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Justinian I · The Digest of Justinian §50.16.244.pr

The Legal Distinction Between Penalty and Fine

Passage 9058 of 9271 · Latin

Summary

In response to Labeo's claim that punishment (poena) and fine (multa) are equivalent, Paul argues that they are distinct based on the availability of appeal, the timing of liability, and the determinacy of the amount.

[LABEO libro quarto pithanon a Paulo epitomatorum. ] §50.16.244.prSi qua poena est, multa est: si qua multa est, poena est.
[From the fourth book of Labeo's "Pithana" epitomized by Paul.] If there is any punishment, it is a fine; if there is any fine, it is a punishment.
PAULUS: utrumque eorum falsum est.
PAUL: Both of these statements are false.
namque harum rerum dissimilitudo ex hoc quoque apparet, quod de poena prouocatio non est: simul atque enim uictus quis est eius maleficii, cuius poena est statuta, statim ea debetur.
For the difference between these things is apparent also from this, that there is no appeal against a punishment; for as soon as anyone is convicted of that crime for which a punishment has been established, it is immediately owed.
at multae prouocatio est, nec ante debetur, quam aut non est prouocatum aut prouocator uictus est: nec aliter quam si is dixit, cui dicere licet.
But against a fine there is an appeal, and it is not owed before either no appeal has been made or the appellant has been defeated; nor otherwise than if he who is permitted to impose it has imposed it.
ex hoc quoque earum rerum dissimilitudo apparere poterit, quia poenae certae singulorum peccatorum sunt, multae contra, quia eius iudicis potestas est, quantam dicat, nisi cum lege est constitutum quantam dicat.
From this also the difference between these things will be able to appear, because punishments are fixed for individual offenses, whereas fines, on the contrary, are within the power of that judge to declare how much they should be, unless it is established by law how much he is to declare.

Notes

  1. 50.16.244.prnec aliter quam si is dixit, cui dicere licet — The verbs "dixit" and "dicere" in this context refer to the idiomatic expression "multam dicere" (to impose/declare a fine), with "multam" being understood. The clause functions as an elliptical conditional modifying the main predicate "debetur" (it is not due otherwise than if...).
  2. 50.16.244.prmultae contra, quia eius iudicis potestas est — Behind "multae contra," a predicate such as "non certae sunt" (are not fixed) is omitted in contrast with the preceding "poenae certae... sunt." "eius iudicis" refers to "of that [particular] judge" who has the power to declare the amount.

Cite this passage

Justinian I, The Digest of Justinian §50.16.244.pr. Humanitext Reader, https://reader.humanitext.ai/en/text/urn:cts:latinLit:phi2806.phi002.humanitext-lat1:50.16.244.pr

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