[ULPIANUS libro tertio disputationum. ] §23.3.43.prLicet soleat dos per acceptilationem constitui, tamen, si ante matrimonium acceptilatio fuerit interposita nec nuptiae secutae, Scaeuola ait matrimonii causa acceptilationem interpositam non secutis nuptiis nullam esse atque ideo suo loco manere obligationem: quae sententia uera est.
[ULPIAN in the third book of discussions.] Although a dowry is customarily established by means of a formal release (acceptilatio), nevertheless, if the formal release is interposed before the marriage and the marriage does not follow, Scaevola says that the formal release interposed for the sake of marriage is void when the marriage does not follow, and therefore the obligation remains in its original position; which opinion is true.
§23.3.43.1Quotiens autem extraneus accepto fert debitori dotis constituendae causa, si quidem nuptiae insecutae non fuerint, liberatio non sequetur: nisi forte sic accepto tulit, ut uelit mulieri in totum donatum: tunc enim credendum est breui manu acceptum a muliere et marito datum: ceterum mulieri per liberam personam condictio adquiri non potest.
But whenever a third party formally releases a debtor for the sake of establishing a dowry, if indeed the marriage does not follow, release from the debt will not ensue; unless perhaps he formally released them in such a way that he wished it to be entirely gifted to the woman; for then it must be believed that it was received by the woman and given to the husband by short-hand delivery (brevi manu); otherwise, a personal action for recovery (condictio) cannot be acquired for a woman through a free person.
§23.3.43.2Plane secutis nuptiis mulier soluto matrimonio dotis exactionem habebit, nisi forte sic accepto tulit extraneus, ut ipse, quoquo modo solutum fuerit matrimonium, condictionem habeat: tunc enim non habebit mulier actionem.
Clearly, once the marriage has followed, the woman will have the right to demand the dowry upon the dissolution of the marriage, unless perhaps the third party formally released the debtor in such a way that he himself, in whatever way the marriage is dissolved, should have the personal action for recovery; for then the woman will not have the action.
secundum quae constituta dote per acceptilationem et secutis nuptiis is effectus erit dotis exactioni, ut, si quidem pura sit obligatio quae accepto lata est, non ipsa iam restituenda sit, sed soluenda dos secundum sua tempora.
According to these rules, when a dowry has been established by formal release and the marriage has followed, the effect on the demand for the dowry will be that, if indeed the obligation which was formally released was unconditional (pura), the obligation itself is not to be restored now, but the dowry is to be paid according to its own periods of time.
sin uero obligatio in diem fuit nec ante solutum matrimonium dies obligationis praeteriit, restauranda est in diem pristinum obligatio et, si debitum cum satisdatione fuerit, satisdatio renouanda est.
But if the obligation was for a certain day (in diem) and the day of the obligation did not pass before the marriage was dissolved, the obligation must be restored to its original day, and, if the debt was with security (satisdatio), the security must be renewed.
similique modo et si condicionalis fuerit obligatio quae in dotem conuersa est et pendente obligatione diuortium fuerit secutum, uerius obligationem sub eadem condicione restitui debere: sed si condicio exstiterit constante matrimonio, ex die diuortii tempora exactionis numerantur.
And in like manner, even if the obligation which was converted into a dowry was conditional, and a divorce followed while the obligation was pending, it is more correct that the obligation ought to be restored under the same condition; but if the condition was fulfilled during the existence of the marriage, the periods of time for demanding it are counted from the day of the divorce.