[MARCIANUS libro singulari ad senatus consultum Turpillianum. ] §48.16.1.prAccusatorum temeritas tribus modis detegitur et tribus poenis subicitur: aut enim calumniantur aut praeuaricantur aut tergiuersantur.
[MARCIANUS, Single Book on the Senatus Consultum Turpillianum.] The temerity of accusers is detected in three ways and is subjected to three penalties: for they either bring a false accusation (calumniate), or collude (prevaricate), or abandon the prosecution (tergiversate).
§48.16.1.1Calumniari est falsa crimina intendere, praeuaricari uera crimina abscondere, tergiuersari in uniuersum ab accusatione desistere.
To calumniate is to bring false charges; to prevaricate is to conceal true charges; to tergiversate is to abandon the prosecution altogether.
§48.16.1.2Calumniatoribus poena lege Remmia irrogatur.
A penalty is imposed on calumniators by the Lex Remmia.
§48.16.1.3Sed non utique qui non probat quod intendit protinus calumniari uidetur: nam eius rei inquisitio arbitrio cognoscentis committitur, qui reo absoluto de accusatoris incipit consilio quaerere, qua mente ductus ad accusationem processit, si et quidem iustum eius errorem reppererit, absoluit eum, si uero in euidenti calumnia eum deprehenderit, legitimam poenam ei irrogat.
But by no means is anyone who does not prove what he alleges immediately deemed to calumniate: for the inquiry into this matter is committed to the discretion of the judge, who, after the defendant has been acquitted, begins to inquire into the design of the accuser, with what mind he proceeded to the accusation; if indeed he finds that his error was excusable, he acquits him, but if he detects him in manifest calumny, he imposes the statutory penalty upon him.
§48.16.1.4Quorum alterutrum ipsis uerbis pronuntiationis manifestatur.
Which of these two has occurred is manifested by the very words of the pronouncement.
nam si quidem ita pronuntiauerit 'non probasti', pepercit ei: sin autem pronuntiauit 'calumniatus es', condemnauit eum.
For if he has pronounced "you have not proved," he has spared him; but if he has pronounced "you have calumniated," he has condemned him.
et quamuis nihil de poena subiecerit, tamen legis potestas aduersus eum exercebitur: nam, ut Papinianus respondit, facti quidem quaestio in arbitrio est iudicantis, poenae uero persecutio non eius uoluntati mandatur, sed legis auctoritati reseruatur.
And even if he has added nothing about the penalty, nevertheless the power of the law will be exercised against him: for, as Papinian answered, the question of fact indeed is in the discretion of the judge, but the enforcement of the penalty is not entrusted to his will, but is reserved for the authority of the law.
§48.16.1.5Quaeri possit, si ita fuerit interlocutus: 'Lucius Titius temere accusasse uidetur', an calumniatorem pronuntiasse uideatur.
It may be asked, if he has declared in an interlocutory decree: "Lucius Titius seems to have accused rashly," whether he is deemed to have pronounced him a calumniator.
et Papinianus temeritatem facilitatis ueniam continere et inconsultum calorem calumniae uitio carere et ob id hunc nullam poenam subire oportere.
And Papinian answered that rashness contains the excuse of thoughtlessness, and unadvised heat lacks the fault of calumny, and for this reason this person ought to undergo no penalty.
§48.16.1.6Praeuaricatorem eum esse ostendimus, qui colludit cum reo et translaticie munere accusandi defungitur, eo quod proprias quidem probationes dissimularet, falsas uero rei excusationes admitteret.
We show that a prevaricator is one who colludes with the defendant and performs the duty of accusing in a perfunctory manner, in that he conceals his own proofs but admits the false excuses of the defendant.
§48.16.1.7Si quis autem ab accusatione citra abolitionem destiterit, punitur.
But if anyone abandons an accusation without an official cancellation (abolition), he is punished.
§48.16.1.8Abolitio priuatim a praesidibus postulari ac impetrari solet, item pro tribunali, non de plano: nec praesens hanc cognitionem alteri demandare potest.
Abolition is accustomed to be petitioned for and obtained privately from the governors, and likewise on the tribunal, not informally; nor can a governor who is present delegate this inquiry to another.
§48.16.1.9Si plura crimina idem eidem intulit, singulorum debet abolitionem petere: alioquin prout quid admiserit, eius nomine senatus consulti poenam patietur.
If the same person has brought several charges against the same person, he must seek abolition for each one; otherwise, according as he has abandoned any, he will suffer the penalty of the senatus consultum on that account.
§48.16.1.10Accusationem is intulit, qui praescriptione summoueri poterat, ut quilibet adulterii masculo post quinque annos continuos ex die commissi adulterii uel feminae post sex menses utiles ex die diuortii: an, si destiterit, hoc senatus consulto plecti debet, belle dubitatur.
An accusation was brought by one who could have been barred by a prescription, such as anyone for adultery against a male after five continuous years from the day the adultery was committed, or against a female after six available months from the day of divorce: whether, if he has abandoned it, he ought to be punished under this senatus consultum is a matter of fair doubt.
mouet, quod paene nulla erit accusatio, quam temporis spatium aut personae uitium omnimodo remoueret reoque securitatem timoris ac periculi promitteret.
What moves on one side is that there will be almost no accusation which the lapse of time or the defect of the person would not altogether remove, promising the defendant security from fear and danger.
contra mouet, quod qualiscumque accusatio illata cognoscentis auctoritate, non accusantis uoluntate aboleri debet maioreque odio dignus existimaretur, qui temere ad tam improbam accusationem processisset.
On the other hand, what moves is that any accusation whatsoever that has been brought ought to be abolished by the authority of the judge, not by the will of the accuser, and that he who had rashly proceeded to so improper an accusation should be deemed worthy of greater hatred.
ergo uerius est eum quoque de quo loquimur in senatus consultum incidere oportere.
Therefore, it is more true that he also of whom we are speaking ought to fall under the senatus consultum.
adquin Papinianus respondit mulierem, quae idcirco ad falsi accusationem non admitteretur, quod suam suorumue iniuriam non persequeretur, desistentem senatus consulto Turpilliano non plecti.
Yet Papinian answered that a woman who was not admitted to an accusation of forgery because she was not pursuing an injury to herself or her relations, does not, upon abandoning it, suffer under the Senatus Consultum Turpillianum.
num ergo et in ceteris idem responsurus sit? quid enim interest, propter sexus infirmitatem an propter status turpitudinem temporisue finem ad accusationem aliquam non admittatur? multoque magis excludendi sunt, quod mulieris quidem accusatio uel propter proprium eius dolorem effectum habere potuit, illorum uero accusatio uoce dumtaxat tenus interuenit.
Would he, then, answer the same in other cases? For what difference does it make whether one is not admitted to an accusation because of the weakness of sex, or because of the disgrace of status, or the limitation of time? And they are much more to be excluded, because the accusation of a woman could have had effect at least on account of her own grief, but their accusation intervened merely by word of mouth.
adquin idem alias scribit non posse aliquem duos eodem tempore adulterii accusare, marem et feminam, et tamen, si utrique simul denuntiauerit, in utriusque persona abolitionem eum petere debere, ne in hoc senatus consulto incidat.
Yet the same author writes elsewhere that no one can accuse two persons of adultery at the same time, a male and a female, and yet, if he has given notice to both at the same time, he must seek abolition in the person of both, lest he fall under this senatus consultum.
quid porro refert, propter causas supra scriptas accusatio non ualuerit an propter numerum personarum non tenuerit? an haec intersint, plenam habuerit aliquis accusandi facultatem, sed propter personarum coniunctionem ab accusatione summoueatur, an uero stricta ratione quibusdam accusandi facultas non competat? merito itaque dicendum est omnes excepta muliere et minore nisi abolitionem petierint, in hoc senatus consulto incidere.
What difference does it make, then, whether the accusation was not valid on account of the causes written above, or did not hold on account of the number of persons? Or do these differ: whether someone had full capacity to accuse, but is barred from the accusation on account of the connection of the persons, or whether by strict reasoning the capacity to accuse does not belong to certain persons? Properly, therefore, it must be said that all, except a woman and a minor, fall under this senatus consultum unless they have sought abolition.
§48.16.1.11Suspecti tutoris accusatio pro tribunali tantum examinari potest, et nullus alius de huiusmodi quaestione quam praeses pronuntiare potest: et tamen qui ab ea destitit, senatus consulto non tenetur.
An accusation of a suspected guardian can only be examined on the tribunal, and no other than the governor can pronounce on an inquiry of this kind; and yet he who has abandoned it is not bound by the senatus consultum.
§48.16.1.12Item si dicat aliquis in senatus consultum incidisse Turpillianum, praesidis est super ea re notio: et tamen contra desertorem senatus consulti non interuenit coercitio: qui autem dicit quem in hoc senatus consulto incidisse, accusator non est.
Likewise, if anyone says that someone has fallen under the Senatus Consultum Turpillianum, the cognizance of this matter belongs to the governor; and yet coercion does not intervene against a deserter of the senatus consultum; and he who says that someone has fallen under this senatus consultum is not an accuser.
§48.16.1.13Incidit in hoc senatus consulto et qui accusatorem summittit aut instigat, aut qui mandat alicui et instruit eum ad accusationem capitalem dando probationes, allegando accusationes: et merito: nam diffidendo crimini quod mouet et eximendo se periculo calumniae uel desertionis merito calumniantis et desistentis poenae subdi debuit, nisi subornatus accusator probauerit crimen quod intendere suscepit.
He also falls under this senatus consultum who suborns or instigates an accuser, or who mandates someone and instructs him for a capital accusation by giving proofs and alleging accusations; and justly so: for by distrusting the charge he brings and exempting himself from the danger of calumny or desertion, he ought justly to be subjected to the penalty of a calumniator and deserter, unless the suborned accuser has proved the charge he undertook to bring.
nec interest, per se mandauit accusationem an per alium: uerum hunc, qui hoc ministerio usus est ad mandandam accusationem, non ex uerbis, sed ex sententia senatus consulti puniri Papinianus respondit.
Nor does it matter whether he mandated the accusation by himself or through another; but Papinian answered that he who used this service to mandate the accusation is to be punished not from the words, but from the intent of the senatus consultum.
summissus enim accusator similiter eodem senatus consulto plectitur, id est propter hoc solum punitur, quod ministerium alieni timoris recepit.
For the suborned accuser is likewise punished under the same senatus consultum, that is, he is punished for this alone, that he undertook a service for another's fear.
§48.16.1.14Reus condemnatus prouocauit, deinde accusator destitit: an in hoc senatus consulto incidit? prope est, ut incidisse uideatur, quia prouocationis remedio condemnationis extinguitur pronuntiatio.
A condemned defendant appealed, then the accuser abandoned the prosecution: does he fall under this senatus consultum? It is close to being deemed that he has fallen under it, because by the remedy of appeal the pronouncement of condemnation is extinguished.