§7.42.1καὶ οἱ μὲν ὡς ἐπιθησόμενοι κατ’ ἀμφότερα παρεσκευάζοντο αὖθις, ἐν τούτῳ δὲ Δημοσθένης καὶ Εὐρυμέδων ἔχοντες τὴν ἀπὸ τῶν Ἀθηνῶν βοήθειαν παραγίγνονται, ναῦς τε τρεῖς καὶ ἑβδομήκοντα μάλιστα ξὺν ταῖς ξενικαῖς καὶ ὁπλίτας περὶ πεντακισχιλίους ἑαυτῶν τε καὶ τῶν ξυμμάχων, ἀκοντιστάς τε βαρβάρους καὶ Ἕλληνας οὐκ ὀλίγους, καὶ σφενδονήτας καὶ τοξότας καὶ τὴν ἄλλην παρασκευὴν ἱκανήν.
While the Syracusans and their allies were preparing to attack again on both elements, Demosthenes and Eurymedon arrived with the reinforcement from Athens, consisting of about seventy-three ships, including the foreign ones, and about five thousand hoplites of their own and of their allies, and not a few javelin-throwers, both barbarian and Greek, and slingers and archers, and an adequate supply of other equipment.
§7.42.2καὶ τοῖς μὲν Συρακοσίοις καὶ ξυμμάχοις κατάπληξις ἐν τῷ αὐτίκα οὐκ ὀλίγη ἐγένετο, εἰ πέρας μηδὲν ἔσται σφίσι τοῦ ἀπαλλαγῆναι τοῦ κινδύνου, ὁρῶντες οὔτε διὰ τὴν Δεκέλειαν τειχιζομένην οὐδὲν ἧσσον στρατὸν ἴσον καὶ παραπλήσιον τῷ προτέρῳ ἐπεληλυθότα τήν τε τῶν Ἀθηναίων δύναμιν πανταχόσε πολλὴν φαινομένην·
Upon this, no small consternation seized the Syracusans and their allies at the moment, when they saw that, in spite of the fortification of Decelea, a force equal and similar to the former one had arrived, and that the power of the Athenians appeared great in every direction, and they feared that there would be no end to their deliverance from danger.
τῷ δὲ προτέρῳ στρατεύματι τῶν Ἀθηναίων ὡς ἐκ κακῶν ῥώμη τις ἐγεγένητο.
On the other hand, the former army of the Athenians received a sort of strength after their misfortunes.
§7.42.3ὁ δὲ Δημοσθένης ἰδὼν ὡς εἶχε τὰ πράγματα καὶ νομίσας οὐχ οἷόν τε εἶναι διατρίβειν οὐδὲ παθεῖν ὅπερ ὁ Νικίας ἔπαθεν (ἀφικόμενος γὰρ τὸ πρῶτον ὁ Νικίας φοβερός, ὡς οὐκ εὐθὺς προσέκειτο ταῖς Συρακούσαις, ἀλλ’ ἐν Κατάνῃ διεχείμαζεν, ὑπερώφθη τε καὶ ἔφθασεν αὐτὸν ἐκ τῆς Πελοποννήσου στρατιᾷ ὁ Γύλιππος ἀφικόμενος, ἣν οὐδ’ ἂν μετέπεμψαν οἱ Συρακόσιοι, εἰ ἐκεῖνος εὐθὺς ἐπέκειτο· ἱκανοὶ γὰρ αὐτοὶ οἰόμενοι εἶναι ἅμα τ’ ἂν ἔμαθον ἥσσους ὄντες καὶ ἀποτετειχισμένοι ἂν ἦσαν, ὥστε μηδ’ εἰ μετέπεμψαν ἔτι ὁμοίως ἂν αὐτοὺς ὠφελεῖν), ταῦτα οὖν ἀνασκοπῶν ὁ Δημοσθένης, καὶ γιγνώσκων ὅτι καὶ αὐτὸς ἐν τῷ παρόντι τῇ πρώτῃ ἡμέρᾳ μάλιστα δεινότατός ἐστι τοῖς ἐναντίοις, ἐβούλετο ὅτι τάχος ἀποχρήσασθαι τῇ παρούσῃ τοῦ στρατεύματος ἐκπλήξει.
Demosthenes, seeing how matters stood, and thinking that it was impossible to waste time or to suffer what Nicias had suffered—for Nicias, who had been formidable when he first arrived, because he did not immediately attack Syracuse but wintered in Catana, fell into contempt, and Gylippus anticipated him by arriving from the Peloponnese with an army, which the Syracusans would not even have sent for if Nicias had immediately pressed them, for they would have thought themselves a match for him, and would have discovered their inferiority only when they were already walled in, so that even if they had sent for help then, it would no longer have benefited them in the same way—Demosthenes, therefore, reflecting on these things, and knowing that he himself also was at the present moment, on the very first day, most formidable to the enemy, wished to make use of the present consternation of their opponents as quickly as possible.
§7.42.4καὶ ὁρῶν τὸ παρατείχισμα τῶν Συρακοσίων, ᾧ ἐκώλυσαν περιτειχίσαι σφᾶς τοὺς Ἀθηναίους, ἁπλοῦν ὂν καί, εἰ κρατήσειέ τις τῶν τε Ἐπιπολῶν τῆς ἀναβάσεως καὶ αὖθις τοῦ ἐν αὐταῖς στρατοπέδου, ῥᾳδίως ἂν αὐτὸ ληφθέν (οὐδὲ γὰρ ὑπομεῖναι ἂν σφᾶς οὐδένα), §7.42.5ἠπείγετο ἐπιθέσθαι τῇ πείρᾳ, καί οἱ ξυντομωτάτην ἡγεῖτο διαπολέμησιν· ἢ γὰρ κατορθώσας ἕξειν Συρακούσας, ἢ ἀπάξειν τὴν στρατιὰν καὶ οὐ τρίψεσθαι ἄλλως Ἀθηναίους τε τοὺς ξυστρατευομένους καὶ τὴν ξύμπασαν πόλιν.
And seeing that the counter-wall of the Syracusans, by which they had prevented the Athenians from circumvallating them, was single, and that if one could gain possession of the ascent to Epipolae and then of the camp upon it, the wall might easily be taken (for no one would even withstand them), he hastened to make the attempt, and considered this to be the speediest way of ending the war; for he would either succeed and take Syracuse, or lead the army away and not uselessly exhaust both the Athenians who were serving with him and the whole state.
§7.42.6πρῶτον μὲν οὖν τήν τε γῆν ἐξελθόντες τῶν Συρακοσίων ἔτεμον οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι περὶ τὸν Ἄναπον, καὶ τῷ στρατεύματι ἐπεκράτουν ὥσπερ τὸ πρῶτον, τῷ τε πεζῷ καὶ ταῖς ναυσίν (οὐδὲ γὰρ καθ’ ἕτερα οἱ Συρακόσιοι ἀντεπεξῇσαν ὅτι μὴ τοῖς ἱππεῦσι καὶ ἀκοντισταῖς ἀπὸ τοῦ Ὀλυμπιείου)·
First, therefore, the Athenians went out and ravaged the land of the Syracusans about the Anapus, and were superior with their force as at first, both by land and by sea (for the Syracusans did not come out to meet them on either element, except with their cavalry and javelin-throwers from the Olympieum).