[IDEM libro quadragensimo octauo ad Sabinum. ] §46.4.8.prAn inutilis acceptilatio utile habeat pactum, quaeritur: et nisi in hoc quoque contra sensum est, habet pactum.
[The same in the forty-eighth book on Sabinus.] Whether an invalid acceptilatio contains a valid pactum is asked; and unless in this case too it is contrary to intention, it contains a pactum.
dicet aliquis: potest ergo non esse consensus? cur non possit? fingamus eum, qui accepto ferebat, scientem prudentemque nullius esse momenti acceptilationem sic accepto tulisse: quis dubitat non esse pactum, cum consensum paciscendi non habuerit?
Someone will say: is it therefore possible for there to be no consent? Why should it not be possible? Let us imagine that the person who recorded it as received, knowing and being aware that the acceptilatio was of no effect, recorded it as received in this way: who doubts that there is no pactum, since he did not have the intention of contracting?
§46.4.8.1Seruus communis sicut uni ex dominis stipulari potest, ita etiam acceptum rogare uni ex dominis potest eumque in solidum liberat: et ita Octauenus putat.
Just as a common slave can stipulate for one of his masters, so he can also ask for an acceptilatio for one of his masters, and he releases him in full; and so Octavenus thinks.
§46.4.8.2Accepto liberare seruus communis alterum ex dominis etiam ab altero domino potest: id enim et Labeoni placuit.
A common slave can also release one of his masters from the other master by acceptilatio; for this was also approved by Labeo.
denique libro pithanon scripsit, si a Primo domino Secundo socio domino suo stipulatus fuerit, posse Secundum accepto rogare et per acceptilationem Primum liberare, quem ipse obligauerat: sic fieri, ut per unum atque eundem seruum et constituatur et tollatur obligatio.
Finally, he wrote in his book of "Plausibilities" that if a common slave stipulated from the first master for the second, his partner-master, the slave can ask the second master for an acceptilatio, and by acceptilatio release the first master, whom he himself had bound; thus it happens that through one and the same slave an obligation is both established and destroyed.
§46.4.8.3Acceptum fieri non potest, nisi quod uerbis colligatum est: acceptilatio enim uerborum obligationem tollit, quia et ipsa uerbis fit: neque enim potest uerbis tolli, quod non uerbis contractum est.
An acceptio cannot be made except for what has been bound by words; for acceptilatio destroys an obligation of words, because it itself is also made by words; for what has not been contracted by words cannot be destroyed by words.
§46.4.8.4Filius familias promittendo patrem ciuiliter non obligat, sed se obligat: propter quod accepto rogare filius familias potest, ut se liberet, quia ipse obligatus est, pater autem acceptum rogando nihil agit, cum non sit ipse obligatus, sed filius.
A son under family power, by promising, does not bind his father under civil law, but binds himself; because of which the son under family power can ask for an acceptilatio to release himself, since he himself is bound, but the father, by asking for an acceptilatio, accomplishes nothing, since he himself is not bound, but the son is.
idem erit et in seruo dicendum: nam et seruus accepto liberari potest, et tolluntur etiam honorariae obligationes, si quae sunt aduersus dominum.
The same must also be said of a slave; for a slave can also be released by acceptilatio, and honorarian obligations, if there are any against the master, are also destroyed.
quia hoc iure utimur, ut iuris gentium sit acceptilatio: et ideo puto et Graece posse acceptum fieri, dummodo sic fiat, ut Latinis uerbis solet: ἔχεις λαβὼν δηνάρια τόσα; ἔχω λαβών.
For we use this law, that acceptilatio is of the ius gentium; and therefore I think that an acceptio can also be made in Greek, provided it is done just as is customary in Latin words: ἔχεις λαβὼν δηνάρια τόσα; ἔχω λαβών.