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Augustine · Against Fortunatus §22#1

Adam's Free Will and the Meaning of the Two Trees

Passage 10 of 13 · Latin

Summary

Augustine argues that the first man, Adam, possessed free will, but after he sinned, humanity fell into necessity through the binding power of habit; he contends that the "two trees" mentioned in scripture do not represent fixed natures but rather represent our changeable human wills.

§22#1AUG. dixit: Agnosco et amplector testimonia diuinarum scripturarum. et fidei meae quemadmodum congruant, sicut deus donare dignabitur. paucis exponam.
Augustine said: "I acknowledge and embrace the testimonies of the divine scriptures; and how they agree with my faith, I will explain in few words, as God shall deign to grant.
liberum uoluntatis arbitrium in illo homine fuisse dico, qui primus formatus est.
I say that free choice of the will was in that man who was first formed.
ille sic factus est, ut nihil omnino uoluntati eius resisteret. si uellet dei praecepta seruare.
He was so made that nothing at all would resist his will, if he wished to keep the commandments of God.
postquam autem libera ipse uoluntate peccauit, nos in necessitatem praecipitati sumus, qui ab eius stirpe descendimus.
But after he himself sinned by free will, we who descend from his stock have been plunged into necessity.
potest autem unusquisque nostrum mediocri consideratione inuenire uerum esse. quod dico.
But every one of us can find by moderate consideration that what I say is true.
hodie namque in actionibus nostris antequam consuetudine aliqua inplicemur, liberum habemus arbitrium faciendi aliquid uel non faciendi.
For today in our actions, before we are implicated in any habit, we have free choice of doing or not doing something.
cum autem ista libertate fecerimus aliquid et facti ipsius tenuerit animam perniciosa dulcedo et uoluptas, eadem ipsa consuetudine sua sic inplicatur, ut postea uincere non possit, quod sibi ipsa peccando fabricata est.
But when we have done something by that freedom, and a destructive sweetness and pleasure of that very deed has held the soul, it is so implicated by its very own habit that afterwards it cannot conquer what it has fabricated for itself by sinning.
uidemus multos iurare nolle. sed quia iam consuetudinem lingua tenuit, non posse refrenare, cum ea exeant de ore ipsorum, quae non possumus dicere ad mali stirpem non pertinere.
We see that many do not wish to swear, but because the tongue has already kept the habit, they cannot refrain when those things go out of their mouth which we cannot say do not belong to the stock of evil.
ut enim uobiscum his uerbis agam, quae utinam sicuti de ore uestro non recedunt, ita et corde intellegantur: per paracletum iuratis.
For, to address you in these words, which I wish were understood in the heart just as they do not depart from your mouth: you swear 'by the Paraclete'.
si ergo uultis experiri uerum esse. quod dico, instituite non iurare, uidebitis illam consuetudinem ferri quo solet.
If therefore you wish to experience that what I say is true, resolve not to swear; you will see that habit being carried where it is accustomed to go.
et hoc est, quod aduersus animam pugnat. consuetudo facta cum carne.
And this is what fights against the soul: habit made with the flesh.
ipsa est nimirum carnis prudentia. quae quamdiu ita est, legi dei subici non potest, quamdiu prudentia carnis est; sed inluminata anima desinit illa esse carnis prudentia.
This is indeed the wisdom of the flesh, which as long as it is so, cannot be subject to the law of God, as long as it is the wisdom of the flesh; but when the soul is illuminated, that ceases to be the wisdom of the flesh.
sic enim dictum est prudentiam carnis non posse legi dei esse subiectam, quemadmodum si diceretur glacialem niuem calidam esse non posse.
For it was said that the wisdom of the flesh cannot be subject to the law of God, just as if it were said that icy snow cannot be warm.
nullo pacto enim quamdiu nix est, calida esse potest.
For by no means, as long as it is snow, can it be warm.
sed quemadmodum illa nix calore resoluitur et desinit nix esse, ut possit calescere, at sic illa carnis prudentia, id est consuetudo facta cum carne, cum fuerit mens nostra inluminata et ad arbitrium diuinae legis totum hominem sibi deus subiecerit, pro illa consuetudine animae mala facit consuetudinem bonam.
But just as that snow is melted by heat and ceases to be snow so that it can become warm, so that wisdom of the flesh, that is, the habit made with the flesh, when our mind is illuminated and God subjects the whole man to Himself at the disposal of the divine law, in place of that bad habit of the soul, makes a good habit.
ex quo illae duae arbores, bona arbor et mala arbor, quas commemorasti, uerissime dictum est a domino quod suos fructus habeant, id est neque bonam posse dare malos fructus neque malam bonos, sed malos quamdiu mala est.
From which, concerning those two trees, the good tree and the evil tree, which you mentioned, it was most truly said by the Lord that they have their own fruits; that is, neither can a good tree yield bad fruits, nor an evil tree good fruits, but bad ones as long as it is evil.
accipiamus duos homines: bonum hominem et malum hominem.
Let us take two men: a good man and an evil man.
quamdiu bonus est, malos fructus dare non potest; quamdiu malus est, fructus bonos dare non potest.
As long as he is good, he cannot yield bad fruits; as long as he is evil, he cannot yield good fruits.
sed ut intellegas istas duas arbores sic esse a domino positas. ut ibi significaretur liberum arbitrium, non naturas esse istas duas arbores, sed uoluntates nostras, ipse ait in euangelio: aut facite arborem bonam aut facite arborem malam. quis est, qui possit facere naturam?
But that you may understand that these two trees were so placed by the Lord that free choice might be signified there, and that these two trees are not natures but our wills, He Himself says in the Gospel: 'Either make the tree good, or make the tree evil.' Who is he that can make a nature?"

Notes

  1. p.104si uellet dei praecepta seruare. — A conditional clause using the imperfect subjunctive `uellet`. This clause depends on the result clause `ut nihil omnino uoluntati eius resisteret`, describing a potential or counterfactual condition in the past, under which Adam, in his state of innocence before the Fall, would have faced no resistance had he wished to keep the commandments.
  2. p.104ut enim uobiscum his uerbis agam — A parenthetical or independent purpose clause ('ut' of purpose used to express the speaker's intention). It does not qualify the main verb directly but means 'to address you in these words,' leading up to the declaration after the colon (`per paracletum iuratis`).
  3. p.105sed ut intellegas istas duas arbores sic esse a domino positas. — The purpose clause `ut intellegas` qualifies the main verb `ipse ait` located later in the sentence. The clause contains an accusative with infinitive construction (`istas duas arbores sic esse... positas`), followed by a contrastive explanation (`non naturas esse... sed uoluntates`), making the structure: 'But that you may understand that... He Himself says in the Gospel.'

Cite this passage

Augustine, Against Fortunatus §22#1. Humanitext Reader, https://reader.humanitext.ai/en/text/urn:cts:latinLit:stoa0040.stoa024b.humanitext-lat1:22%231

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