[PAULUS libro septuagensimo secundo ad edictum. ]
[PAULUS, On the Edict, Book 72] A transaction is contracted between the stipulator and the promisor.
§45.1.83.prInter stipulantem et promittentem negotium contrahitur. itaque alius pro alio promittens daturum facturumue cum non obligatur: nam de se quemque promittere oportet.
Therefore, one who promises on behalf of another that the other will give or do something does not obligate him; for everyone ought to promise concerning himself.
et qui spondet 'dolum malum abesse afuturumque esse', non simplex abnutiuum spondet, sed curaturum se, ut dolus malus absit: idemque in illis stipulationibus 'habere licere' item 'neque per te neque per heredem tuum fieri, quo minus fiat'. §45.1.83.1Si Stichum stipulatus de alio sentiam, tu de alio, nihil actum erit.
And he who promises "that fraud is and will be absent" does not promise a simple negative, but that he will see to it that fraud is absent; and the same applies in those stipulations "to be allowed to hold" and "that nothing will be done either by you or by your heir to prevent this." If, having stipulated for Stichus, I mean one slave and you another, nothing will have been done.
quod et in iudiciis Aristo existimauit: sed hic magis est, ut petitus uideatur, de quo actor sensit.
Aristo thought that this also applies in trials; but in this case, it is more acceptable that the one whom the plaintiff meant should be deemed to have been sued for.
nam stipulatio ex utriusque consensu ualet, iudicium autem etiam in inuitum redditur et ideo actori potius credendum est: alioquin semper negabit reus se consensisse.
For a stipulation is valid by the consent of both parties, whereas a judgment is rendered even against an unwilling party, and therefore the plaintiff is rather to be believed; otherwise, the defendant will always deny that he consented.
§45.1.83.2Si stipulante me Stichum aut Pamphilum tu unum daturum te spoponderis, constat non teneri te nec ad interrogatum esse responsum.
If, upon my stipulating for "Stichum or Pamphilus," you promise that you will give "one of them," it is established that you are not bound, and that no answer has been made to the question.
§45.1.83.3Diuersa causa est summarum, ueluti 'decem aut uiginti dari spondes?' hic enim etsi decem spoponderis, recte responsum est, quia semper in summis id, quod minus est, sponderi uidetur.
The case of sums is different, as: "Do you promise that ten or twenty shall be given?" For here, even if you promise ten, the answer is correct, because in sums, that which is less is always deemed to be promised.
§45.1.83.4Item si ego plures res stipuler, Stichum puta et Pamphilum, licet unum spoponderis, teneris: uideris enim ad unam ex duabus stipulationibus respondisse.
Likewise, if I stipulate for several things, say Stichum and Pamphilus, even though you promise only one of them, you are bound; for you are deemed to have answered one of the two stipulations.
§45.1.83.5Sacram uel religiosam rem uel usibus publicis in perpetuum relictam (ut forum aut basilicam) aut hominem liberum inutiliter stipulor, quamuis sacra profana fieri et usibus publicis relicta in priuatos usus reuerti et ex libero seruus fieri potest.
I stipulate with no effect for a sacred or religious thing, or one left forever to public use (such as a forum or a basilica), or a free person, although a sacred thing can become profane, things left to public use can return to private use, and a free person can become a slave.
nam et cum quis rem profanam aut Stichum dari promisit, liberatur, si sine facto eius res sacra esse coeperit aut Stichus ad libertatem peruenerit, nec reuocantur in obligationem, si rursus lege aliqua et res sacra profana esse coeperit et Stichus ex libero seruus effectus sit.
For also when someone has promised that a profane thing or Stichus shall be given, he is released if, without his act, the thing begins to be sacred or Stichus attains freedom; nor are they recalled into the obligation if, again by some law, the sacred thing begins to be profane and Stichus is made a slave from being a free person.
quoniam una atque eadem causa et liberandi et obligandi esset, quod aut dari non possit aut dari possit: nam et si nauem, quam spopondit, dominus dissoluit et isdem tabulis compegerit, quia eadem nauis esset, inciperet obligari.
Since there would be one and the same cause both for releasing and for obligating, namely, that it either cannot be given or can be given. For even if the owner dismantles the ship which he promised and puts it together with the same planks, because it would be the same ship, he would begin to be bound.
pro quo et illud dici posse Pedius scribit: si stipulatus fuero ex fundo centum amphoras uini, exspectare debeo, donec nascatur: et si natum sine culpa promissoris consumptum sit, rursum exspectare debeam, donec iterum nascatur et dari possit: et per has uices aut cessaturam aut ualituram stipulationem.
In support of which Pedius writes that this also can be said: if I have stipulated for a hundred amphorae of wine from a certain estate, I ought to wait until it is produced; and if, once produced, it is consumed without fault of the promisor, I ought again to wait until it is produced once more and can be given; and by these turns, the stipulation will either cease or be effective.
sed haec dissimilia sunt: adeo enim, cum liber homo promissus est, seruitutis tempus spectandum non esse, ut ne haec quidem stipulatio de homine libero probanda sit: 'illum, cum seruus esse coeperit, dare spondes?' item 'eum locum, cum ex sacro religiosoue profanus esse coeperit, dari?' quia nec praesentis temporis obligationem recipere potest et ea dumtaxat, quae natura sui possibilia sunt, deducuntur in obligationem.
But these cases are dissimilar; for indeed, when a free person is promised, the time of slavery is so little to be looked to that not even this stipulation concerning a free person is to be approved: "Do you promise to give him when he begins to be a slave?" or likewise "that place to be given when, from being sacred or religious, it begins to be profane?" because it cannot receive an obligation of the present time, and only those things which are possible by their nature are brought into an obligation.
uini autem non speciem, sed genus stipulari uidemur et tacite in ea tempus continetur: homo liber certa specie continetur.
In the case of wine, however, we are deemed to stipulate not for a specific thing but for a class, and time is tacitly contained in it; a free person is defined by a certain specific entity.
et casum aduersamque fortunam spectari hominis liberi neque ciuile neque naturale est: nam de his rebus negotium recte geremus, quae subici usibus dominioque nostro statim possunt.
And it is neither in accordance with civil law nor natural law that the mishap and adverse fortune of a free person should be expected; for we rightly conduct business concerning those things which can be immediately subjected to our use and ownership.
et nauis si hac mente resoluta est, ut in alium usum tabulae destinarentur, licet mutato consilio perficiatur, tamen et perempta prior nauis et haec alia dicenda est: sed si reficiendae nauis causa omnes tabulae refixae sint, nondum intercidisse nauis uidetur et compositis rursus eadem esse incipit: sicuti de aedibus deposita tigna ea mente, ut reponantur, aedium sunt, sed si usque ad aream deposita sit, licet eadem materia restituatur, alia erit.
And if a ship is dismantled with the intention that the planks should be destined for another use, even though it is completed upon a change of mind, nevertheless the former ship is destroyed and this must be said to be another; but if all the planks are removed for the purpose of repairing the ship, the ship is not yet deemed to have perished, and when they are put together again, it begins to be the same. Just as timbers taken down from a building with the intention of being replaced are part of the building, but if the building is taken down to the ground, even though it is rebuilt with the same materials, it will be another.
hic tractatus etiam ad praetorias stipulationes pertinet, quibus de re restituenda cauetur et an eadem res sit, quaeritur.
This discussion also relates to praetorian stipulations, in which security is given for restoring a thing, and the question is raised whether it is the same thing.
§45.1.83.6Si rem, quam ex causa lucratiua stipulatus sum, nactus fuero ex causa lucratiua, euanescit stipulatio.
If I have obtained through a lucrative cause a thing which I stipulated for through a lucrative cause, the stipulation vanishes.
sed si heres exstitero domino, extinguitur stipulatio.
But if I become the heir to the owner, the stipulation is extinguished.
si uero a me herede defunctus eam legauit, potest agi ex stipulatu: idemque esse et si sub condicione legata sit, quia et, si ipse debitor rem sub condicione legatam dedisset, non liberaretur: sed si condicione deficiente remanserit, petitio infirmabitur.
But if the deceased bequeathed it charging me as heir, an action can be brought on the stipulation. And the same is true if it is bequeathed under a condition, because even if the debtor himself had given the thing bequeathed under a condition, he would not be released; but if the condition fails and the thing remains, the claim will be invalidated.
§45.1.83.7Stichum, qui decessit, si stipuler, si quidem condici etiam mortuus potuit, ut furi, utiliter me stipulatum Sabinus ait: si uero ex aliis causis, inutiliter, quia et si deberetur, morte promissor liberetur. idem ergo diceret et si mora facta defunctum stipularer.
If I stipulate for Stichus, who has died, Sabinus says that I have stipulated with effect if indeed he could have been sued for even when dead, as in the case of a thief; but if from other causes, with no effect, because even if he were owed, the promisor would be released by his death. Therefore, he would say the same even if I stipulated for one who died after a delay was made.
§45.1.83.8Si quis ancillam sistere se in aliquo loco promiserit, quae praegnas erat, etsi sine partu eam sistat, in eadem causa eam sistere intellegitur.
If anyone has promised to present a female slave in a certain place, who was pregnant, even if he presents her without the offspring, he is understood to present her "in the same state."