Humanitext Reader

Plutarch · On Fate §10-11

Providence and Fate: Differences from Determinism

Passage 6 of 6 · Greek

Summary

The author organizes the hierarchical relationship between the threefold providence and fate with reference to Platonic dialogues. Then, the main points of disagreement are contrasted between the author's position, which allows room for free will and chance, and the opposing determinist position, which subjects everything to fate.

§10ἐγὼ μὲν οὖν τὰ πρὸς τοῦ Πλάτωνος ταύτῃ τῇ παροιμίᾳ λαμβάνω.
Therefore, I indeed take the statements of Plato in accordance with this proverb.
τριττῆς γὰρ οὔσης τῆς προνοίας, ἡ μὲν ἅτε γεννήσασα τὴν εἱμαρμένην τρόπον τινὰ αὐτὴν περιλαμβάνει· ἡ δὲ συγγεννηθεῖσα τῇ εἱμαρμένῃ πάντως αὐτῇ συμπεριλαμβάνεται ἡ δʼ ὡς ὕστερον τῆς εἱμαρμένης γενομένη κατὰ ταὐτὰ δὴ ἐμπεριέχεται ὑπʼ αὐτῆς, καθʼ ἃ καὶ τὸ ἐφʼ ἡμῖν καὶ ἡ τύχη εἴρηται.
For since providence is threefold, the first, as having generated fate, in a certain way encompasses it; and the second, having been co-generated with fate, is altogether encompassed by it; and the third, as having come into being after fate, is in the same way contained by it, just as both what is in our power and chance are said to be.
οἷς γὰρ ἂν συλλάβηται τῆς συνουσίας ἡ τοῦ δαιμονίου δύναμις ὥς φησι Σωκράτης μονονουχὶ θεσμόν τινα καὶ τοιοῦτον Ἀδραστείας διεξιὼν πρὸς τὸν Θεάγην οὗτοί εἰσιν, ὧν καὶ σὺ ᾔσθησαι· ταχὺ γὰρ παραχρῆμα ἐπιδιδόασιν οὐκοῦν ἐν τούτῳ τὸ μὲν συλλαμβάνειν τισὶ τὸ δαιμόνιον κατὰ τὴν τρίτην πρόνοιαν ἀναθετέον, τὸ δὲ ταχὺ παραχρῆμα ἐπιδιδόναι καθʼ εἱμαρμένην, τὸ δʼ ὅλον οὐκ ἄδηλον, ὡς αὐτὸ τοῦθʼ εἱμαρμένη τίς ἐστιν.
"For those with whose association the power of the divine cooperates," as Socrates says, almost explaining a certain such decree of Adrasteia to Theages, "these are they of whom you also have perceived; for they make progress quickly on the spot." Therefore, in this, the "cooperating of the divine with some" must be referred to the third providence, and the "making progress quickly on the spot" is according to fate, and the whole is not unclear, since this very thing is a certain fate.
τάχα δʼ ἂν οὕτω πολὺ πιθανώτερον δόξειε καὶ τὴν δευτέραν πρόνοιαν ὑπὸ τῆς εἱμαρμένης περιέχεσθαι καὶ πάνθʼ ἁπλῶς τὰ γιγνόμενα· εἴ γε καὶ ἡ κατʼ οὐσίαν εἱμαρμένη ὀρθῶς ἡμῖν εἰς τὰς τρεῖς μοίρας διανενέμηται, καὶ ὁ τῆς ἁλύσεως λόγος τὰς περὶ οὐρανὸν περιόδους τοῖς ἐξ ὑποθέσεως ἀποβαίνουσι συγκαταλέγει.
And perhaps in this way it would seem much more plausible that both the second providence is encompassed by fate and simply all things that come into being; if indeed fate according to substance has been correctly divided by us into the three portions, and the argument of the chain reckons the revolutions around heaven among those things that turn out from a hypothesis.
ἀλλὰ περὶ μὲν τούτων οὐκ ἂν ἔγωγʼ ἐπὶ πλέον διενεχθείην πρότερον ἐξ ὑποθέσεως λεγόμενα, ἢ ὡς μᾶλλον σὺν εἱμαρμένῃ προκατάρχοντος αὐτῆς τῆς εἱμαρμένης εἱμαρμένου.
But concerning these things, I indeed would not dispute further, whether they are said previously from a hypothesis, or rather as being destined along with fate, with fate itself leading the way before it.
§11ὁ μὲν οὖν ἡμέτερος λόγος, ἐπὶ κεφαλαίων εἰπεῖν, τοιοῦτός τις ἂν εἴη· ὁ δὲ τούτων ἐναντίος οὐ μόνον ἐν εἱμαρμένῃ ἀλλὰ καὶ καθʼ εἱμαρμένην πάντα τίθεται.
Our discourse, then, to speak in summary, would be of such a kind; but the opposite to this places all things not only in fate but also according to fate.
πάντα δὲ θατέρῳ συνᾴδει· τὰ δὲ τῷ ἑτέρῳ συνῳδὰ δῆλον ὅτι καὶ θάτερον.
And all things harmonize with the one; and what harmonizes with the one, it is clear that it also harmonizes with the other.
κατὰ μὲν οὖν τόνδε τὸν λόγον τὸ ἐνδεχόμενον εἴρηται· καὶ τὸ γʼ ἐφʼ ἡμῖν δεύτερον· καὶ τρίτον ἥ τε τύχη καὶ τὸ αὐτόματον καὶ ὅσα κατʼ αὐτά· ἔπαινος δὲ καὶ ψόγος καὶ τὰ τούτων συγγενῆ τέταρτα πέμπτον δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ πᾶσιν εὐχαὶ θεῶν καὶ θεραπεῖαι λεγέσθω· ἀργοὶ δὲ καὶ θερίζοντες λόγοι καὶ ὁ παρὰ τὴν εἱμαρμένην ὀνομαζόμενος σοφίσμαθʼ ὡς ἀληθῶς κατὰ τοῦτον τὸν λόγον τυγχάνει ὄντα.
According, then, to this discourse, the contingent is spoken of; and indeed what is in our power second; and thirdly both chance and the spontaneous and all things according to them; and praise and blame and their kindred fourth; and fifthly and above all let prayers to the gods and worship be spoken of; and the 'idle' and 'reaping' arguments, and that named 'contrary to fate', turn out to be truly sophisms according to this discourse.
κατὰ δὲ τὸν ἐναντίον μάλιστα μὲν καὶ πρῶτον ἂν εἶναι δόξειε, τὸ μηδὲν ἀναιτίως γίγνεσθαι ἀλλὰ κατὰ προηγουμένας αἰτίας· δεύτερον δὲ τὸ φύσει διοικεῖσθαι τόνδε τὸν κόσμον σύμπνουν καὶ συμπαθῆ αὐτὸν αὑτῷ ὄντα· τρίτον δέ, ἃ πρὸς τούτοις μαρτύρια μᾶλλον ἔοικεν εἶναι, μαντικὴ μὲν ἅπασιν ἀνθρώποις εὐδόκιμος ὡς ἀληθῶς θεῶνὑπάρχουσα· ἡ δὲ τῶν σοφῶν πρὸς τὰ συμβαίνοντα εὐαρέστησις, ὡς πάντα κατὰ μοῖραν γιγνόμενα δευτέρα. τρίτον δὲ τὸ πολυθρύλητον τοῦτο, ὅτι πᾶν ἀξίωμα ἢ ἀληθές ἐστιν ἢ ψευδές.
But according to the opposite, especially and first it would seem to be that nothing comes into being without a cause but according to antecedent causes; and secondly that this universe is administered by nature, being in conspiration and sympathy with itself; and thirdly, what seem rather to be testimonies in addition to these, that divination exists for all men, being truly held in high repute from the gods; and secondly, the satisfaction of the wise with respect to what happens, on the ground that all things come into being according to portion; and thirdly, this much-celebrated saying, that every proposition is either true or false.
τούτων γε μὴν ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον ἐμνήσθημεν, ἵνα ὡς ἐπὶ βραχὺ τὰ τῆς εἱμαρμένης κεφάλαια δηλωθείη ἃ χρὴ διερευνήσασθαι κατὰ τὴν ἀκριβῆ βάσανον ἑκατέρου τῶν λόγων, τὰ δὲ καθʼ ἕκαστα τούτων ἐσαῦθις μέτιμεν.
Of these things, indeed, we made mention to such an extent, so that the main heads of fate might be shown in brief, which must be investigated according to the exact examination of each of the two discourses, and we shall go over each of these in detail hereafter.

Notes

  1. 574bτριττῆς γὰρ οὔσης τῆς προνοίας — Genitive absolute construction with the participle οὔσης, serving as the introduction to explain how each of the threefold providences stands in relation (encompassing, co-encompassed, or contained) to fate.
  2. 574cτάχα δʼ ἂν οὕτω πολὺ πιθανώτερον δόξειε — The potential optative construction with ἂν ... δόξειε, expressing what might hypothetically seem plausible regarding the opposing determinist position.
  3. 574dπάντα δὲ θατέρῳ συνᾴδει· τὰ δὲ τῷ ἑτέρῳ συνῳδὰ δῆλον ὅτι καὶ θάτερον. — While the subjects are implied, this highly elliptic sentence presents the determinist (Stoic) view where "according to fate" (the one) and "in fate" (the other) completely coincide and render any distinction between them obsolete.

Cite this passage

Plutarch, On Fate §10-11. Humanitext Reader, https://reader.humanitext.ai/en/text/urn:cts:greekLit:tlg0007.tlg108.humanitext-grc2:10-11

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