[ULPIANUS libro quadragensimo nono ad edictum. ] §38.15.2.prUtile tempus est bonorum possessionum admittendarum: ita autem utile tempus est, ut singuli dies in eo utiles sint, scilicet ut per singulos dies et scierit et potuerit admittere: ceterum quacumque die nescierit aut non potuerit, nulla dubitatio est, quin dies ei non cedat.
[ULPIANUS, from the forty-ninth book on the Edict.] The time for accepting the possessions of goods is available time (tempus utile); moreover, it is available time in such a way that individual days in it are available, namely, that on each individual day one both knew and was able to accept; otherwise, on whatever day one did not know or was not able, there is no doubt that the day does not run for him.
fieri autem potest, ut qui initio scierit uel potuerit bonorum possessionem admittere, hic incipiat nescire uel non posse admittere: scilicet si, cum initio cognouisset eum intestatum decessisse, postea quasi certiore nuntio allato dubitare coeperit, numquid testatus decesserit uel numquid uiuat, quia hic rumor postea perrepserat.
However, it can happen that he who knew or was able to accept the possession of goods in the beginning, begins not to know or not to be able to accept; namely, if, although he had known in the beginning that he died intestate, he later, as if a more certain message had been brought, began to doubt whether he died testate or whether he is alive, because this rumor had later spread.
idem et in contrarium accipi potest, ut qui ignorauit initio, postea scire incipiat.
The same can also be accepted in reverse, so that he who was ignorant in the beginning, begins to know afterwards.
§38.15.2.1Dies bonorum possessionis utiles esse palam est: sed non sessionum numerabuntur, si modo ea sit bonorum possessio, quae de plano peti potuit.
It is clear that the days of the possession of goods are available days; but they will not be counted as sessions, if only it is a possession of goods which could be requested on level ground (de plano).
quod si ea, quae causae cognitionem pro tribunali desiderat uel quae decretum exposcit, sessiones erunt nobis computandae, quibus sedit is quibusque per ipsum praetorem factum non est, quo minus daret bonorum possessionem.
But if it is one that requires a trial on the tribunal or demands a decree, we must compute the sessions in which he sat and in which it was not due to the praetor himself that he did not grant the possession of goods.
§38.15.2.2In bonorum possessione, quae pro tribunali datur, illud quaeritur, si sedit quidem praetor pro tribunali, sed postulationibus non dedit: potest dici tempus ad bonorum possessionem non cedere, cum praeses aliis rebus aut militaribus aut custodiis aut cognitionibus fuerit occupatus.
In the possession of goods which is granted on the tribunal, this is questioned: if the praetor indeed sat on the tribunal but did not grant a hearing to applications, it can be said that the time for the possession of goods does not run, when the governor has been occupied with other matters, either military, or custody, or trials.
§38.15.2.3Si praeses prouinciae in proxima fuit ciuitate, accedere debet ad utilitatem temporis ratio itineris, scilicet numeratione uiginti milium passuum facta: nec enim exspectare debemus, ut praeses prouinciae ueniat ad eum, qui bonorum possessionem petiturus est.
If the governor of the province was in the nearest city, the calculation of the journey must be added to the availability of the time, namely, with a calculation of twenty miles having been made; for we ought not to expect that the governor of the province should come to him who is about to request the possession of goods.
§38.15.2.4Si uenter in possessionem missus sit, bonorum possessionis tempus non cedere sequentibus nequaquam ambigendum est, nec tantum intra centensimum diem, uerum etiam quamdiu nasci possit: nam et si natus fuerit, ante ei deferri bonorum possessionem sciendum est.
If the unborn child has been put into possession, there is no doubt at all that the time for the possession of goods does not run against subsequent heirs, and not only within the hundredth day, but also for as long as he can be born; for it must be known that even if he is born, the possession of goods is deferred to him in preference to others.
§38.15.2.5Scientiam eam obseruandam Pomponius ait, non quae cadit in iuris prudentes, sed quam quis aut per se aut per alios adsequi potuit, scilicet consulendo prudentiores, ut diligentiorem patrem familias consulere dignum sit.
Pomponius says that the knowledge to be observed is not that which falls to the jurists, but that which anyone could acquire either by himself or through others, namely, by consulting more prudent people, such as is worthy of a more diligent father of a family to consult.