Humanitext Reader

Plutarch · On Hearing §5-6

Overcoming Envy and Ambition through Receptive Listening

Passage 3 of 11 · Greek

Summary

In section 5, the author describes the harmful effects of envy and untimely ambition on listening, detailing the resulting mental distractions. In section 6, he emphasizes the importance of listening with a receptive and gentle mind, learning from both the successes and errors of speakers, and correcting oneself through comparison.

§5φθόνος τοίνυν μετὰ βασκανίας καὶ δυσμενείας οὐδενὶ μὲν ἔργῳ παρὼν ἀγαθόν, ἀλλὰ πᾶσιν ἐμπόδιος τοῖς καλοῖς, κάκιστος δʼ ἀκροωμένῳ πάρεδρος καὶ σύμβουλος, ἀνιαρὰ καὶ ἀηδῆ καὶ δυσπρόσδεκτα ποιῶν τὰ ὠφέλιμα διὰ τὸ πᾶσι μᾶλλον ἥδεσθαι τοὺς φθονοῦντας ἢ τοῖς εὖ λεγομένοις.
Envy, then, accompanied by malice and ill-will, is present in no work as a good thing, but is an obstacle to all beautiful things, and is the worst companion and counselor to a listener, making useful things painful, unpleasant, and hard to accept, because those who are envious take pleasure in anything rather than in well-spoken things.
καίτοι πλοῦτος μὲν ὅντινα δάκνει καὶ δόξα καὶ κάλλος, ἑτέροις ὑπάρχοντα, φθονερός ἐστι μόνον·
And yet, he whom wealth, glory, or beauty, belonging to others, stings is only envious; for he is vexed at the good fortune of others.
ἄχθεται γὰρ ἄλλων εὐτυχούντων ὁ δὲ λόγῳ καλῶς λεγομένῳ δυσχεραίνων ὑπὸ τῶν ἰδίων ἀγαθῶν ἀνιᾶται.
But he who is displeased with a well-spoken discourse is pained by his own benefits.
ὡς γὰρ τὸ φῶς τῶν βλεπόντων, καὶ ὁ λόγος τῶν ἀκουόντων ἀγαθόν ἐστιν, ἂν βούλωνται δέχεσθαι.
For as light is a good to those who see, so discourse is a good to those who listen, if they are willing to receive it.
τὸν μὲν οὖν ἐφʼ ἑτέροις φθόνον ἄλλαι τινὲς ἀπαίδευτοι καὶ κακαὶ διαθέσεις ἐμποιοῦσιν, ὁ δὲ πρὸς τοὺς λέγοντας ἐκ φιλοδοξίας ἀκαίρου καὶ φιλοτιμίας ἀδίκου γεννώμενος οὐδὲ προσέχειν ἐᾷ τοῖς λεγομένοις τὸν οὕτω διακείμενον, ἀλλὰ θορυβεῖ καὶ περισπᾷ τὴν διάνοιαν, ἅμα μὲν τὴν ἑαυτῆς ἕξιν ἐπισκοποῦσαν εἰ λείπεται τῆς τοῦ λέγοντος, ἅμα δὲ τοὺς ἄλλους ἐπιβλέπουσαν εἰ ἄγανται καὶ θαυμάζουσιν, ἐκπληττομένην τε ὑπὸ τῶν ἐπαίνων καὶ ἀγριαίνουσαν πρὸς τοὺς παρόντας ἂν ἀποδέχωνται τὸν λέγοντα, τῶν δὲ λόγων τοὺς μὲν εἰρημένους ἐῶσαν καὶ προϊεμένην, ὅτι λυποῦσι μνημονευόμενοι, πρὸς δὲ τοὺς λείποντας ταραττομένην καὶ τρέμουσαν μὴ τῶν εἰρημένων βελτίονες γένωνται, σπεύδουσαν δὲ τάχιστα παύσασθαι τοὺς λέγοντας ὅταν κάλλιστα λέγωσι, λυθείσης δὲ τῆς ἀκροάσεως πρὸς οὐδενὶ τῶν εἰρημένων οὖσαν ἀλλὰ τὰς φωνὰς καὶ διαθέσεις τῶν παρόντων ἐπιψηφίζουσαν, καὶ τοὺς μὲν ἐπαινοῦντας ὥσπερ ἐμμανῆ φεύγουσαν καὶ ἀποπηδῶσαν, προστρέχουσαν δὲ καὶ συναγελαζομένην τοῖς ψέγουσι τὰ εἰρημένα καὶ διαστρέφουσιν ἂν δὲ μηδὲν διαστρέψαι, παραβάλλουσαν ἑτέρους τινὰς ὡς ἄμεινον εἰρηκότας εἰς ταὐτὸ καὶ δυνατώτερον, ἕως διαφθείρασα καὶ λυμηναμένη τὴν ἀκρόασιν ἀχρεῖον ἑαυτῇ καὶ ἀνόνητον ἀπεργάσηται,
Now, envy toward others is produced by certain other uneducated and bad dispositions; but that which is directed toward speakers, arising from untimely desire for glory and unjust ambition, does not even allow the one so disposed to attend to what is being said, but throws into confusion and distracts his mind. This mind, on the one hand, is examining its own state to see if it falls short of the speaker's, and on the other hand, is watching the others to see if they admire and wonder, being struck with panic by the praises, and growing wild against those present if they accept the speaker. It lets go and dismisses the part of the discourse already spoken, because they cause pain when remembered, but is troubled and trembles at the remaining parts lest they turn out better than what has been said, and is eager for the speakers to stop as quickly as possible when they are speaking best. And when the listening is concluded, it is intent upon nothing of what has been said, but counts the voices and dispositions of those present, and flees and leaps away from those who praise as if from madmen, but runs to and herds with those who find fault with what has been said and distort it; and if they can distort nothing, it compares certain others as having spoken better and more powerfully on the same subject, until, having destroyed and ruined the listening, it renders it useless and unprofitable to itself.
§6διὸ δεῖ τῇ φιληκοΐᾳ πρὸς τὴν φιλοδοξίαν σπεισάμενον ἀκροᾶσθαι τοῦ λέγοντος ἵλεων καὶ πρᾶον, ὥσπερ ἐφʼ ἑστίασιν ἱερὰν καὶ θυσίας ἀπαρχὴν παρειλημμένον, ἐπαινοῦντα μὲν ἐν οἷς ἐπιτυγχάνει τὴν δύναμιν, ἀγαπῶντα δὲ τὴν προθυμίαν αὐτὴν τοῦ φέροντος εἰς μέσον ἃ γιγνώσκει καὶ πείθοντος ἑτέρους διʼ ὧν αὐτὸς πέπεισται.
Therefore, making a truce with ambition in favor of a love of listening, one should listen to the speaker kindly and gently, as if invited to a sacred feast and the first-fruits of a sacrifice, praising his ability in those things where he succeeds, and welcoming the very goodwill of the one who brings into the open what he knows and who persuades others through those things by which he himself has been persuaded.
τοῖς μὲν οὖν κατορθουμένοις ἐπιλογιστέον ὡς οὐκ ἀπὸ τύχης οὐδʼ αὐτομάτως ἀλλʼ ἐπιμελείᾳ καὶ πόνῳ καὶ μαθήσει κατορθοῦνται, καὶ μιμητέον γε ταῦτα θαυμάζοντάς γε δὴ καὶ ζηλοῦντας τοῖς δʼ ἁμαρτανομένοις ἐφιστάναι χρὴ τὴν διάνοιαν, ὑφʼ ὧν αἰτιῶν καὶ ὅθεν ἡ παρατροπὴ γέγονεν.
For those things, then, that are successful, one must consider that they are achieved not by chance or automatically, but by care, labor, and learning, and one should indeed copy these things, admiring and emulating them. But for those things that are errors, one must apply the mind to find out from what causes and from where the deviation arose.
ὡς γὰρ ὁ Ξενοφῶν φησι τοὺς οἰκονομικοὺς καὶ ἀπὸ τῶν φίλων ὀνίνασθαι καὶ ἀπὸ τῶν ἐχθρῶν, οὕτω τοὺς ἐγρηγορότας καὶ προσέχοντας οὐ μόνον κατορθοῦντες ἀλλὰ καὶ διαμαρτάνοντες ὠφελοῦσιν οἱ λέγοντες·
For as Xenophon says that those skilled in household management benefit both from friends and from enemies, so speakers benefit those who are awake and paying attention, not only when they succeed, but also when they err.
καὶ γὰρ διανοήματος εὐτέλεια καὶ ῥήματος κενότης καὶ σχῆμα φορτικὸν καὶ πτόησις μετὰ χαρᾶς ἀπειροκάλου πρὸς ἔπαινον καὶ ὅσα τοιαῦτα μᾶλλον ἀκροωμένοις ἐφʼ ἑτέρων ἢ λέγουσιν ἐφʼ ἑαυτῶν καταφαίνεται.
For indeed, poverty of thought, emptiness of words, a vulgar gesture, and a fluttering accompanied by unrefined joy in response to praise, and all such things, are more apparent to listeners in others than to speakers in themselves.
διὸ δεῖ μεταφέρειν τὴν εὐθύνην ἐφʼ ἑαυτοὺς ἀπὸ τοῦ λέγοντος, ἀνασκοποῦντας εἴ τι τοιοῦτο λανθάνομεν ἁμαρτάνοντες, ῥᾷστον γάρ ἐστι τῶν ὄντων τὸ μέμψασθαι τὸν πλησίον, ἀχρήστως τε καὶ κενῶς γιγνόμενον, ἂν μὴ πρός τινα διόρθωσιν ἢ φυλακὴν ἀναφέρηται τῶν ὁμοίων.
Therefore, we must transfer the scrutiny to ourselves from the speaker, examining whether we are unconsciously committing some such error; for to blame one's neighbor is the easiest of all things, yet it is useless and empty unless it is directed toward some correction or prevention of similar errors.
καὶ τὸ τοῦ Πλάτωνος οὐκ ὀκνητέον ἀεὶ πρὸς αὑτὸν ἐπὶ τῶν ἁμαρτανόντων ἀναφθέγγεσθαι, μή που ἄρʼ ἐγὼ τοιοῦτος; ὡς γὰρ ἐν τοῖς ὄμμασι τῶν πλησίον ἐλλάμποντα τὰ ἑαυτῶν ὁρῶμεν, οὕτως ἐπὶ τῶν λόγων δεῖ τοὺς ἑαυτῶν ἐνεικονίζεσθαι τοῖς ἑτέρων, ἵνα μήτʼ ἄγαν θρασέως καταφρονῶμεν ἄλλων, αὑτοῖς τε προσέχωμεν ἐν τῷ λέγειν ἐπιμελέστερον.
And one must not hesitate always to repeat to oneself Plato's saying in the case of those who err: "Am I not perhaps such a one?" For just as we see our own reflections shining in the eyes of our neighbors, so in the case of speeches we must image our own in those of others, so that we may not despise others too boldly, and may attend to ourselves more carefully in speaking.
χρήσιμον δὲ πρὸς τοῦτο καὶ τὸ τῆς παραβολῆς, ὅταν γενόμενοι καθʼ αὑτοὺς ἀπὸ τῆς ἀκροάσεως καὶ λαβόντες τι τῶν μὴ καλῶς ἢ μὴ ἱκανῶς εἰρῆσθαι δοκούντων ἐπιχειρῶμεν εἰς ταὐτὸ καὶ προάγωμεν αὑτοὺς τὰ μὲν ὥσπερ ἀναπληροῦν, τὰ δʼ ἐπανορθοῦσθαι, τὰ δʼ ἑτέρως φράζειν, τὰ δʼ ὅλοις ἐξ ὑπαρχῆς εἰσφέρειν πειρώμενοι πρὸς τὴν ὑπόθεσιν.
And useful for this is also the practice of comparison, when, having become by ourselves after the listening and having taken some of those things that seemed not well or not sufficiently spoken, we attempt the same subject and advance ourselves, trying to fill up some parts, to correct others, to phrase others differently, and to introduce others entirely anew to the theme.
ὃ καὶ Πλάτων ἐποίησε πρὸς τὸν Λυσίου λόγον.
This Plato also did with Lysias' speech.
τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἀντειπεῖν οὐ χαλεπὸν ἀλλὰ καὶ πάνυ ῥᾴδιον εἰρημένῳ λόγῳ· τὸ δʼ ἕτερον ἀνταναστῆσαι βελτίονα παντάπασιν ἐργῶδες.
For to speak against what has been said is not difficult, but indeed very easy; but to raise up another better one in its place is altogether laborious.
ὥσπερ ὁ Λακεδαιμόνιος ἀκούσας ὅτι Φίλιππος Ὄλυνθον κατέσκαψεν ἀλλʼ οὐκ ἀναστῆσαί γε τοιαύτην ἔφη πόλιν ἐκεῖνος ἂν δυνηθείη. ὅταν οὖν ἐν τῷ διαλέγεσθαι πρὸς τὴν τοιαύτην ὑπόθεσιν μὴ πολὺ φαινώμεθα τῶν εἰρηκότων διαφέροντες, πολὺ τοῦ καταφρονεῖν ἀφαιροῦμεν, καὶ τάχιστα κολούεται τὸ αὔθαδες ἡμῶν καὶ φίλαυτον ἐν ταῖς τοιαύταις ἐλεγχόμενον ἀντιπαραβολαῖς.
Just as the Spartan, hearing that Philip had razed Olynthus, said, "But he would not be able to raise up such a city." When, therefore, in discussing the same theme, we do not appear to differ much from those who have spoken, we take away much of our contempt, and our self-will and self-love are very quickly humbled when refuted in such comparisons.

Notes

  1. 39fἅμα μὲν τὴν ἑαυτῆς ἕξιν ἐπισκοποῦσαν... — The series of feminine accusative singular participles starting from this point (ἐπισκοποῦσαν, ἐπιβλέπουσαν, ἐκπληττομένην, etc.) agree with the direct object of the main clause, τὴν διάνοιαν. This forms a long hyperbaton structure depicting vividly how envy and ambition distract the listener's 'mind'.
  2. 40bδιὸ δεῖ τῇ φιληκοΐᾳ πρὸς τὴν φιλοδοξίαν σπεισάμενον... — The participle σπεισάμενον (first aorist middle, masculine accusative singular) agrees with the implied accusative subject of the impersonal verb δεῖ. The dative τῇ φιληκοΐᾳ depends on σπεισάμενον (to make a truce with/in favor of), and πρὸς τὴν φιλοδοξίαν indicates the opposing force against which the truce is made (ambition).

Cite this passage

Plutarch, On Hearing §5-6. Humanitext Reader, https://reader.humanitext.ai/en/text/urn:cts:greekLit:tlg0007.tlg069.humanitext-grc2:5-6

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