§3.43.1‘ὧν ἡμεῖς τἀναντία δρῶμεν, καὶ προσέτι ἤν τις καὶ ὑποπτεύηται κέρδους μὲν ἕνεκα τὰ βέλτιστα δὲ ὅμως λέγειν, φθονήσαντες τῆς οὐ βεβαίου δοκήσεως τῶν κερδῶν τὴν φανερὰν ὠφελίαν τῆς πόλεως ἀφαιρούμεθα.
'But we do the exact opposite; and furthermore, if anyone is even suspected of speaking what is best, though for the sake of gain, we, grudging him the uncertain suspicion of gain, deprive the city of its manifest benefit.
§3.43.2καθέστηκε δὲ τἀγαθὰ ἀπὸ τοῦ εὐθέος λεγόμενα μηδὲν ἀνυποπτότερα εἶναι τῶν κακῶν, ὥστε δεῖν ὁμοίως τόν τε τὰ δεινότατα βουλόμενον πεῖσαι ἀπάτῃ προσάγεσθαι τὸ πλῆθος καὶ τὸν τὰ ἀμείνω λέγοντα ψευσάμενον πιστὸν γενέσθαι.
And it has become established that good counsels, when spoken frankly, are no less suspected than bad ones, so that it is equally necessary for the one who wishes to persuade you to the most terrible things to win over the multitude by deceit, and for the one who speaks what is better to become believed by lying.
§3.43.3μόνην τε πόλιν διὰ τὰς περινοίας εὖ ποιῆσαι ἐκ τοῦ προφανοῦς μὴ ἐξαπατήσαντα ἀδύνατον· ὁ γὰρ διδοὺς φανερῶς τι ἀγαθὸν ἀνθυποπτεύεται ἀφανῶς πῃ πλέον ἕξειν.
And owing to your over-subtlety, this is the only city which it is impossible to benefit openly without deceiving her; for he who openly offers some good is suspected of going to gain some private advantage in secret.
§3.43.4χρὴ δὲ πρὸς τὰ μέγιστα καὶ ἐν τῷ τοιῷδε ἀξιοῦν τι ἡμᾶς περαιτέρω προνοοῦντας λέγειν ὑμῶν τῶν δι’ ὀλίγου σκοπούντων, ἄλλως τε καὶ ὑπεύθυνον τὴν παραίνεσιν ἔχοντας πρὸς ἀνεύθυνον τὴν ὑμετέραν ἀκρόασιν.
But in the face of the greatest matters, and in such a situation, we must deem it proper that we should speak with somewhat further foresight than you who look only to the moment, especially since we have a counsel that is subject to accountability, whereas your listening is free from accountability.
§3.43.5εἰ γὰρ ὅ τε πείσας καὶ ὁ ἐπισπόμενος ὁμοίως ἐβλάπτοντο, σωφρονέστερον ἂν ἐκρίνετε· νῦν δὲ πρὸς ὀργὴν ἥντινα τύχητε ἔστιν ὅτε σφαλέντες τὴν τοῦ πείσαντος μίαν γνώμην ζημιοῦτε καὶ οὐ τὰς ὑμετέρας αὐτῶν, εἰ πολλαὶ οὖσαι ξυνεξήμαρτον.
For if both the persuader and the follower were damaged alike, you would judge more soberly; but as it is, whenever you meet with failure, you yield to whatever anger you happen to feel, and punish the single opinion of the one who persuaded you, and not your own opinions, even though they, being many, shared in the mistake.'