§3Quorum ergo paenitentia iusta et debita videatur, id est quae delicto deputanda sint, locus quidem expostulat denotare, sed otiosum videri potest.
Therefore, to point out those things for which repentance seems just and due—that is, what things are to be imputed to sin—is indeed demanded by this passage, but it may seem idle.
Domino enim cognito ultro spiritus a suo auctore respectus emergit ad notitiam veritatis, et admissus ad dominica praecepta ex ipsis statim eruditur id peccato deputandum a quo deus arceat.
For once the Lord is known, the spirit, looked upon by its Author, rises of its own accord to the knowledge of the truth, and being admitted to the Lord's precepts, is immediately instructed by them that that is to be imputed to sin from which God restrains us.
Quoniam, cum deum grande quid boni constet esse, utique bono nisi malum non displiceret, quod inter contraria sibi nulla amicitia est.
Since, as it is established that God is some great good, surely nothing but evil would displease the good, because there is no friendship between contraries.
Perstringere tamen non pigebit delictorum quaedam esse carnalia, id est corporalia, quaedam vero spiritalia.
Yet it will not be unpleasant to sketch briefly that some sins are carnal, that is, corporal, while others are spiritual.
Nam cum ex hac duplicis substantiae congregatione confectus homo sit, non aliunde delinquit quam unde constat.
For since man is composed of this union of double substance, he does not sin from any other source than that of which he consists.
Sed non eo inter se differunt, quod corpus et spiritus duo sunt (alioquin eo magis paria sunt, quia duo unum efficiunt), ne quis pro diversitate materiarum peccata eorum discernat, ut alterum altero levius aut gravius existimet.
But they do not differ from each other on the ground that the body and the spirit are two (otherwise they are all the more equal, because the two make one), lest anyone, on account of the diversity of materials, should distinguish their sins so as to think one lighter or heavier than the other.
Siquidem et caro et spiritus dei res, alia manu eius expressa, alia afflatu eius consummata.
Since indeed both flesh and spirit are things of God, the one formed by His hand, the other completed by His breath.
Cum ergo ex pari ad dominum pertineant, quodcunque eorum deliquerit, ex pari dominum offendit.
Since, therefore, they belong equally to the Lord, whichever of them sins, it offends the Lord equally.
An tu discernas actus carnis et spiritus, quorum et in vita et in morte et in resurrectione tantum communionis atque consortii est, ut pariter tunc aut in vitam aut in iudicium suscitentur, quia scilicet, pariter aut deliquerint aut innocenter egerint? Hoc eo praemiserimus, ut non minorem alteri quam utrique parti, si quid deliquerit, paenitentiae necessitatem intellegamus impendere.
Would you distinguish the acts of the flesh and the spirit, which have so much communion and partnership both in life and in death and in resurrection, that they are raised up together then either to life or to judgment, obviously because they have either sinned together or acted innocently together? We have premised this so that we may understand that the necessity of repentance impends no less upon either part than upon both, if either should sin.
Communis reatus amborum est, communis et iudex, deus scilicet, communis igitur et paenitentiae medela.
The guilt of both is common, the judge is common—namely, God—and therefore the remedy of repentance is also common.
Exinde spiritalia et corporalia nominantur, quod delictum omne aut agitur aut cogitatur, ut corporale sit quod in facto est, quia factum, ut corpus, et videri et contingi habet, spiritale vero quod in animo est, quia spiritus neque videtur neque tenetur.
Hence they are called spiritual and corporal, because every sin is either acted or thought; so that that is corporal which is in deed, because a deed, like a body, can be both seen and touched, but that is spiritual which is in the mind, because a spirit is neither seen nor held.
Per quod ostenditur, non facti solum, verum et voluntatis delicta vitanda et paenitentia purganda esse.
By this it is shown that not only sins of deed, but also of will, must be avoided and cleansed by repentance.
Neque enim, si mediocritas humana facti solum iudicat, quia voluntatis latebris par non est, idcirco crimina eius etiam sub deo neglegamus.
For even if human littleness judges the deed alone, because it is not equal to the hiding places of the will, we should not on that account neglect its crimes under God.
Deus in omnia sufficit.
God is sufficient for all things.
Nihil a conspectu eius remotum unde omnino delinquitur, quia non ignorat nec omittit, quominus in iudicium decernat.
Nothing is removed from His sight from which sin is committed at all, because He is neither ignorant nor does He omit to decree it into judgment.
Dissimulator et praevaricator perspicaciae suae non est.
He is not a dissembler or a prevaricator of His own perspicacity.
Quid, quod voluntas facti origo est? Viderint enim, si qua casui aut necessitati aut ignorantiae imputantur, quibus exceptis iam non nisi voluntate delinquitur.
What of the fact that the will is the origin of the deed? For let them see if any things are imputed to chance or necessity or ignorance, excepted which, sin is not committed except by the will.
Cum ergo facti origo est, non tanto potior ad poenam est, quanto principalis ad culpam, quae ne tunc quidem liberatur, cum aliqua difficultas perpetrationem eius intercipit? Ipsa enim sibi imputatur, nec excusari poterit per illam perficiendi infelicitatem, operata quod suum fuerat.
Since, therefore, the will is the origin of the deed, is it not as much more powerful for punishment as it is principal for guilt, which is not set free even when some difficulty intercepts its perpetration? For it is imputed to itself, nor can it be excused through that unhappiness of completion, having done what was its own to do.
Denique dominus quemadmodum se adiectionem legi superstruere demonstrat, nisi et voluntatis interdicendo delicta, cum adulterum non eum solum definit qui cominus in alienum matrimonium cecidisset, verum etiam illum qui aspectus concupiscentia contaminasset? Adeo quod prohibetur administrare, satis periculose animus sibi repraesentat, et temere per voluntatem expungit effectum.
Finally, how does the Lord show that He builds an addition to the law, if not also by forbidding sins of the will, when He defines as an adulterer not only him who has physically fallen into another's marriage, but also him who has defiled it with the lust of a look? So much does the mind represent to itself, quite perilously, what it is forbidden to perform, and through the will rashly carries out the effect.
Cuius voluntatis cum vis tanta sit, ut non solatium sui saturans pro facto cedat, pro facto ergo plectetur.
Since the force of this will is so great that, satisfying itself with its own gratification, it stands for the deed, it shall therefore be punished as the deed.
Vanissimum est dicere: Volui, nec tamen feci. Atquin perficere debes, quia vis, aut nec velle, quia nec perficis.
It is most idle to say, "I willed, but yet I did not do it." Nay, you ought to complete it because you will, or not even to will because you do not complete it.
Sed ipse conscientiae tuae confessione pronuntias.
But you pronounce this by the confession of your own conscience.
Nam si bonum concupisceres, perficere gestisses: porro sicut malum non perficis, nec concupiscere debueras.
For if you desired good, you would have yearned to complete it; furthermore, just as you do not complete evil, you ought not even to have desired it.
Quaqua te constitueris, crimine adstringeris, quia aut malum volueris, aut bonum non adimpleveris.
Whichever way you place yourself, you are bound by crime, because you either willed evil or did not fulfill good.