§8Liceat nunc denuo nubere, si omne quod licet bonum est.
Let it now be permitted to marry again, if everything that is permitted is good.
Idem apostolus exclamat, Omnia licent, sed non omnia prosunt. Quod non prodest, oro te, bonum potest dici? Si licita sunt et quae non pro salute, ergo et quae non bona sunt licita sunt.
The same apostle exclaims: 'All things are permitted, but not all things are expedient.' Can that which is not expedient, I pray you, be called good? If those things also are permitted which are not for salvation, then those things also which are not good are permitted.
Quid autem magis velle debebis, quod ideo bonum est quia licet, an quod ideo quia prodest? Multum existimo esse inter licentiam et salutem.
But which ought you rather to wish for: that which is good because it is permitted, or that which is so because it is expedient? I think there is a great difference between permission and salvation.
De bono non dicitur LICET, quia bonum permitti non exspectat, sed assumi.
Concerning what is good, 'IT IS PERMITTED' is not said, because what is good does not wait to be permitted, but to be assumed.
Permittitur autem quod an bonum sit in dubio est, quod potest etiam non permitti, si non habeat aliquam sui causam primam, quia propter incontinentiae periculum permittitur nubere secundo, quia nisi licentia alicuius non bonae rei subiaceret, non esset in quo probaretur qui divinae voluntati et qui potestati suae obsequeretur, quis nostrum utilitatis praesentiam sectetur et quis occasionem licentiae amplexetur.
But that is permitted which is in doubt whether it be good, which can also not be permitted if it does not have some primary cause of its own, since on account of the danger of incontinence it is permitted to marry a second time; because, unless permission for some not good thing were underlying, there would be no means by which it might be proved who would obey the divine will and who his own power, who of us would follow the presence of utility and who would embrace the opportunity of permission.
Licentia plerumque temptatio est disciplinae, quoniam disciplina per temptationem probatur, temptatio per licentiam operatur.
Permission is generally a trial of discipline, since discipline is proved through trial, and trial works through permission.
Ita fit, ut omnia liceant, sed non omnia expediant, dum temptatur cui permittitur, et iudicatur dum in permissione temptatur.
Thus it happens that all things are permitted, but not all things are expedient, while he to whom it is permitted is tested, and is judged while he is tested in the permission.
Licebat et apostolis nubere et uxores circumducere.
It was permitted also to the apostles to marry and to lead about wives.
Licebat et de evangelio ali.
It was permitted also to be nourished by the gospel.
Sed qui iure hoc non usus est in occasionem, ad exemplum nos suum provocat, docens in eo esse probationem in quo licentia experimentum abstinentiae praestruxit.
But he who did not use this right as an occasion, calls us to his own example, teaching that the proof is in that wherein permission has pre-established the trial of abstinence.
§9Si penitus sensus eius interpretemur, non aliud dicendum erit secundum matrimonium quam species stupri.
If we interpret his meaning deeply, second marriage will have to be called nothing other than a species of fornication.
Cum enim dicat maritos hoc in sollicitudine habere, quemadmodum sibi placeant, non utique de moribus (nam bonam sollicitudinem non suggillaret), et de cultu et ornatu et omni studio formae ad inlecebras moliendas sollicitos intellegi velit, de forma autem et cultu. placere carnalis concupiscentiae ingenium sit, quae etiam stupri causa est, ecquid videtur tibi stupri affine esse secundum matrimonium, quoniam ea in illo deprehenduntur quae stupro competunt? Ipse dominus, Qui viderit, inquit, mulierem ad concupiscendum, iam stupravit eam in corde suo. Qui autem eam ad ducendum viderit, minus an plus fecit? Quid si etiam duxerit? quod non faceret, nisi et ad ducendum concupisset et ad concupiscendum vidisset.
For since he says that husbands have this care, how they may please their wives, certainly not concerning morals (for he would not insult a good care), and since he wants them to be understood as anxious about dress and ornament and every study of beauty for contriving enticements, and since to please by beauty and dress is the character of carnal concupiscence, which is also the cause of fornication, does not second marriage seem to you akin to fornication, since in it are detected those things which belong to fornication? The Lord Himself says: 'He who looks upon a woman to lust after her, has already committed fornication with her in his heart.' But he who looks upon her to marry her, has he done less or more? What if he has even married her? Which he would not have done unless he had both lusted to marry her and looked in order to lust.
Nisi si potest duci uxor quam non videris nec concupieris.
Unless indeed a wife can be married whom you have neither seen nor lusted after.
Multum sane interest, maritus an caelebs aliam concupiscat.
To be sure, it makes a great difference whether a husband or a celibate lusts after another woman.
Omnis mulier etiam caelibi alia est, quamdiu aliena, nec per aliud tamen fit marita, nisi per quod et adultera.
Every woman, even to a celibate, is 'another' as long as she belongs to another, nor yet does she become a wife through anything else than that through which she also becomes an adulteress.
Leges videatur matrimonii et stupri differentiam facere, per diversitatem inliciti, non per condicionem rei ipsius.
The laws seem to make a difference between marriage and fornication, through the diversity of what is unlawful, not through the condition of the thing itself.
Alioquin quae res et viris et feminis omnibus adest ad matrimonium et stuprum? commixtio carnis scilicet, cuius concupiscentiam dominus stupro adaequavit.
Otherwise, what thing is present to all men and women for both marriage and fornication? The mixture of the flesh, of course, the lust of which the Lord equated to fornication.
Ergo, inquit, iam et primas, id est unas nuptias destruis? Nec immerito, quia et ipsae ex eo constant quod est stuprum.
'Therefore,' some one says, 'do you now destroy even the first, that is, the single marriage?' And not without reason, because they too consist of that which is fornication.
Ideo optimum est homini mulierem non attingere, et ideo virginis principalis est sanctitas, quia caret stupri affinitate.
Therefore 'it is best for a man not to touch a woman,' and therefore the holiness of the virgin is primary, because it lacks affinity with fornication.
Et cum haec etiam de primis et unis nuptiis praetendi ad causam continentiae possint, quanto magis secundo matrimonio recusando praeiudicabunt? Gratus esto, si semel tibi indulsit deus nubere.
And since these things can be urged even concerning the first and single marriage for the cause of continence, how much more will they prejudice against second marriage, to its refusal? Be grateful if God has permitted you to marry once.
Gratus autem eris, si iterum indulsisse illum tibi nescias.
But you will be grateful if you do not know that He has permitted it to you a second time.
Celerum abuteris indulgentia, cum sine modestia uteris.
Otherwise, you abuse indulgence when you use it without moderation.
Modestia a modo intellegitur.
Moderation is understood from measure.
Non tibi sufficit de summo illo immaculatae virginitatis gradu in secundum recidisse nubendo, sed in ter tium adhuc devolveris, et in quartum, et fortassis in plures, postquam in secunda statione continens non fuisti, quia nec prohibere plures nuptias voluit qui de secundis provocandis retractavit.
It is not enough for you to have fallen back from that highest step of immaculate virginity into the second by marrying, but you roll down still into a third, and into a fourth, and perhaps into more, after you have not been continent in the second station, because he who reconsidered provoking a second marriage surely did not wish not to forbid more marriages.
Nubamus igitur quotidie, et nubentes ab ultimo die deprehendamur, tamquam Sodoma et Gomorra, quo die VAE illud super praegnantes et lactantes adimplebitur, id est super maritos et incontinentes; de nuptiis enim uteri et ubera et infantes.
Let us marry, then, daily, and let us be overtaken by the last day while marrying, just like Sodom and Gomorrah, on which day that 'WOE' upon those who are pregnant and those who nurse will be fulfilled—that is, upon husbands and the incontinent; for from marriage come wombs and breasts and infants.
Et quando finis nubendi? Credo post finem vivendi.
And when is the end of marrying? I believe, after the end of living.