[ULPIANUS libro quinquagensimo octauo ad edictum. ] §42.1.4.prSi se non optulit procurator, iudicati actio in eum denegabitur et in dominum dabitur: si se optulit, in ipsum dabitur.
[ULPIAN, in the fifty-eighth book on the Edict.] If a procurator does not offer himself, the action on the judgment will be denied against him and will be granted against the principal; if he does offer himself, it will be granted against him.
optulisse autem se liti uidetur non is, qui in rem suam procurator datus sit: nam hic alia ratione recusare iudicati actionem non potest, quia hic non in alienam, sed in suam rem procurator factus est.
However, a person who has been appointed procurator in his own affair is not deemed to have offered himself to the suit; for he cannot refuse the action on the judgment for another reason, because he was made procurator not in another's affair, but in his own.
§42.1.4.1Tutor quoque uel curator in ea condicione sunt, ut non debeant uideri se liti optulisse, idcircoque debet denegari in eos iudicati actio.
A tutor or a curator is also in such a position that they ought not to be deemed to have offered themselves to the suit, and therefore the action on the judgment ought to be denied against them.
§42.1.4.2Actor municipum potest rem iudicatam recusare: in municipes enim iudicati actio dabitur.
An agent of a municipality can refuse the judgment; for the action on the judgment will be granted against the members of the municipality.
§42.1.4.3Ait praetor: 'condemnatus ut pecuniam soluat'. a iudicato ergo hoc exigitur, ut pecuniam soluat.
The praetor says: "condemned to pay money." Therefore, what is required from the person condemned is to pay money.
quid ergo, si soluere quidem paratus non sit, satisfacere autem paratus sit, quid dicimus? et ait Labeo debuisse hoc quoque adici 'neque eo nomine satisfaciat': fieri enim posse, ut idoneum expromissorem habeat.
What then if he is not prepared to pay, but is prepared to give satisfaction; what do we say? Labeo says that this also ought to have been added: "nor shall he give satisfaction on that account"; for it is possible that he has a suitable expromissor.
sed ratio pecuniae exigendae haec fuit, quod noluerit praetor obligationes ex obligationibus fieri: idcirco ait 'ut pecunia soluatur'. ex magna tamen et idonea causa accedendum erit ad Labeonis sententiam.
But the reason for requiring money was that the praetor did not want obligations to arise out of obligations; therefore he said "that money be paid." Nevertheless, for a great and sufficient reason, we must agree with Labeo's opinion.
§42.1.4.4Si ex conuentione litigantium cautum sit post rem iudicatam ei, cui quis condemnatus est, eueniet, ut hic et retendatur, si modo nouatio intercessit: ceterum si non nouandi causa id factum est, manebit ordo exsecutionis.
If, by agreement of the litigants, security is given after the judgment to the person to whom one has been condemned, the result will be that this is relaxed, provided that a novation has intervened; but if this was not done for the purpose of novation, the order of execution will remain.
sed et si pignora accepta sint uel fideiussores in rem iudicatam, consequens erit dicere non cessare exsecutionem, quippe cum accesserit aliquid rei iudicatae, non sit a re iudicata recessum.
Moreover, if pledges have been accepted or sureties given for the judgment, it will follow to say that the execution does not cease, since something has been added to the judgment, and there has been no departure from the judgment.
idem obseruandum est in eo, cuius procurator condemnatus est.
The same must be observed in the case of a person whose procurator has been condemned.
§42.1.4.5Si quis condemnatus sit, ut intra certos dies soluat, unde ei tempus iudicati actionis computamus, utrum ex quo sententia prolata est an uero ex eo, ex quo dies statutus praeteriit? sed si quidem minorem diem statuerit iudex tempore legitimo, repletur ex lege, quod sententiae iudicis deest: sin autem ampliorem numerum dierum sua definitione iudex amplexus est, computabitur reo et legitimum tempus et quod supra id iudex praestitit.
If anyone has been condemned to pay within a certain number of days, from when do we compute the time of the action on the judgment for him: from when the sentence was pronounced, or indeed from when the established day passed? If, indeed, the judge has established a shorter day than the legal time, that which is lacking in the sentence of the judge is filled up by law; but if the judge has embraced a larger number of days in his definition, both the legal time and what the judge provided beyond it will be computed for the defendant.
§42.1.4.6Condemnatum accipere debemus eum, qui rite condemnatus est, ut sententia ualeat: ceterum si aliqua ratione sententia nullius momenti sit, dicendum est condemnationis uerbum non tenere.
We must accept as condemned one who has been duly condemned, so that the sentence is valid; but if for any reason the sentence is of no force, we must say that the word condemnation does not apply.
§42.1.4.7Soluisse accipere debemus non tantum eum, qui soluit, uerum omnem omnino, qui ea obligatione liberatus est, quae ex causa iudicati descendit.
We must accept as having paid not only the one who paid, but absolutely everyone who has been released from that obligation which flows from the cause of the judgment.
§42.1.4.8Celsus scribit, si noxali condemnatus eum seruum, in quo usus fructus alienus est, noxae dedisti, posse tecum adhuc agi iudicati: sed si usus fructus interierit, liberari ait.
Celsus writes that if, having been condemned in a noxal action, you have surrendered as noxa a slave in whom another has a usufruct, the action on the judgment can still be brought against you; but if the usufruct is extinguished, he says you are released.