§4.73.1μετὰ δὲ τοῦτο Βρασίδας καὶ τὸ στράτευμα ἐχώρουν ἐγγυτέρω τῆς θαλάσσης καὶ τῆς τῶν Μεγαρέων πόλεως, καὶ καταλαβόντες χωρίον ἐπιτήδειον παραταξάμενοι ἡσύχαζον, οἰόμενοι σφίσιν ἐπιέναι τοὺς Ἀθηναίους καὶ τοὺς Μεγαρέας ἐπιστάμενοι περιορωμένους ὁποτέρων ἡ νίκη ἔσται.
After this, Brasidas and his army advanced closer to the sea and to the city of the Megarians, and having occupied a suitable place, they drew up in order of battle and remained quiet, thinking that the Athenians would attack them, and knowing that the Megarians were waiting to see on which side the victory would lie.
§4.73.2καλῶς δὲ ἐνόμιζον σφίσιν ἀμφότερα ἔχειν, ἅμα μὲν τὸ μὴ ἐπιχειρεῖν προτέρους μηδὲ μάχης καὶ κινδύνου ἑκόντας ἄρξαι, ἐπειδή γε ἐν φανερῷ ἔδειξαν ἑτοῖμοι ὄντες ἀμύνεσθαι, καὶ αὐτοῖς ὥσπερ ἀκονιτὶ τὴν νίκην δικαίως ἂν τίθεσθαι, ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ δὲ καὶ πρὸς τοὺς Μεγαρέας ὀρθῶς ξυμβαίνειν·
And they considered that either alternative would be well for them: on the one hand, that they should not attack first nor voluntarily begin a battle and danger, since they had shown openly that they were ready to defend themselves, and so the victory would justly be ascribed to them, as it were, without a blow; and at the same time, this would result in a correct position toward the Megarians.
§4.73.3εἰ μὲν γὰρ μὴ ὤφθησαν ἐλθόντες, οὐκ ἂν ἐν τύχῃ γίγνεσθαι σφίσιν, ἀλλὰ σαφῶς ἂν ὥσπερ ἡσσηθέντων στερηθῆναι εὐθὺς τῆς πόλεως· νῦν δὲ κἂν τυχεῖν αὐτοὺς Ἀθηναίους μὴ βουληθέντας ἀγωνίζεσθαι, ὥστε ἀμαχητὶ ἂν περιγενέσθαι αὐτοῖς ὧν ἕνεκα ἦλθον.
For if they had not been seen to come, they would not have had a chance of success, but would clearly, as if they had been defeated, have been deprived of the city at once; whereas now, it might well happen that the Athenians would not wish to fight, so that they would obtain without a battle the object for which they had come.
ὅπερ καὶ ἐγένετο.
Which indeed is what happened.
§4.73.4οἱ γὰρ Μεγαρῆς, ὡς οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι ἐτάξαντο μὲν παρὰ τὰ μακρὰ τείχη ἐξελθόντες, ἡσύχαζον δὲ καὶ αὐτοὶ μὴ ἐπιόντων, λογιζόμενοι καὶ οἱ ἐκείνων στρατηγοὶ μὴ ἀντίπαλον εἶναι σφίσι τὸν κίνδυνον, ἐπειδὴ καὶ τὰ πλείω αὐτοῖς προυκεχωρήκει, ἄρξασι μάχης πρὸς πλέονας αὐτῶν ἢ λαβεῖν νικήσαντας Μέγαρα ἢ σφαλέντας τῷ βελτίστῳ τοῦ ὁπλιτικοῦ βλαφθῆναι, τοῖς δὲ ξυμπάσης τῆς δυνάμεως καὶ τῶν παρόντων μέρος ἕκαστον κινδυνεύειν εἰκότως ἐθέλειν τολμᾶν, χρόνον δὲ ἐπισχόντες καὶ ὡς οὐδὲν ἀφ’ ἑκατέρων ἐπεχειρεῖτο, ἀπῆλθον πρότερον οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι ἐς τὴν Νίσαιαν καὶ αὖθις οἱ Πελοποννήσιοι ὅθενπερ ὡρμήθησαν. οὕτω δὴ τῷ μὲν Βρασίδᾳ αὐτῷ καὶ τοῖς ἀπὸ τῶν πόλεων ἄρχουσιν οἱ τῶν φευγόντων φίλοι Μεγαρῆς, ὡς ἐπικρατήσαντι καὶ τῶν Ἀθηναίων οὐκέτι ἐθελησάντων μάχεσθαι, θαρσοῦντες μᾶλλον ἀνοίγουσί τε τὰς πύλας καὶ δεξάμενοι καταπεπληγμένων ἤδη τῶν πρὸς τοὺς Ἀθηναίους πραξάντων ἐς λόγους ἔρχονται.
For the Megarians—when they saw that the Athenians had come out and drawn up along the long walls, but they too remained quiet since the enemy did not advance, and their generals calculated that the danger was not equal for them, since the greater part of their object had already succeeded for them, and to begin a battle against forces more numerous than themselves would mean either to take Megara if they won, or, if they failed, to be damaged in the best part of their hoplite force, whereas for the enemy, with each part of their present forces risking only a fraction of their whole strength, it was natural that they should be willing to run the risk and venture it; and after waiting some time, as nothing was attempted on either side, the Athenians withdrew first to Nisaea and then the Peloponnesians to the place from which they had started—under these circumstances, the Megarians who were friends of the exiles, being now more encouraged because Brasidas had prevailed and the Athenians were no longer willing to fight, opened the gates to Brasidas himself and to the commanders from the cities, and having admitted them while those who had negotiated with the Athenians were already struck with terror, they entered into negotiations.