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Justinian I · The Digest of Justinian §45.1.35.pr-45.1.35.2

Impossibility, Legal Prohibition, and Consensual Contracts

Passage 7381 of 9271 · Latin

Summary

This chunk discusses the impossibility of establishing an obligation due to natural impossibility or legal prohibition (along with exceptions), and presents the rule that consensual contracts are valid if consent exists, even without an exact verbal match in questions and answers.

[PAULUS libro duodecimo ad Sabinum. ] §45.1.35.prSi stipulor, ut id fiat, quod natura fieri non concedit, non magis obligatio consistit, quam cum stipulor ut detur quod dari non potest: nisi per quem stetit, quo minus facere id possit.
[PAUL, in the twelfth book on Sabinus.] If I stipulate that something be done which nature does not allow to be done, the obligation is no more established than when I stipulate that something be given which cannot be given: unless it was due to the person [the promisor] that he could not perform it.
§45.1.35.1Item quod leges fieri prohibent, si perpetuam causam seruaturum est, cessat obligatio, ueluti si sororem nupturam sibi aliquis stipuletur: quamquam etiamsi non sit perpetua causa, ut reccidit in sorore adoptiua, idem dicendum sit, quia statim contra mores sit.
Likewise, as to that which the laws forbid to be done, if it is to maintain a permanent impediment, the obligation is of no effect, as, for example, if someone should stipulate for his sister to marry him: although even if the impediment is not permanent, as occurs in the case of an adoptive sister, the same must be said, because it is immediately contrary to good morals.
§45.1.35.2Si in locando conducendo, uendendo emendo ad interrogationem quis non responderit, si tamen consentitur in id, quod responsum est, ualet quod actum est, quia hi contractus non tam uerbis quam consensu confirmantur.
If, in leasing and hiring, or selling and buying, anyone does not answer to a question, yet if there is consent to that which was answered, what was done is valid, because these contracts are established not so much by words as by consent.

Notes

  1. §45.1.35.prnon magis obligatio consistit, quam — A correlative construction using the comparative 'non magis ... quam ...', expressing an equal degree of negation ('no more ... than ...'). It indicates that an agreement on what nature does not permit is just as invalid as an agreement on a performance that is physically impossible.
  2. §45.1.35.prper quem stetit, quo minus — An impersonal phrase utilizing the idiom 'stare per aliquem, quo minus...' (to be the fault of someone that ... not). Here, it indicates that even if performance is naturally impossible, if the impossibility was due to the promisor's own fault ('per quem stetit'), an exception applies, rendering them liable (e.g., for damages).
  3. §45.1.35.1si perpetuam causam seruaturum est — A construction using the active future participle neuter singular 'seruaturum'. Taking the preceding relative clause 'quod leges fieri prohibent' as its subject, it expresses the condition: 'if [the forbidden act] is destined to maintain a permanent cause [of impediment]'. For instance, a prohibition on marriage based on blood relationship constitutes a 'permanent cause'.

Cite this passage

Justinian I, The Digest of Justinian §45.1.35.pr-45.1.35.2. Humanitext Reader, https://reader.humanitext.ai/en/text/urn:cts:latinLit:phi2806.phi002.humanitext-lat1:45.1.35.pr-45.1.35.2

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