι γάρ· εἰ μεγάλων καὶ δεινῶν αἰτιῶν περὶ σὲ γεγονυιῶν τοῦτόν τις τὸν τρόπον σοι συνείποι, πῶς ἂν διατεθείης;
For consider: if, when great and terrible charges had been brought against you, someone should advocate for you in this manner, how would you be disposed?
ἐγὼ μὲν γὰρ οἶδʼ ὅτι μᾶλλον ἂν αὐτὸν μισήσειας ἢ τοὺς κατηγοροῦντας.
For I know that you would hate him more than your accusers.
καίτοι πῶς οὐκ αἰσχρὸν τοιαύτας ὑπὲρ τῶν ἄλλων ποιεῖσθαι τὰς ἀπολογίας, ἐφʼ αἷς ὑπὲρ σαυτοῦ λεγομέναις μάλιστʼ ἂν ὀργισθείης;
And yet, how is it not shameful to make such defenses on behalf of others, at which you would be most angry if they were spoken on your own behalf?
§47σκέψαι δὲ κἀκεῖνο καὶ δίελθε πρὸς αὑτόν.
Consider also this and go over it with yourself.
εἴ τις τῶν σοι συνόντων ἐπαρθείη ποιεῖν ἃ σὺ τυγχάνεις εὐλογῶν, πῶς οὐκ ἂν ἀθλιώτατος εἴη καὶ τῶν νῦν ὄντων καὶ τῶν πώποτε γεγενημένων;
If one of your associates should be incited to do what you happen to be praising, how would he not be the most wretched of those who now exist and of those who have ever lived?
ἆρʼ οὖν χρὴ τοιούτους λόγους γράφειν οἷς τοῦτο προσέσται μέγιστον ἀγαθόν, ἢν μηδένα πεῖσαι τῶν ἀκουσάντων δυνηθῶσιν;
Is it then necessary to write such arguments whose greatest good will be if they are able to persuade none of those who hear them?
§48ἀλλὰ γὰρ ἴσως ἂν εἴποις ὡς οὐδὲ σὲ τοῦτο παρέλαθεν, ἀλλʼ ἐβουλήθης τοῖς φιλοσόφοις παράδειγμα καταλιπεῖν ὡς χρὴ περὶ τῶν αἰσχρῶν αἰτιῶν καὶ δυσχερῶν πραγμάτων ποιεῖσθαι τὰς ἀπολογίας.
But indeed, perhaps you might say that this did not escape you either, but you wished to leave an example for philosophers of how one must make defenses concerning shameful charges and difficult matters.
ἀλλʼ εἰ καὶ πρότερον ἠγνόεις, οἶμαί σοι νῦν γεγενῆσθαι φανερὸν ὅτι πολὺ θᾶττον ἄν τις σωθείη μηδὲν φθεγξάμενος ἢ τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον ἀπολογησάμενος.
But even if you were ignorant before, I think it has now become clear to you that one would be saved much more quickly by saying nothing than by defending oneself in this manner.
§49καὶ μὲν δὴ καὶ τοῦτο δῆλον, ὅτι τῆς φιλοσοφίας ἐπικήρως διακειμένης καὶ φθονουμένης διὰ τοὺς τοιούτους τῶν λόγων ἔτι μᾶλλον αὐτὴν μισήσουσιν.
And indeed this too is clear, that since philosophy is in a precarious state and envied because of such arguments, they will hate it even more.
ἢν οὖν ἐμοὶ πείθῃ, μάλιστα μὲν οὐ ποιήσει τοῦ λοιποῦ πονηρὰς ὑποθέσεις, εἰ δὲ μή, τοιαῦτα ζητήσεις λέγειν ἐξ ὧν μήτʼ αὐτὸς χείρων εἶναι δόξεις μήτε τοὺς μιμουμένους λυμανεῖ μήτε τὴν περὶ τοὺς λόγους παίδευσιν διαβαλεῖς.
If, therefore, you obey me, preferably you will not make wicked themes in the future; but if not, you will seek to say such things from which you yourself will not seem to be worse, nor will you harm those who imitate you, nor bring slander upon education in discourse.
§50καὶ μὴ θαυμάσῃς, εἰ νεώτερος ὢν καὶ μηδέν σοι προσήκων οὕτω προχείρως ἐπιχειρῶ σε νουθετεῖν· ἡγοῦμαι γὰρ οὐ τῶν πρεσβυτάτων οὐδὲ τῶν οἰκειοτάτων, ἀλλὰ τῶν πλεῖστʼ εἰδότων καὶ βουλομένων ὠφελεῖν ἔργον εἶναι περὶ τῶν τοιούτων συμβουλεύειν.
And do not wonder if, being younger and in no way related to you, I attempt so readily to admonish you; for I believe that advising on such matters is the duty not of the oldest nor of the closest, but of those who know most and wish to be of help.

Notes

  1. §42ἐκείνων δὲ καταγιγνώσκομεν ὡς — The verb `καταγιγνώσκω` (charge, condemn) takes the person accused (here `ἐκείνων` referring to the gods) in the genitive, and the content of the charge is introduced by the `ὡς` clause.
  2. §43δυοῖν τοῖν αἰσχίστοιν οὐ διαμαρτάνουσιν — The verb `διαμαρτάνω` typically takes the genitive and means "to miss" or "to escape." Here, combined with the negative, it indicates that they "do not miss (i.e., cannot escape) either of the two most shameful things."
  3. §44πολλῶν δʼ ἐνόντων — A genitive absolute construction using `ἐνόντων`, the present participle neuter plural of the impersonal verb `ἔνεστι` (it is possible, there is in). It has a concessive force: "although there are many things (to say)."
  4. §47οἷς τοῦτο προσέσται μέγιστον ἀγαθόν, ἢν — The relative pronoun `οἷς` refers back to `λόγους` as a dative of possession. `τοῦτο` is a proleptic pronoun pointing forward to the `ἢν` clause ("if they are able to persuade no one"), creating a highly ironical structure: "speeches whose greatest benefit will be this, namely, if they persuade no one."
  5. §50οὐ τῶν πρεσβυτάτων... ἔργον εἶναι — A genitive of possession or duty with the verb `εἶναι` ("to be the part of..."). The noun `ἔργον` (duty, task) is explicitly supplied, and the true subject of the infinitive clause is `συμβουλεύειν` (to advise).

Cite this passage

Isocrates, Busiris §42-50. Humanitext Reader, https://reader.humanitext.ai/en/text/urn:cts:greekLit:tlg0010.tlg010.humanitext-grc2:42-50

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