[IDEM libro quinquagensimo secundo digestorum. ] §45.1.56.prEum, qui ita stipulatur: 'mihi et Titio decem dare spondes?' uero similius est semper una decem communiter sibi et Titio stipulari, sicuti qui legat Titio et Sempronio, non aliud intellegitur quam una decem communiter duobus legare.
[THE SAME, in the fifty-second book of the Digests.] When anyone stipulates in this way: 'Do you promise that ten shall be given to me and to Titius?', it is more likely that he always stipulates for one sum of ten jointly for himself and Titius, just as he who bequeaths to Titius and Sempronius is understood to do nothing else than bequeath one sum of ten jointly to the two.
'Te et Titium heredem tuum decem daturum spondes?' Titii persona superuacua comprehensa est: siue enim solus heres exstiterit, in solidum tenebitur, siue pro parte, eodem modo, quo ceteri coheredes eius, obligabitur.
'Do you promise that you and Titius, your heir, will give ten?' The person of Titius is included superfluously; for whether Titius alone becomes the heir, he will be liable for the whole, or whether he does so in part, he will be bound in the same manner as his other co-heirs.
et quamuis conuenisse uideatur, ne ab alio herede quam a Titio peteretur, tamen inutile pactum conuentum coheredibus eius erit.
And although it may seem to have been agreed that the petition should not be made from any heir other than Titius, nevertheless the agreement will be of no effect for his co-heirs.
§45.1.56.1Qui sibi aut filio suo dari stipulatur, manifeste personam filii in hoc complectitur, ut ei recte soluatur: neque interest, sibi aut extraneo cuilibet, an sibi aut filio suo quis stipuletur: quare uel manenti in potestate uel emancipato filio recte soluitur.
He who stipulates for a performance to be made to himself or to his son clearly includes the person of the son for this purpose, that payment may properly be made to him; and it makes no difference whether one stipulates for oneself or for any stranger, or for oneself or for one's son; therefore, payment is properly made to the son, whether he remains under power or is emancipated.
neque ad rem pertinet, quod qui filio suo dari stipulatur, sibi adquirit, quia coniuncta sua persona stipulator efficit, ut non adquirendae obligationis gratia, sed solutionis causa personam filii adprehendisse intellegatur.
Nor is it relevant that he who stipulates for a performance to be made to his son acquires for himself, because the stipulator, by joining his own person, brings it about that he is understood to have included the person of his son not for the sake of acquiring the obligation, but for the sake of payment.
§45.1.56.2Quod si soli filio suo, qui in potestate sua sit, dari quis stipulatus sit, non recte filio soluetur, quia filii persona obligationi magis quam solutioni applicatur.
But if anyone has stipulated for a performance to be made only to his son who is under his power, payment will not properly be made to the son, because the person of the son is applied to the obligation rather than to the payment.
§45.1.56.3Qui ita stipulatur: 'decem, quoad uiuam, dari spondes?', confestim decem recte dari petit: sed heres eius exceptione pacti conuenti summouendus est: nam stipulatorem id egisse, ne heres eius peteret, palam est, quemadmodum is, qui usque in kalendas dari stipulatur, potest quidem etiam post kalendas petere, sed exceptione pacti summouetur.
He who stipulates in this way: 'Do you promise that ten shall be given as long as I live?', immediately petitions properly that ten be given; but his heir must be barred by the exception of an agreement; for it is obvious that the stipulator acted to the effect that his heir should not petition, just as he who stipulates for a performance to be made up to the Kalends can indeed petition even after the Kalends, but is barred by the exception of an agreement.
§45.1.56.4Nam et heres eius, cui seruitus praedii ita concessa est, ut, quoad uiueret, ius eundi haberet, pacti conuenti exceptione submouebitur.
For even the heir of him to whom a praedial servitude was so granted that he should have the right of way as long as he lived will be barred by the exception of an agreement.
§45.1.56.5Qui ita stipulatur: 'ante kalendas proximas dari spondes?' nihil differt ab eo, qui 'kalendis dari' stipulatur. §45.1.56.6Qui proprietatem sine usu fructu habet, recte usum fructum dari sibi stipulatur: id enim in obligationem deducit, quod non habet, sed habere potest.
He who stipulates in this way: 'Do you promise that it shall be given before the next Kalends?' does not differ at all from him who stipulates for it 'to be given on the Kalends.' He who has ownership without the usufruct properly stipulates for the usufruct to be given to himself; for he brings into the obligation that which he does not have, but is able to have.
§45.1.56.7Si a te stipulatus fuero fundum Sempronianum, deinde eundem fundum detracto usu fructu ab alio stipulor, prior stipulatio non nouabitur, quia nec soluendo fundum detracto usu fructu liberaberis, sed adhuc a te recte fundi usum fructum peterem.
If I have stipulated with you for the Sempronian estate, and then stipulate with another for the same estate excluding the usufruct, the prior stipulation will not be novated, because you will not be released by delivering the estate excluding the usufruct, but I would still properly petition you for the usufruct of the estate.
quid ergo est? cum mihi fundum dederis, is quoque liberabitur, a quo detracto usu fructu fundum stipulatus fueram.
What then is the case? When you have given me the estate, he also will be released, from whom I had stipulated for the estate excluding the usufruct.
§45.1.56.8Si hominem, quem a Titio pure stipulatus fueram, Seius mihi sub condicione promiserit et is pendente condicione post moram Titii decesserit, confestim cum Titio agere potero, nec Seius existente condicione obligetur: at si Titio acceptum fecissem, Seius existente condicione obligari potest.
If Seius has promised me under a condition a slave whom I had stipulated for unconditionally from Titius, and, while the condition is pending, the slave dies after Titius's default, I can immediately sue Titius, and Seius will not be bound upon the fulfillment of the condition; but if I had released Titius by acceptilatio, Seius can be bound upon the fulfillment of the condition.
idcirco haec tam uarie, quod homine mortuo desinit esse res, in quam Seius obligaretur: acceptilatione interposita superest homo, quem Seius promiserat.
The reason why these cases are treated so differently is that, upon the death of the slave, the thing for which Seius would be bound ceases to exist, whereas when acceptilatio is interposed, the slave whom Seius had promised still survives.