[PAULUS libro septimo decimo ad Plautium. ] §45.1.91.prSi seruum stipulatus fuero et nulla mora intercedente seruus decesserit: si quidem occidat eum promissor, expeditum est.
[PAULUS, On Plautius, Book 17] If I have stipulated for a slave and, without any delay intervening, the slave dies: if indeed the promisor kills him, the matter is clear.
sin autem neglegat infirmum, an teneri debeat promissor, considerantibus, utrum, quemadmodum in uindicatione hominis, si neglectus a possessore fuerit, culpae huius nomine tenetur possessor, ita et cum dari promisit, an culpa, quod ad stipulationem attinet, in faciendo accipienda sit, non in non faciendo? quod magis probandum est, quia qui dari promisit, ad dandum, non faciendum tenetur.
But if he neglects the sick slave, on the question of whether the promisor ought to be held liable, to those considering whether—just as in a claim for the recovery of a slave, if he is neglected by the possessor, the possessor is held liable under the head of this fault—so too when one has promised to give, or rather, as far as a stipulation is concerned, fault is to be admitted in an act of commission and not in an omission; the latter view is more to be approved, because he who has promised to give is bound to give, not to do.
§45.1.91.1Sed si sit quidem res in rebus humanis, sed dari non possit, ut fundus religiosus puta uel sacer factus uel seruus manumissus, uel etiam ab hostibus si capiatur, culpa in hunc modum diiudicatur, ut, si quidem ipsius promissoris res uel tempore stipulationis uel postea fuerit et quid eorum acciderit, nihilo minus teneatur, idemque fiat et si per alium, posteaquam ab hoc alienatus sit, id contigerit.
But if the thing is indeed still in existence, but cannot be given—for instance, if a piece of land is made religious or sacred, or a slave is manumitted, or even if he is captured by enemies—fault is judged in this manner: if indeed the thing belonged to the promisor himself either at the time of the stipulation or afterwards, and any of these things should happen, he is nevertheless held liable; and the same applies if, after it has been alienated by him, this happens through another person.
sin autem alienus fuit et ab alio tale quid accidit, non tenetur, quia nihil fecit, nisi si posteaquam moratus est solutionem, aliquid huiusmodi acciderit: quam distinctionem et Iulianus sequitur.
But if it belonged to someone else and such a thing happened through another, he is not held liable, because he did nothing, unless some such thing happened after he delayed the payment; a distinction which Julian also follows.
item si homo, qui fuit promissoris, ex praecedenti causa ablatus ei fuerit, quod statuliber fuit, perinde habendus sit, ac si alienum promisisset, quia sine facto ipsius desiit eius esse.
Likewise, if a slave, who belonged to the promisor, was taken away from him for a prior cause, namely because he was a statuliber, he should be treated just as if he had promised someone else's slave, because the slave ceased to be his without his own act.
§45.1.91.2De illo quaeritur, an et is, qui nesciens se debere occiderit, teneatur: quod Iulianus putat in eo, qui, cum nesciret a se petitum codicillis ut restitueret, manumisit.
The question is raised regarding whether a person who kills the slave, not knowing that he owes him, is also held liable; a point which Julian holds in the case of one who, when he did not know that he was requested by a codicil to restore him, manumitted him.
§45.1.91.3Sequitur uidere de eo, quod ueteres constituerunt, quotiens culpa interuenit debitoris, perpetuari obligationem, quemadmodum intellegendum sit.
Next, we must see how we are to understand what the ancient jurists established, namely, that whenever the fault of the debtor intervenes, the obligation is perpetuated.
et quidem si effecerit promissor, quo minus soluere possit, expeditum intellectum habet constitutio: si uero moratus sit tantum, haesitatur, an, si postea in mora non fuerit, extinguatur superior mora.
And indeed, if the promisor brought it about that he could not pay, the rule is easily understood; but if he was merely in delay, it is doubted whether, if he is not in delay afterwards, the prior delay is extinguished.
et Celsus adulescens scribit eum, qui moram fecit in soluendo Sticho quem promiserat, posse emendare eam moram postea offerendo: esse enim hanc quaestionem de bono et aequo: in quo genere plerumque sub auctoritate iuris scientiae perniciose, inquit, erratur.
And the younger Celsus writes that he who was in delay in paying Stichus, whom he had promised, can purge that delay afterwards by offering performance; for he says that this question concerns the good and equitable, in which category errors are often perniciously made under the authority of jurisprudence.
et sane probabilis haec sententia est, quam quidem et Iulianus sequitur: nam dum quaeritur de damno et par utriusque causa sit, quare non potentior sit qui teneat, quam qui persequitur?
And indeed, this opinion is plausible, and Julian also follows it; for while the question concerns a loss and the case of both parties is equal, why should the position of the one who holds not be stronger than that of the one who sues?
§45.1.91.4Nunc uideamus, in quibus personis haec constitutio locum habeat.
Now let us see in which persons this rule has application.
quae inspectio duplex est, ut primo quaeramus, quae personae efficiant perpetuam obligationem, deinde quibus eam producant.
This investigation is twofold: first, we ask which persons make the obligation perpetual, and second, for whom they prolong it.
utique autem principalis debitor perpetuat obligationem: accessiones an perpetuent, dubium est.
In any case, the principal debtor perpetuates the obligation; whether accessory parties perpetuate it is doubtful.
Pomponio perpetuare placet: quare enim facto suo fideiussor suam obligationem tollat? cuius sententia uera est: itaque perpetuatur obligatio tam ipsorum quam successorum eorum.
Pomponius is of the opinion that they do perpetuate it; for why should a guarantor, by his own act, extinguish his own obligation? His opinion is correct; and therefore, the obligation is perpetuated both for themselves and for their successors.
accessionibus quoque suis, id est fideiussoribus, perpetuant obligationem, quia in totam causam spoponderunt.
They also perpetuate the obligation for their own accessories, that is, for their guarantors, because they have bound themselves for the entire cause.
§45.1.91.5An filius familias, qui iussu patris promisit, occidendo seruum producat patris obligationem, uidendum est.
We must consider whether a filius familias who promised by order of his father prolongs the father's obligation by killing the slave.
Pomponius producere putat, scilicet quasi accessionem intellegens eum qui iubeat.
Pomponius thinks that he does prolong it, evidently understanding the one who orders as an accessory party, as it were.
§45.1.91.6Effectus huius constitutionis ille est, ut adhuc homo peti possit: sed et acceptum ei posse ferri creditur et fideiussorem accipi eius obligationis nomine.
The effect of this rule is that the slave can still be sued for; but it is also believed that a release by acceptilatio can be given to him, and a guarantor can be accepted on account of that obligation.
nouari autem an possit haec obligatio, dubitationis est, quia neque hominem qui non est neque pecuniam quae non debetur stipulari possumus.
However, whether this obligation can be novated is doubtful, because we can stipulate neither for a slave who does not exist nor for money which is not owed.
ego puto nouationem fieri posse, si hoc actum inter partes sit, quod et Iuliano placet.
I think that a novation can take place if this was the intention between the parties, a view which also pleases Julian.