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Justinian I · The Digest of Justinian §46.1.8.pr-46.1.8.12

Expressions of Suretyship and the Rule on Onerousness

Passage 7556 of 9271 · Latin

Summary

Ulpian explains the expressions for sureties in Greek and their applicability to various types of obligations, focusing on the rule that a surety's condition must not be more disadvantageous than that of the principal debtor through various illustrative cases.

[ULPIANUS libro quadragensimo septimo ad Sabinum. ] §46.1.8.prGraece fideiussor, et ita accipitur: τῇ ἐμῇ πίστει κελεύω λέγω θέλω siue βούλομαι: sed et si φημί dixerit, pro eo erit atque si dixerit λέγω. §46.1.8.1Praeterea sciendum est fideiussorem adhiberi omni obligationi posse, siue re siue uerbis siue consensu. §46.1.8.2Pro eo etiam, qui iure honorario obligatus est, posse fideiussorem accipi sciendum est. §46.1.8.3Et post litem contestatam fideiussor accipi potest, quia et ciuilis et naturalis subest obligatio: et hoc et Iulianus admittit eoque iure utimur.
[ULPIAN in the forty-seventh book on Sabinus.]\n\nA surety in Greek, and it is accepted in this way: "τῇ ἐμῇ πίστει κελεύω λέγω θέλω" or "βούλομαι"; but even if he has said "φημί", it will be the same as if he had said "λέγω".\n\nFurthermore, it must be known that a surety can be added to any obligation, whether by thing, by words, or by consent.\n\nIt must also be known that a surety can be accepted even for one who is bound under praetorian law.\n\nEven after joinder of issue, a surety can be accepted, because both a civil and a natural obligation underlie it; and Julian also admits this, and we follow this rule.
an ergo condemnato reo exceptione uti possit, quaeritur: nam ipso iure non liberatur.
Therefore, it is asked whether he can use an exception when the principal debtor is condemned; for he is not released by operation of law.
et si quidem iudicati actionis acceptus non est, sed tantum litis exercitationis, rectissime dicetur uti eum exceptione posse: si uero acceptus fuerit etiam totius causae, cessabit exceptio. §46.1.8.4A tutore, qui testamento datus est, si fuerit fideiussor datus, tenetur. §46.1.8.5Sed et si ex delicto oriatur actio, magis putamus teneri fideiussorem. §46.1.8.6Et generaliter omnium obligationum fideiussorem accipi posse nemini dubium est. §46.1.8.7Illud commune est in uniuersis, qui pro aliis obligantur, quod, si fuerint in duriorem causam adhibiti, placuit eos omnino non obligari: in leuiorem plane causam accipi possunt, propter quod in minorem summam recte fideiussor accipietur.
And if indeed he was not accepted for the action on the judgment, but only for the conduct of the litigation, it will be said most correctly that he can use the exception; but if he was accepted also for the whole case, the exception will not apply.\n\nIf a surety has been given by a guardian appointed by will, the surety is bound.\n\nBut even if an action arises from a delict, we are rather of the opinion that the surety is bound.\n\nAnd generally, no one doubts that a surety can be accepted for all obligations.\n\nIt is common to all who are bound for others that if they are employed for a more burdensome cause, it is agreed that they are not bound at all; clearly, they can be accepted for a lighter cause, because of which a surety will be rightly accepted for a smaller sum.
item accepto reo pure ipse ex die uel sub condicione accipi potest: enimuero si reus sub condicione sit acceptus, fideiussor pure, non obligabitur. §46.1.8.8Si qui Stichum stipulatus fuerit, fideiussorem ita acceperit: 'Stichum aut decem fide tua iubes?', non obligari fideiussorem Iulianus ait, quia durior eius fit condicio, utpote cum futurum sit, ut mortuo Sticho teneatur.
Likewise, when the debtor is accepted unconditionally, he himself can be accepted from a certain day or under condition; but indeed, if the debtor is accepted under condition, and the surety unconditionally, he will not be bound.\n\nIf anyone has stipulated for Stichus, and has accepted a surety in this way: "Do you guarantee Stichus or ten on your credit?", Julian says that the surety is not bound, because his condition becomes harder, inasmuch as it will happen that he is bound even if Stichus dies.
Marcellus autem notat non ideo tantum non obligari, quia in duriorem condicionem acceptus est, sed quia et in aliam potius obligationem acceptus est: denique pro eo, qui decem promiserit, non poterit fideiussor ita accipi, ut decem aut Stichum promittat, quamuis eo casu non fit eius durior condicio. §46.1.8.9Idem Iulianus ait: si is, qui hominem aut decem dari stipulatus fuerat, fideiussorem ita acceperit: 'hominem aut decem, utrum ego uelim?', non obligauit eum, quia durior eius condicio facta est. §46.1.8.10Contra autem si is, qui hominem aut decem, utrum ipse stipulator uolet, stipulatus est, recte fideiussorem ita accipiet: 'decem aut hominem, utrum tu uoles?' fit enim, inquit, hoc modo fideiussoris condicio melior. §46.1.8.11Sed et si reum sic interrogauero 'Stichum et Pamphilum?', fideiussorem 'Stichum aut Pamphilum?', recte interrogem, quia leuior fideiussoris condicio est. §46.1.8.12Pro fideiussore fideiussorem accipi nequaquam dubium est.
Marcellus, however, notes that he is not bound not only for the reason that he was accepted under a more burdensome condition, but because he was accepted rather for another obligation; after all, a surety cannot be accepted for one who has promised ten in such a way as to promise ten or Stichus, although in that case his condition does not become harder.\n\nThe same Julian says: if he who had stipulated for a slave or ten to be given accepted a surety in this way: "A slave or ten, whichever I prefer?", he has not bound him, because his condition has been made harder.\n\nBut on the contrary, if he who has stipulated for a slave or ten, whichever the stipulator himself prefers, accepts a surety in this way: "Ten or a slave, whichever you prefer?", it is correct; for in this way, he says, the condition of the surety becomes better.\n\nBut even if I have questioned the debtor thus: "Stichus and Pamphilus?", and the surety: "Stichus or Pamphilus?", I would question correctly, because the condition of the surety is lighter.\n\nThere is no doubt at all that a surety can be accepted for a surety.

Notes

  1. §46.1.8.3iudicati actionis — Both 'iudicati actionis' and 'litis exercitationis' function as objective genitives depending on the participle 'acceptus'. The former refers to a surety accepted to secure the judgment (actio iudicati), while the latter refers merely to a surety accepted for the conduct of the litigation itself.
  2. §46.1.8.4A tutore — The prepositional phrase 'A tutore' (by a guardian) functions as the ablative of agent with the passive verbal phrase 'fideiussor datus' (a surety having been given). A testamentary guardian is not legally obliged to offer security, but if he does so voluntarily, the surety is nevertheless bound.
  3. §46.1.8.7in duriorem causam — Meaning 'for a more burdensome cause/condition'. This represents the Roman law principle that a surety's obligation cannot be more onerous than the principal debt. Note that if the condition is harder, the surety is not bound at all (omnino non obligari), rather than being bound up to the limit of the principal debt.
  4. §46.1.8.8ut mortuo Sticho teneatur — The 'ut' clause functions as a substantive clause of result (subject) following 'futurum sit'. While the principal debtor is released upon the death of the specific slave (Stichus), a surety bound for 'Stichus or ten' would still be liable for ten, explaining why the surety's condition becomes harder ('durior').

Cite this passage

Justinian I, The Digest of Justinian §46.1.8.pr-46.1.8.12. Humanitext Reader, https://reader.humanitext.ai/en/text/urn:cts:latinLit:phi2806.phi002.humanitext-lat1:46.1.8.pr-46.1.8.12

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