[ULPIANUS libro undecimo ad edictum. ] §4.3.1.prHoc edicto praetor aduersus uarios et dolosos, qui aliis offuerunt calliditate quadam, subuenit, ne uel illis malitia sua sit lucrosa uel istis simplicitas damnosa. §4.3.1.1Uerba autem edicti talia sunt: 'Quae dolo malo facta esse dicentur, si de his rebus alia actio non erit et iusta causa esse uidebitur, iudicium dabo. ' §4.3.1.2Dolum malum Seruius quidem ita definiit machinationem quandam alterius decipiendi causa, cum aliud simulatur et aliud agitur.
[ULPIANUS libro undecimo ad edictum.]\n\nBy this edict, the praetor provides a remedy against shifty and deceitful persons who have harmed others by some cleverness, so that their malice may not be profitable to the former, nor simplicity damaging to the latter.\n\nNow the words of the edict are as follows: 'Regarding those things which shall be said to have been done with malicious intent, if there is no other action concerning these matters and there seems to be a just cause, I will grant a trial.'\n\nServius indeed defined malicious intent as "a certain machination for the purpose of deceiving another, when one thing is pretended and another is done." Labeo, however, argues that it is possible even without pretense for something to be done so that someone is circumvented; and that it is possible even without malicious intent for one thing to be done and another pretended, as is done by those who, through this kind of dissimulation, preserve and protect either their own things or those of others.
Labeo autem posse et sine simulatione id agi, ut quis circumueniatur: posse et sine dolo malo aliud agi, aliud simulari, sicuti faciunt, qui per eiusmodi dissimulationem deseruiant et tuentur uel sua uel aliena: itaque ipse sic definiit dolum malum esse omnem calliditatem fallaciam machinationem ad circumueniendum fallendum decipiendum alterum adhibitam. §4.3.1.3Labeonis definitio uera est.
Therefore, Labeo himself defined malicious intent as "any cleverness, deceit, or machination employed for the purpose of circumventing, cheating, or deceiving another."\n\nLabeo's definition is correct.
Non fuit autem contentus praetor dolum dicere, sed adiecit malum, quoniam ueteres dolum etiam bonum dicebant et pro sollertia hoc nomen accipiebant, maxime si aduersus hostem latronemue quis machinetur. §4.3.1.4Ait praetor: 'si de his rebus alia actio non erit. ' merito praetor ita demum hanc actionem pollicetur, si alia non sit, quoniam famosa actio non temere debuit a praetore decerni, si sit ciuilis uel honoraria, qua possit experiri: usque adeo, ut et Pedius libro octauo scribit, etiam si interdictum sit quo quis experiri, uel exceptio qua se tueri possit, cessare hoc edictum.
Moreover, the praetor was not satisfied with just saying "intent" (dolus), but added "malicious" (malus), because the ancients spoke of even "good intent" (dolus bonus) and accepted this term for cleverness, especially if someone was machinating against an enemy or a robber.\n\nThe praetor says: 'if there is no other action concerning these matters.' Deservedly, the praetor promises this action only if there is no other, because an action involving infamy ought not to be rashly decreed by the praetor if there is a civil or honorarian action by which one can sue: to such an extent that, as Pedius also writes in his eighth book, even if there is an interdict by which one can sue, or an exception by which one can defend oneself, this edict ceases to apply.
idem et Pomponius libro uicensimo octauo: et adicit, et si stipulatione tutus sit quis, eum actionem de dolo habere non posse, ut puta si de dolo stipulatum sit. §4.3.1.5Idem Pomponius ait et si actionem in nos dari non oporteat, ueluti si stipulatio tam turpis dolo malo facta sit, ut nemo daturus sit ex ea actionem, non debere laborare, ut habeam de dolo malo actionem, cum nemo sit aduersus me daturus actionem. §4.3.1.6Idem Pomponius refert Labeonem existimare, etiam si quis in integrum restitui possit, non debere ei hanc actionem competere: et si alia actio tempore finita sit, hanc competere non debere, sibi imputaturo eo qui agere supersedit: nisi in hoc quoque dolus malus admissus sit ut tempus exiret. §4.3.1.7Si quis cum actionem ciuilem haberet uel honorariam, in stipulatum deductam acceptilatione uel alio modo sustulerit, de dolo experiri non poterit, quoniam habuit aliam actionem: nisi in amittenda actione dolum malum passus est. §4.3.1.8Non solum autem si aduersus eum sit alia actio, aduersus quem de dolo quaeritur,
Pomponius says the same in his twenty-eighth book, and adds that if someone is protected by a stipulation, he cannot have the action for fraud, as for example if there has been a stipulation against fraud.\n\nThe same Pomponius says that even if an action ought not to be granted against us—for example, if a stipulation has been made through malicious intent so shameful that no one would grant an action based on it—I ought not to trouble myself to obtain an action for malicious intent, since no one is going to grant an action against me.\n\nThe same Pomponius reports Labeo as holding that, even if someone can be restored to his original state (in integrum restitui), this action ought not to be available to him; and if another action has been barred by the lapse of time, this action ought not to be available, since the person who refrained from acting must attribute the loss to himself, unless malicious intent was also committed in this very matter so that the time would expire.\n\nIf someone, while having a civil or honorarian action, brought it into a stipulation and then extinguished it by acceptilation or in another way, he will not be able to sue for fraud, since he did have another action; unless he suffered malicious intent in the losing of that action.\n\nMoreover, not only if there is another action against the person about whose fraud inquiry is made,