§1περὶ τῆς ἠθικῆς λεγομένης; ἀρετῆς καὶ δοκούσης, ᾧ δὴ μάλιστα τῆς θεωρητικῆς διαφέρει, τῷ τὸ μὲν πάθος ὕλην ἔχειν τὸν δὲ λόγον εἶδος, εἰπεῖν πρόκειται τίνʼ οὐσίαν ἔχει καὶ πῶς ὑφίστασθαι πέφυκε· καὶ πότερον οἰκείῳ λόγῳ κεκόσμηται τὸ δεδεγμένον μόριον αὐτὴν τῆς ψυχῆς ἢ μετέσχηκεν ἀλλοτρίου· καὶ εἰ μετέσχηκε, πότερον ὡς τὰ μεμιγμένα πρὸς τὸ βέλτιον ἢ μᾶλλον ὡς ἐπιστασίᾳ τινὶ χρώμενον καὶ ἀρχῇ μετέχειν λέγεται τῆς τοῦ ἄρχοντος δυνάμεως.
Concerning what is called and thought to be moral virtue—which differs from theoretical virtue most especially in this: that it has passion as its matter and reason as its form—it is proposed to state what its essence is and how it is constituted; and whether the part of the soul that receives it is ordered by its own reason, or participates in an alien one; and if it participates, whether it does so as things mixed with what is better, or rather is said to participate in the power of the ruler by employing some supervision and rule.
ὅτι μὲν γὰρ δυνατὸν καὶ ἀρετὴν γεγονέναι καὶ μένειν παντάπασιν· ἄυλον καὶ ἄκρατον, οἶμαι δῆλον εἶναι.
For that it is possible for virtue to be and remain altogether immaterial and pure, I think is clear.
βέλτιον δὲ βραχέως ἐπιδραμεῖν καὶ τὰ τῶν ἑτέρων, οὐχ ἱστορίας ἕνεκα μᾶλλον ἢ τοῦ σαφέστερα γενέσθαι τὰ οἰκεῖα καὶ βεβαιότερα, προεκτεθέντων ἐκείνων.
But it is better to run briefly over the opinions of others as well, not so much for the sake of history, but rather so that our own views may become clearer and more certain after those have been set forth beforehand.
§2Μενέδημος μὲν ὁ ἐξ Ἐρετρίας ἀνῄρει τῶν ἀρετῶν καὶ τὸ πλῆθος καὶ τὰς διαφοράς, ὡς μιᾶς οὔσης καὶ χρωμένης πολλοῖς ὀνόμασι· τὸ γὰρ αὐτὸ σωφροσύνην καὶ ἀνδρείαν καὶ δικαιοσύνην λέγεσθαι, καθάπερ βροτὸν καὶ ἄνθρωπον. ἀρίστων δʼ ὁ Χῖος τῇ μὲν οὐσίᾳ μίαν καὶ αὐτὸς ἀρετὴν ἐποίει καὶ ὑγίειαν ὠνόμαζε· τῷ δὲ πρὸς τί πως διαφόρους καὶ πλείονας, ὡς εἴ τις ἐθέλοι τὴν ὅρασιν ἡμῶν λευκῶν μὲν ἀντιλαμβανομένην λευκοθέαν καλεῖν, μελάνων δὲ μελανθέαν ἤ τι τοιοῦτον ἕτερον.
Menedemus of Eretria abolished both the number and the differences of the virtues, on the ground that virtue is one, though employing many names; for the same thing is called temperance, courage, and justice, just as "mortal" and "human." And Ariston of Chios also made virtue one in essence, and called it "health"; but in its being in a certain relation, he made it diverse and multiple, as if one should wish to call our sight "white-sight" when perceiving white things, and "black-sight" when perceiving black ones, or some other such name.
καὶ γὰρ ἡ ἀρετὴ ποιητέα μὲν ἐπισκοποῦσα καὶ μὴ ποιητέα κέκληται φρόνησις, ἐπιθυμίαν δὲ κοσμοῦσα καὶ τὸ μέτριον καὶ τὸ εὔκαιρον ἐν ἡδοναῖς ὁρίζουσα σωφροσύνη, κοινωνήμασι δὲ καὶ συμβολαίοις ὁμιλοῦσα τοῖς πρὸς ἑτέρους δικαιοσύνη· καθάπερ τὸ μαχαίριον ἓν μὲν ἐστιν ἄλλοτε δʼ ἄλλο διαιρεῖ, καὶ τὸ πῦρ ἐνεργεῖ περὶ ὕλας διαφόρους μιᾷ φύσει χρώμενον.
For virtue, when inspecting what is to be done and what is not to be done, is called prudence; when ordering desire and defining moderation and timeliness in pleasures, temperance; and when dealing with partnerships and contracts with others, justice; just as a knife is one, but cuts different things at different times, and fire acts upon different matters while employing a single nature.
ἔοικε δὲ καὶ Ζήνων εἰς τοῦτό πως ὑποφέρεσθαι ὁ Κιτιεύς, ὁριζόμενος τὴν φρόνησιν ἐν μὲν ἀπονεμητέοις δικαιοσύνην ἐν δʼ αἱρετέοις σωφροσύνην ἐν δʼ ὑπομενετέοις ἀνδρείαν· ἀπολογούμενοι δʼ ἀξιοῦσιν ἐν τούτοις τὴν ἐπιστήμην φρόνησιν ὑπὸ τοῦ Ζήνωνος ὠνομάσθαι.
And Zeno of Citium also seems to drift somewhat in this direction, defining prudence in things to be distributed as justice, in things to be chosen as temperance, and in things to be endured as courage; and those who defend him argue that in these cases the knowledge was named prudence by Zeno.
Χρύσιππος δὲ κατὰ τὸ ποιὸν ἀρετὴν ἰδίαν ποιότητι συνίστασθαι νομίζων, ἔλαθεν ἑαυτὸν κατὰ τὸν Πλάτωνα
σμῆνος ἀρετῶν
οὐ σύνηθες οὐδὲ γνώριμον ἐγείρας ὡς γὰρ παρὰ τὸν ἀνδρεῖον ἀνδρείαν καὶ παρὰ τὸν πρᾶον πραότητα καὶ δικαιοσύνην παρὰ τὸν δίκαιον, οὕτω παρὰ τὸν χαρίεντα χαριεντότητας καὶ παρὰ τὸν ἐσθλὸν ἐσθλότητας καὶ παρὰ τὸν μέγαν μεγαλότητας καὶ παρὰ τὸν καλὸν καλότητας, ἑτέρας τε τοιαύτας ἐπιδεξιότητας εὐαπαντησίας εὐτραπελίας ἀρετὰς τιθέμενος, πολλῶν καὶ ἀτόπων ὀνομάτων οὐδὲν δεομένην ἐμπέπληκε φιλοσοφίαν.
But Chrysippus, believing that virtue, according to its quality, is constituted by an individual quality, was unaware that he was raising, in Plato's words, "a swarm of virtues" neither customary nor familiar. For just as he places courage alongside the courageous man, gentleness alongside the gentle, and justice alongside the just, so also alongside the graceful man he places gracefulnesses, alongside the noble, noblenesses, alongside the great, greatnesses, and alongside the beautiful, beauties, and by establishing other such virtues as dexterity, sociability, and wittiness, he has filled philosophy with many strange names for which there is no need.