[GAIUS libro secundo de uerborum obligationibus. ] §45.1.141.prSi seruus aut filius familias ita stipulatus sit: 'illam rem aut illam, utram ego uelim?', non pater dominusue, sed filius seruusue destinare de alterutra debet.
[GAIUS in his second book on verbal obligations.] If a slave or a son in power has stipulated thus: 'that thing or that, whichever I wish?', not the father or master, but the son or slave must decide which of the two.
§45.1.141.1Extranei quoque persona si comprehensa fuerit, ueluti hoc modo: 'utram earum Titius elegerit', non aliter stipulator alterutrius petendae facultatem habet, quam si Titius elegerit.
If the person of an outsider is also included, for example in this way: 'whichever of them Titius chooses', the stipulator does not otherwise have the power to demand either of the two, unless Titius has made the choice.
§45.1.141.2Pupillus licet ex quo fari coeperit, recte stipulari potest, tamen, si in parentis potestate est, ne auctore quidem patre obligatur: pubes uero, qui in potestate est, proinde ac si pater familias obligari solet.
Although a ward can legally stipulate as soon as he has begun to speak, nevertheless, if he is in the power of a parent, he is not bound even with the authorization of his father; but a pubes who is in power is usually bound just as if he were a paterfamilias.
quod autem in pupillo dicimus, idem et in filia familias impubere dicendum est.
What we say in the case of a ward must also be said of a daughter in power who is impubes.
§45.1.141.3Si ita fuero stipulatus 'mihi aut Titio?' et tu mihi daturum te spondeas, secundum omnium opinionem ad interrogatum te respondere, quia constat mihi soli adquiri obligationem, Titio autem dumtaxat recte soluitur.
If I make a stipulation in this way: 'to me or to Titius?' and you promise that you will give to me, according to the opinion of everyone you answer the question, because it is clear that the obligation is acquired by me alone, whereas payment is merely legally made to Titius.
§45.1.141.4Si inter eos, qui Romae sunt, talis fiat stipulatio: 'hodie Carthagine dare spondes?', quidam putant non semper uideri impossibilem causam stipulationi contineri, quia possit contingere, ut tam stipulator quam promissor ante aliquod tempus suo quisque dispensatori notum fecerit in eum diem futuram stipulationem ac demandasset promissor quidem suo dispensatori, ut daret, stipulator autem suo, ut acciperet: quod si ita factum fuerit, poterit ualere stipulatio.
If between people who are in Rome, such a stipulation is made: 'Do you promise to give today at Carthage?', some think that it does not always appear that an impossible condition is contained in the stipulation, because it could happen that both the stipulator and the promisor, some time beforehand, had made known to their respective business agents that there would be a stipulation for that day, and the promisor indeed had instructed his agent to give, and the stipulator his to receive; if this has been so done, the stipulation can be valid.
§45.1.141.5Cum 'mihi aut Titio' stipulor, dicitur aliam quidem rem in personam meam, aliam in Titii designari non posse, ueluti 'mihi decem aut Titio hominem': si uero Titio ea res soluta sit, quae in eius persona designata fuerit, licet ipso iure non liberetur promissor, per exceptionem tamen defendi possit.
When I stipulate 'to me or to Titius', it is said that one thing cannot be designated for my person, and another for Titius's, for instance, 'ten to me or a slave to Titius'; however, if that thing which was designated for his person has been paid to Titius, although the promisor is not released by operation of law, he can nevertheless be defended by an exception.
§45.1.141.6Tempora uero diuersa designari posse, ueluti 'mihi kalendis Ianuariis aut Titio kalendis Februariis?' immo etiam citeriorem diem in Titii personam conferri posse, ueluti 'mihi kalendis Februariis, Titio kalendis Ianuariis?' quo casu talem esse stipulationem intellegemus: 'si Titio kalendis Ianuariis non dederis, mihi kalendis Februariis dare spondes?' §45.1.141.7Sed rursus mihi quidem pure aut Titio sub condicione stipulari possum.
But different times can indeed be designated, for example 'to me on the Kalends of January or to Titius on the Kalends of February?' Indeed, even an earlier date can be assigned to Titius, for example 'to me on the Kalends of February, to Titius on the Kalends of January?' In which case we shall understand the stipulation to be as follows: 'if you do not give to Titius on the Kalends of January, do you promise to give to me on the Kalends of February?' But again, I can stipulate unconditionally to myself, or conditionally to Titius.
contra uero si mihi sub condicione aut Titio pure, inutilis erit tota stipulatio, nisi in meam personam condicio extiterit, scilicet quia, nisi quod ad me uim acceperit obligatio, adiectio nihil potest ualere.
Conversely, however, if to myself conditionally, or to Titius unconditionally, the entire stipulation will be void, unless the condition is fulfilled in my person, obviously because, unless the obligation takes effect in relation to me, the addition can have no force.
hoc tamen ita demum tractari potest, si euidenter apparet pure Titii persona adiecta: alioquin cum ita stipulor: 'si nauis ex Africa uenerit, mihi aut Titio dari spondes?' Titii quoque persona sub eadem condicione adici uidetur.
This, however, can only be treated in this way if it is clearly apparent that Titius's person was added unconditionally; otherwise, when I stipulate: 'if the ship arrives from Africa, do you promise it to be given to me or to Titius?' Titius's person also is deemed to be added under the same condition.
§45.1.141.8Ex hoc apparet, si diuersa condicio in meam personam, diuersa in Titii posita sit nec in meam personam extiterit condicio, totam stipulationem nullius momenti futuram: exstante uero mea condicione, si quidem Titii quoque condicio extiterit, poterit uel Titio solui: si uero in illius persona defecerit, quasi non adiectus habebitur.
From this it appears that if a different condition is placed on my person and a different one on Titius's, and the condition on my person is not fulfilled, the entire stipulation will be of no effect; but if my condition is fulfilled, and if Titius's condition also is fulfilled, payment can be made even to Titius; but if it fails in his case, he will be regarded as if he had not been added.
§45.1.141.9Ex his omnibus apparet, licet alterius persona non recte adiciatur, non ideo minus in nostra persona utiliter procedere stipulationem.
From all this it appears that, although the person of another is not legally added, the stipulation is nevertheless valid in our own person.