[GAIUS libro tertio de uerborum obligationibus. ] §46.2.34.prDubitari non debet, quin filius seruusue, cui administratio peculii permissa est, nouandi quoque peculiaria debita ius habeat, utique si ipsi stipulentur, maxime si etiam meliorem suam condicionem eo modo faciunt.
[GAIUS, On Verbal Obligations, Book 3.] It ought not to be doubted that a son or slave, to whom the administration of a peculium has been permitted, also has the right to novate debts belonging to the peculium, especially if they themselves stipulate, and most of all if they also make their own condition better in that way.
nam si alium iubeant stipulari, interest, utrum donandi animo alium iubeant stipulari an ut ipsi filio seruoue negotium gerat: quo nomine etiam mandati actio peculio adquiritur.
For if they command another to stipulate, there is a difference whether they command another to stipulate with the intention of making a donation, or in order that he may conduct business for the son or slave themselves; under which title an action of mandate is also acquired for the peculium.
§46.2.34.1Adgnatum furiosi aut prodigi curatorem nouandi ius habere minime dubitandum est, si hoc furioso uel prodigo expediat.
It is by no means to be doubted that the agnate curator of a madman or a prodigal has the right to novate, if this is advantageous to the madman or the prodigal.
§46.2.34.2In summa admonendi sumus nihil uetare una stipulatione plures obligationes nouari, ueluti si ita stipulemur: 'quod Titium et Seium mihi dare oportet, id dari spondes?' licet enim ex diuersis causis singuli fuerant obligati, utrique tamen nouationis iure liberantur, cum utriusque obligatio in huius personam, a quo nunc stipulemur, confluat.
In short, we must be reminded that nothing prevents multiple obligations from being novated by a single stipulation, for example, if we stipulate thus: "Do you promise that what Titius and Seius ought to give to me, shall be given?" For although they had been individually obligated from different causes, yet both are released by the law of novation, since the obligation of both merges into the person of this one from whom we now stipulate.