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Justinian I · The Digest of Justinian §4.3.18.pr-4.3.18.5

Arbitral Restitution and Value Assessment in Fraud Actions

Passage 679 of 9271 · Latin

Summary

Paulus explains the mechanism of arbitral restitution and value condemnation in the action for fraud, showing its relationship with other legal remedies in various scenarios such as arson, lending false weights, expiration of lawsuits, and third-party destruction of a promised slave.

[PAULUS libro undecimo ad edictum. ] §4.3.18.prArbitrio iudicis in hac quoque actione restitutio comprehenditur: et nisi fiat restitutio, sequitur condemnatio quanti ea res est.
[PAULUS libro undecimo ad edictum.] In this action as well, restitution is included in the arbitrator's decision of the judge; and unless restitution is made, a condemnation for the value of the matter follows.
ideo autem et hic et in metus causa actione certa quantitas non adicitur, ut possit per contumaciam suam tanti reus condemnari, quanti actor in litem iurauerit: sed officio iudicis debet in utraque actione taxatione iusiurandum refrenari.
Moreover, the reason why a fixed sum is not added both here and in the action on the ground of fear is so that the defendant, through his own obstinacy, may be condemned for as much as the plaintiff has sworn to in the lawsuit; but by the duty of the judge, the oath must be restrained in both actions by a limitation of the amount.
§4.3.18.1Non tamen semper in hoc iudicio arbitrio iudicis dandum est: quid enim si manifestum sit restitui non posse (ueluti si seruus dolo malo traditus defunctus sit) ideoque protinus condemnari debeat in id quod intersit actoris?
However, the opportunity for the judge's arbitrator's decision should not always be given in this trial; for what if it is obvious that restitution cannot be made (for example, if a slave delivered through malicious intent has died) and therefore a condemnation ought to be made immediately for the amount of the plaintiff's interest?
§4.3.18.2Si dominus proprietatis insulam, cuius usus fructus legatus erat, incenderit, non est de dolo actio, quoniam aliae ex hoc oriuntur actiones.
If the owner of the property has burned down an apartment building whose usufruct had been bequeathed, the action for fraud does not lie, because other actions arise from this.
§4.3.18.3De eo qui sciens commodasset pondera, ut uenditor emptori merces adpenderet, Trebatius de dolo dabat actionem.
Concerning one who knowingly lent weights so that the seller might weigh goods for the buyer, Trebatius used to grant an action for fraud.
atquin si maiora pondera commnodauit, id quod amplius mercis datum est repeti condictione potest, si minora, ut reliqua merx detur ex empto agi potest: nisi si ea condicione merx uenit, ut illis ponderibus traderetur, cum ille decipiendi causa adfirmasset se aequa pondera habere.
But if he lent heavier weights, that which was given in excess of the goods can be recovered by a condictio; if lighter weights, an action on purchase can be brought so that the remaining goods may be delivered; unless the goods were sold on the condition that they should be delivered by those weights, since he had affirmed for the purpose of deceiving that he had fair weights.
§4.3.18.4Dolo cuius effectum est, ut lis temporibus legitimis transactis pereat: Trebatius ait de dolo dandum iudicium, non ut arbitrio iudicis res restituatur, sed ut tantum actor consequatur, quanti eius interfuerit id non esse factum, ne aliter obseruantibus lex circumscribatur.
Where by someone's fraud it has been brought about that a lawsuit perishes due to the expiration of the lawful time: Trebatius says that an action for fraud should be granted, not so that the matter may be restored by the arbitrator's decision of the judge, but so that the plaintiff may obtain as much as it was to his interest that this had not been done, lest otherwise the law be evaded against those who observe it.
§4.3.18.5Si seruum, quem tu mihi promiseras, alius occiderit, de dolo malo actionem in eum dandam plerique recte putant, quia tu a me liberatus sis: ideoque legis Aquiliae actio tibi denegabitur.
If another person has killed a slave whom you had promised to me, most jurists rightly think that an action for fraud should be granted against him, because you have been released from your obligation to me; and therefore, the action under the Lex Aquilia will be denied to you.

Notes

  1. §4.3.18.prArbitrio iudicis — Refers to the "arbitrator's decision (order)" of the judge. This concerns the function of the *clausula arbitraria*, showing how a condemnation based on the plaintiff's oath (*iusiurandum in litem*) is issued only if the defendant fails to comply with the judge's preliminary order for restitution.
  2. §4.3.18.1non tamen semper in hoc iudicio arbitrio iudicis dandum est — An impersonal expression (or taking `arbitrium` as subject) meaning "the opportunity for the judge's arbitrator's decision (order) should not always be given." It establishes that when restitution is physically impossible, the judge should bypass the preliminary restoration order and immediately proceed to condemnation for the plaintiff's interest (*id quod interest*).
  3. §4.3.18.3maiora pondera... si minora — The relative weights of false measures and their corresponding remedies. If the weights are heavier (`maiora`), an excess of goods is delivered to balance the scale, allowing the seller to bring a *condictio* for recovery. If lighter (`minora`), the delivery is insufficient, allowing the buyer to bring an action on purchase (*actio ex empto*). Since other remedies exist, the subsidiary action for fraud is excluded in principle.
  4. §4.3.18.4ne aliter obseruantibus lex circumscribatur — `obseruantibus` is the dative plural present participle with a noun like `legem` implied. The clause means "lest otherwise the law be evaded/circumscribed against those who observe it," ensuring that malicious actors do not escape liability and undermine the legal system by letting statutory limitations expire.
  5. §4.3.18.5quia tu a me liberatus sis — Refers to the situation where the debtor (you) who promised a specific thing (the slave) is released from the obligation to the creditor (me) because the specific thing was destroyed by a third party's unlawful act. Since the creditor (me) is not the owner, they cannot bring an action under the Lex Aquilia, but they are protected by being granted the action for fraud against the third party.

Cite this passage

Justinian I, The Digest of Justinian §4.3.18.pr-4.3.18.5. Humanitext Reader, https://reader.humanitext.ai/en/text/urn:cts:latinLit:phi2806.phi002.humanitext-lat1:4.3.18.pr-4.3.18.5

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