§1Quodam die in diebus sanctis octauarum, cum mane apud me fuissent multi fratres laici christiani et in loco solito consedissemus, ortus est sermo de religione christiana aduersus praesumptionem et tamquam miram et magnam scientiam paganorum: quem recordatum atque conpletum litteris mandandum putaui non expressis personis contradicentium, quamuis christiani essent et magis contradicendo quaerere uiderentur, quid paganis responderi oporteret.
On a certain day during the holy days of the octave, when many lay Christian brothers had been with me in the morning and we had sat down in the usual place, a discussion arose concerning the Christian religion against the presumption and, as it were, wonderful and great knowledge of the pagans: which discussion, having remembered and completed it, I thought should be committed to writing, without expressing the names of those who spoke against it, although they were Christians and seemed to be asking, rather by way of contradiction, what answer ought to be given to the pagans.
cum ergo de diuinatione daemonum quaereretur et affirmaretur praedixisse nescio quem euersionem templi Serapis, quae in Alexandria facta est, respondi non esse mirandum, si istam euersionem templis et simulacris suis inminere daemones et scire et praedicere potuerunt sicut alia multa, quantum eis nosse et praenuntiare permittitur.
When, therefore, a question was raised about the divination of demons, and it was asserted that someone or other had predicted the destruction of the temple of Serapis, which took place in Alexandria, I answered that it was not to be wondered at if the demons were able both to know and to predict that this destruction was impending over their temples and idols, just like many other things, insofar as it is permitted to them to know and to foretell.
§2Et cum mihi referretur: non ergo sunt malae diuinationes huius modi nec deo displicent — alioquin omnipotens et iustus ista fieri non permitteret, si mala et iniusta essent — respondi non ideo haec uideri iusta debere, quod ea fieri permittit omnipotentissimus et iustissimus deus; nam et alia multa manifestissime iniuste fieri, sicut homicidia, adulteria, furta, rapinas et cetera huius modi: quae quamuis iusto deo eo quod iniusta sint sine dubitatione displiceant, idem tamen omnipotens ea fieri certa iudicii sui ratione permittit non utique inpune, sed ad eorum damnationem, a quibus fiunt quae displicent iusto.
And when it was retorted to me: "Therefore, divinations of this kind are not evil, nor do they displease God—otherwise the almighty and just God would not permit these things to happen if they were evil and unjust"—I replied that these things ought not to seem just for the reason that the most almighty and most iust God permits them to happen; for many other things also are most obviously done unjustly, such as homicides, adulteries, thefts, robberies, and other things of this kind: which, although they undoubtedly displease the just God because they are unjust, yet the same almighty God permits them to happen by a certain reason of His judgment, not indeed with impunity, but unto the condemnation of those by whom the things that displease the just God are done.
§3Et cum e contrario diceretur non quidem esse dubitandum, quod omnipotens et iustus sit deus, sed haec humana peccata, quae contra societatem hominum fierent, non eum curare, dum fierent ■— propterea posse fieri: quae utique fieri non possent, si omnipotens non siuisset; illa uero, quae ad ipsum religionis cultum pertineant, nullo modo ab eo credendum esse contemni. ac per hoc fieri non potuisse, nisi ei placuissent. et ideo mala ea putari non oportere — ad hoc quoque respondi: nunc ergo ei displicent, cum templa et simulacra euertuntur et illa gentium sacrificia, si facta fuerint. puniuntur.
And when, on the contrary, it was said that it is indeed not to be doubted that God is almighty and just, but that He does not care for these human sins, which are committed against human society, while they are being committed—for which reason they are able to happen, whereas they certainly could not happen if the Almighty did not permit it; but as for those things which pertain to the very worship of religion, it is by no means to be believed that they are neglected by Him; and therefore they could not have happened unless they had pleased Him, and consequently they ought not to be thought evil—to this also I replied: "Then, therefore, they displease Him now, since the temples and idols are being destroyed, and those sacrifices of the gentiles, if they are performed, are punished.
sicut enim dicitur non ea fieri potuisse, nisi deo placuissent, et ideo bona putanda, quoniam iusto placent, ita dici potest non ea prohiberi, euerti, puniri potuisse, nisi deo displicerent; ac per hoc si tunc ideo recte fiebant, quia iusto deo placere hinc ostendebantur, quod ab illo fieri sinebantur, ideo nunc inique fiunt, quia deo displicere hinc ostenduntur, quod ea uel iubet uel permittit euerti. §4Contra hoc dictum est iniusta quidem esse nunc ista, non tamen mala, et ideo iniusta, quia contra leges, quibus prohibentur, fiunt, ideo autem non mala, quia, si mala essent, numquam deo utique placuissent;
For just as it is said that they could not have happened unless they pleased God, and therefore must be thought good because they please the just God, so it can be said that they could not have been forbidden, destroyed, and punished unless they displeased God; and therefore, if at that time they were rightly done because they were shown to please the just God by the fact that they were permitted by Him to be done, so now they are done unjustly because they are shown to displease God by the fact that He either commands or permits them to be destroyed." Against this it was said that these things are indeed unjust now, but yet not evil; and they are unjust because they are done against the laws by which they are forbidden, but not evil because, if they were evil, they would certainly never have pleased God; furthermore, if they had never pleased Him, they would never have happened without the permission of Him who can do all things and who would not neglect such matters, when they are so great that they would be committed against the very religion by which God is worshiped, if they were committed evilly.
porro si numquam placuissent, numquam facta essent illo non sinente, qui omnia potest et qui talia non contemneret, quando tam magna sunt, ut contra ipsam religionem, qua deus colitur, fierent, si male fierent.
Here I said: "If they are not evil for the reason that they are proved to please God by the fact that the Almighty permits them to be done, how will it be good that they are forbidden to be done and are destroyed?
hic ego, si propterea, inquam, mala non sunt, quia deo placere hinc probantur, quod ea fieri sinit omnipotens, quomodo erit bonum, quod fieri prohibentur et euertuntur? si autem hoc bonum non est, quod euertuntur, quae deo placent, hoc fieri non sineret omnipotens, quia et hoc contra religionem fit, qua colitur deus, si ea, quae deo placent, ab hominibus euertuntur.
But if this is not good, namely, that those things which please God are destroyed, the Almighty would not permit this to happen, because this too is done against the religion by which God is worshiped, if those things which please God are destroyed by men.
si autem hoc, cum male fiat, permittit omnipotens, non ideo putanda sunt illa bona, quod ea fieri permisit omnipotens.
But if the Almighty permits this, although it is done evilly, those things are not to be thought good for the reason that the Almighty permitted them to be done."