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Justinian I · The Digest of Justinian §45.2.9.pr-45.2.9.2

Sources, Equality, and Due Dates of Joint Obligations

Passage 7498 of 9271 · Latin

Summary

Papinian explains that joint obligations can arise from various legal transactions including contracts and wills, that unequal liability prevents the formation of a true joint obligation, and that performance times for debtors in different locations must be assessed individually.

[PAPINIANUS libro uicensimo septimo quaestionum. ] §45.2.9.prEandem rem apud duos pariter deposui utriusque fidem in solidum secutus, uel eandem rem duobus similiter commodaui: fiunt duo rei promittendi, quia non tantum uerbis stipulationis, sed et ceteris contractibus, ueluti emptione uenditione, locatione conductione, deposito, commodato testamento, ut puta si pluribus heredibus institutis testator dixit: 'Titius et Maeuius Sempronio decem dato'. §45.2.9.1Sed si quis in deponendo penes duos paciscatur, ut ab altero culpa quoque praestaretur, uerius est non esse duos reos, a quibus inpar suscepta est obligatio.
[PAPINIANUS in the twenty-seventh book of Questions.] If I deposit the same thing with two persons simultaneously, relying on the honesty of each of them for the whole, or if I likewise lend the same thing to two persons: they become two joint promisors, because this happens not only by the words of a stipulation, but also in other contracts, such as sale, lease, deposit, loan, and by a will, as, for example, if a testator, having appointed several heirs, said: "Let Titius and Maevius give ten to Sempronius." But if anyone, in making a deposit with two persons, should agree that negligence also should be made good by one of them, it is more correct to hold that they are not joint debtors, since an unequal obligation has been undertaken by them.
non idem probandum est, cum duo quoque culpam promisissent, si alteri postea pacto culpa remissa sit, quia posterior conuentio, quae in alterius persona intercessit, statum et naturam obligationis, quae duos initio reos fecit, mutare non potest.
The same is not to be approved where both had also promised to answer for negligence, if negligence is afterwards remitted to one of them by an agreement; because a subsequent agreement, which intervened in the person of one of them, cannot change the state and nature of the obligation which initially made them joint debtors.
quare si socii sint et communis culpa intercessit, etiam alteri pactum cum altero factum proderit.
Therefore, if they are partners and a common negligence has occurred, the agreement made with one will also benefit the other.
§45.2.9.2Cum duos reos promittendi facerem ex diuersis locis, Capuae pecuniam dari stipulatus sim, ex persona cuiusque ratio proprii temporis habebitur: nam etsi maxime parem causam suscipiunt, nihilo minus in cuiusque persona propria singulorum consistit obligatio.
When I make two joint promisors from different places, and have stipulated that money be paid at Capua, account will be taken of the proper time from the person of each: for although they undertake a very equal cause, nevertheless, a proper obligation of each individual consists in the person of each.

Notes

  1. §45.2.9.prtestamento — An ablative of means or cause standing in parallel with 'ceteris contractibus'. It indicates that joint obligations can arise not only from bilateral contracts but also from a unilateral disposition such as a testament.
  2. §45.2.9.1non esse duos reos, a quibus inpar suscepta est obligatio — The phrase 'a quibus' is a relative pronoun in the ablative (expressing agency) referring back to 'duos reos'. Since joint obligations (correi) require identity and equality of liability, the undertaking of an 'unequal obligation' (inpar obligatio), where only one party answers for negligence, prevents them from being true joint debtors.
  3. §45.2.9.2ex persona cuiusque ratio proprii temporis habebitur — The phrase 'ex persona' means 'based on the personal circumstances or individual situation of each.' 'ratio... habebitur' is a passive construction meaning 'account will be taken of.' This implies that when debtors are situated in different locations, the reasonable individual time (proprium tempus) required to perform the obligation at the designated place (Capua) must be calculated and factored in separately for each debtor.

Cite this passage

Justinian I, The Digest of Justinian §45.2.9.pr-45.2.9.2. Humanitext Reader, https://reader.humanitext.ai/en/text/urn:cts:latinLit:phi2806.phi002.humanitext-lat1:45.2.9.pr-45.2.9.2

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