[IDEM libro uicensimo septimo quaestionum. ] §45.1.118.prLiber homo, qui bona fide seruit mihi, quod stipulanti mihi promittit, prope est, ut omnimodo sit utile, quamuis ex re mea promittat: nam quid aliud dici potest, quo minus liber homo teneatur? nec tamen ideo si stipulanti eidem ex eadem causa spondeam, tenebor: quemadmodum etenim habebit eius actionem aduersus me, quod ab alio stipulatus quaereret mihi? hoc itaque latere fructuario seruo uel alieno, qui bona fide seruit, comparabitur.
[THE SAME, book twenty-seven of Questions.] What a free person who serves me in good faith promises to me when I stipulate is close to being valid in every way, even if he promises from my own property; for what else can be said to prevent the free person from being bound? However, it does not follow from this that if I, on the same ground, make a promise to him when he stipulates, I shall be bound; for how indeed will he have an action against me for that which, had he stipulated for it from another, he would have acquired for me? Therefore, in this respect, he will be compared to a usufructuary slave or another's slave who serves in good faith.
seruus autem fructuario si promittat ex re ipsius uel alienus, qui bona fide seruit, emptori, nulla de peculio dabitur in dominum actio: nam in his causis domini esse intelleguntur.
But if a slave promises to a usufructuary from the latter's own property, or another's slave who serves in good faith promises to his purchaser, no action concerning the peculium will be granted against the owner; for in these cases, they are understood to be the owners.
§45.1.118.1'Decem hodie dari spondes?' dixi posse uel eo die pecuniam peti nec uideri praematurius agi non finito stipulationis die, quod in aliis temporibus iuris est (nam peti non debet, quod intra tempus comprehensum solui potest): in proposito enim diem non differendae actionis insertum uideri, sed quo praesens ostendatur, esse responsum.
"Do you promise that ten shall be given today?" I said that the money could be demanded even on that very day, and that the action does not seem to be brought prematurely although the day of the stipulation has not ended, which is the rule of law in other cases of time (for what can be paid within the included period ought not to be demanded); for it was answered that in the case proposed, the day seems to have been inserted not to postpone the action, but to show that it is due immediately.
§45.1.118.2'Decem mihi aut Titio, utrum ego uelim, dare spondes?' ex eo, quod mihi dandum est, certi stipulatio est, ex eo, quod illi soluendum, incerti: finge mea interesse Titio potius quam mihi solui, quoniam poenam promiseram, si Titio solutum non fuisset.
"Do you promise to give ten to me or to Titius, whichever I prefer?" From the point of view of what is to be given to me, it is a stipulation for a certain sum; from the point of view of what is to be paid to him, it is for an uncertain sum. Imagine that it is in my interest for payment to be made to Titius rather than to myself, because I had promised a penalty if payment had not been made to Titius.