[ULPIANUS libro octauo decimo ad edictum. ] §9.2.5.prSed et si quemcumque alium ferro se petentem quis occiderit, non uidebitur iniuria occidisse: et si metu quis mortis furem occiderit, non dubitabitur, quin lege Aquilia non teneatur.
[ULPIAN, from the eighteenth book on the Edict.] But also if anyone kills any other person who is attacking him with a weapon, he will not be deemed to have killed unlawfully; and if anyone kills a thief out of fear of death, there will be no doubt that he is not liable under the Aquilian Law.
sin autem cum posset adprehendere, maluit occidere, magis est ut iniuria fecisse uideatur: ergo et Cornelia tenebitur.
But if, when he could have apprehended him, he preferred to kill him, it is more correct to say that he is deemed to have acted unlawfully; therefore, he will also be liable under the Cornelian Law.
§9.2.5.1Iniuriam autem hic accipere nos oportet non quemadmodum circa iniuriarum actionem contumeliam quandam, sed quod non iure factum est, hoc est contra ius, id est si culpa quis occiderit: et ideo interdum utraque actio concurrit et legis Aquiliae et iniuriarum, sed duae erunt aestimationes, alia damni, alia contumeliae.
Now, we ought to understand "wrong" (iniuria) here not in the sense of a certain "insult" (contumelia) as in the action for insults, but as what is done "not by right" (non iure), that is, contrary to law, that is, if anyone kills through fault (culpa); and therefore sometimes both actions concur, both that under the Aquilian Law and that for insults, but there will be two assessments, one of the damage, the other of the insult.
igitur iniuriam hic damnum accipiemus culpa datum etiam ab eo, qui nocere noluit.
Therefore, we shall here understand "wrong" as damage caused by fault, even by one who did not wish to do harm.
§9.2.5.2Et ideo quaerimus, si furiosus damnum dederit, an legis Aquiliae actio sit? et Pegasus negauit: quae enim in eo culpa sit, cum suae mentis non sit? et hoc est uerissimum.
And therefore we ask, if a madman causes damage, whether there is an action under the Aquilian Law? And Pegasus said no; for what fault could there be in him, when he is not of sound mind? And this is most true.
cessabit igitur Aquiliae actio, quemadmodum, si quadrupes damnum dederit, Aquilia cessat, aut si tegula ceciderit.
Therefore, the Aquilian action will not lie, just as the Aquilian action does not lie if a four-footed animal causes damage, or if a tile falls.
sed et si infans damnum dederit, idem erit dicendum.
But also if an infant causes damage, the same must be said.
quodsi inpubes id fecerit, Labeo ait, quia furti tenetur, teneri et Aquilia eum: et hoc puto uerum, si sit iam iniuriae capax.
But if an impubes (a youth under the age of puberty) does it, Labeo says that since he is held liable for theft, he is also held liable under the Aquilian Law; and I think this is true, if he is already capable of wrongdoing.
§9.2.5.3Si magister in disciplina uulnerauerit seruum uel occiderit, an Aquilia teneatur, quasi damnum iniuria dederit? et Iulianus scribit Aquilia teneri eum, qui eluscauerat discipulum in disciplina: multo magis igitur in occiso idem erit dicendum.
If a master, in the course of instruction, wounds or kills a slave, is he liable under the Aquilian Law, as having caused damage unlawfully? And Julian writes that he who had blinded a pupil in one eye during instruction is liable under the Aquilian Law; therefore, much more must the same be said in the case of one who is killed.
proponitur autem apud eum species talis: sutor, inquit, puero discenti ingenuo filio familias, parum bene facienti quod demonstraverit, forma calcei cervicem percussit, ut oculus puero perfunderetur.
Now, a case of this kind is set forth in his work: a shoemaker, he says, struck on the neck with a shoe-last a boy who was learning from him, a freeborn son under paternal power, because he did not do very well what he had demonstrated to him, so that the boy's eye was knocked out.
dicit igitur Iulianus iniuriarum quidem actionem non competere, quia non faciendae iniuriae causa percusserit, sed monendi et docendi causa: an ex locato, dubitat, quia leuis dumtaxat castigatio concessa est docenti: sed lege Aquilia posse agi non dubito:
Julian therefore says that the action for insults indeed does not lie, because he did not strike for the purpose of committing an insult, but for the purpose of warning and teaching; he doubts whether an action on the contract of hiring (ex locato) lies, because only light chastisement is permitted to a teacher; but I do not doubt that action can be brought under the Aquilian Law.